November 28, 2000
Jennifer N. Carpenter, Barbara Remmers
ABSTRACT
Insider option exercises from 1984 to 1990 precede significantly positive abnormal stock returns. During this period,
the SEC required insiders to hold the shares acquired through option exercise for at least six months. In May 1991,
the SEC removed this restriction. Using a model of optimal exercise which allows for differential income and capital
gains taxes, we show that if the executive can sell the acquired shares immediately after exercise, then bad news
can trigger an exercise but good news cannot. Consequently, the used of private information should manifest itself
as negative post-exercise abnormal stock price performance. Empirically, we find that post-exercise abnormal returns
are insignificant in the current regulatory regime. At least with regard to their exercise policies, insiders'
informational advantage appears to have little impact on executive stock option value.
Subject: Event Study Analysis, Valuation/Effect of Taxes (Theoretical, Empirical)
Carpenter: (212) 998-0352 jcarpen0@stern.nyu.edu
Remmers: (212) 998-0373 bremmers@stern.nyu.edu
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