FIN-02-036 |
NYU Stern School of Business |
October 2002
Paolo Pasquariello
ABSTRACT
We study the impact of Central Bank intervention on the microstructure of currency
markets. We analyze the two major channels of effectiveness of currency management
policies, imperfect substitutability and signaling, in a model of sequential
trading in which the stylized monetary authority is a rational but not necessarily
profit-maximizing player. In the context of our model and consistently with
the available empirical literature, intervention has long-lived effects on quotes
when informative about policy objectives and economic fundamentals, or when
the threat of future government action is significant and credible. A monetary
authority attempting to lean against the wind or to chase the trend of the domestic
currency is more successful when dealers compete against each other for the
incoming trades. The resulting process of intraday price formation and bid-ask
spreads are shown to depend crucially on the degree of market power held by
the forex dealers, on the sign and magnitude of the announced and realized intervention,
on the perceived likelihood of a future intervention to occur, on the transparency
of the order flow induced by the intervention, on the direction and heterogeneity
of agents' beliefs and expectations, and on the elasticity of risk-averse investors'
demand for foreign currency-denominated assets.
Paolo Pasquariello
Institution: Stern School of Business, New York University, 44th West 4th Street,
New York, NY 10012
Telephone: (212) 998-0369
Fax: (212) 995-4233
Email: ppasquar@stern.nyu.edu
Homepage:
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~ppasquar/
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