September 14, 1999
Qi Huang and Richard M. Levich
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study a large sample of 507 privatization offerings from 39 countries over the period 1979-1996. Our objectives are twofold. First, we document the extent of short-run underpricing of these privatization offerings and measure their variation across countries, industries, and years, as well as drawing comparisons to private company IPOs. Second, we test alternative explanations of the determinants of short-run underpricing drawing on various models of maximizing behavior by underwriters, augmented by variables that proxy for national political objectives. Overall, we find support for elements of asymmetric information theory, investor sentiment theory and the reputation building hypothesis. With the exception of the Gini coefficient, our political proxy variables are typically not significant. Thus to a significant degree, the investment banking strategies believed to characterize IPOs of private companies in industrial countries may also play a role in the IPO strategies of state-owned-enterprises in both industrial and lesser developed economies.
Subject: Investments/Market efficiency; International Finance; Investments
Classification: Empirical
Huang: FINQZH@office.hofstra.edu
Levich: (212) 998-0422 rlevich@stern.nyu.edu
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