FIN-02-030 |
NYU Stern School of Business |
September 2002
Heitor Almeida, Murillo Campello, and Michael S. Weisbach
ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a theory of corporate liquidity demand and provides new evidence on corporate
cash policies. Firms have access to valuable investment opportunities, but potentially cannot fund
them with the use of external finance. Firms that are financially unconstrained can undertake all
positive NPV projects regardless of their cash position, so their cash positions are irrelevant. In
contrast, firms facing financial constraints have an optimal cash position determined by the value
of today’s investments relative to the expected value of future investments. The model predicts
that constrained firms will save a positive fraction of incremental cash flows, while unconstrained
firms will not. We also consider the impact of Jensen (1986) style overinvestment on the model’s
equilibrium, and derive conditions under which overinvestment a .ects corporate cash policies. We
test the model’s implications on a large sample of publicly-traded manufacturing firms over the
1981-2000 period, and find that firms classified as financially constrained save a positive fraction of
their cash flows, while firms classified as unconstrained do not. Moreover, constrained firms save a
higher fraction of cash inflows during recessions. These results are robust to the use of alternative
proxies for financial constraints, and to several changes in the empirical specification. We also find
weak evidence consistent with our agency-based model of corporate liquidity.
Heitor Almeida
Institution: Stern School of Business, New York University, 44th West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012
Telephone: (212) 998-0279
Fax: (212) 995-4233
Email: halmeida@stern.nyu.edu
Homepage:http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~halmeida
Murillo Campello
Institution: University of Illinois
Email: m-campe@uiuc.edu
Michael S. Weisbach
Institution: University of Illinois
Email: weisbach@uiuc.edu
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