http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/nick1.jpgProf. Nicholas Economides

Stern School of Business
New York University
44 West Fourth Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
tel. (212) 998-0864, fax (212) 995-4218.

e-mail: economides@stern.nyu.edu
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/


Last Updated: 12/15/2009


Current Position: Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University.

Past / Concurrent Positions: Executive Director, NET Institute, http://www.netinst.org/, December 2002 - . Visiting Professor, Haas School, UC Berkeley, June 2007- .  January 2004 - March 2004, Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; April 2004 - August 2004, Visiting Professor, Economics Department, Stanford University; January - August 2001: Visiting Professor, Economics Department, Stanford University; Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Academic year 1996-1997: Visiting Professor, Stanford University January 1989 - August 1990: Visiting Associate Professor, Stanford University. July 1988 to August 1990: Associate Professor, Columbia University, Department of Economics. September 1981 - June 1988: Assistant Professor, Columbia University, Department of Economics. Research Assistant for Professor Andreu Mas-Colell, October 1979 - June 1981. Research Assistant for Professor David Babbel, January 1981 - August 1981. Research Assistant for Professor Richard Gilbert, October 1978 - September 1979. Teaching Assistant at the University of California, Berkeley, September 1977 - June 1980. Courses supervised: Graduate Microeconomic Theory, Intermediate Microeconomics, Introductory Economics.

Education

Ph.D. 1981, University of California, Berkeley
M.A. 1979, University of California, Berkeley
B.Sc. 1976, London School of Economics. First Class Honors

Research Interests: Industrial Organization, Network Industries, Structure of Financial Markets, Law and Economics.

Teaching Experience: Network Economics and the "New Economy" for Executive MBAs, Ph.D. level Industrial Organization, Topics in Industrial Organization, Ph.D. level Microeconomic Theory, Strategic Interaction in Markets and Industries, Undergraduate Industrial Organization, Seminar in Industrial Organization, Ph.D. level Advanced Microeconomics, MBA Microeconomics, Seminar in Microeconomics, and The New Economy, Networks, and Digital Convergence.

Biographical Information: Married.

Papers are cross-listed in the following subject categories:

[N] = Network Economics
[F] = Finance
[L] = Differentiated Products, Variety, Quality, and Location Theory

http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/lighthse.gifA. PUBLISHED AND ACCEPTED PAPERS

 

1.     [N] A Critical Appraisal of Remedies in the EU Microsoft Cases, (with Ioannis Lianos), forthcoming, Columbia Business Law Review (2010).

2.     [N] Pricing of Complementary Goods and Network Effects, (with V. Brian Viard), forthcoming, Regulation and the Economic Performance of Communication and Information Networks, Gary Madden (ed.). Edward Elgar (2010).

3.     [N] The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, (with Ioannis Lianos), Antitrust Law Journal 76/3 (2009).

4.     [N] Loyalty/Requirement Rebates and the AMC: What is the Appropriate Liability Standard?, Antitrust Bulletin vol. 54, no. 2, Summer 2009, pp. 259-279.

5.     [N] Competition Policy Issues in the Consumer Payments Industry, in Robert E. Litan and Martin Neil Baily, eds., Moving Money: The Future of Consumer Payment. Brookings Institution (2009).

6.     [N] Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing, (with Giuseppe Lopomo and Glenn Woroch), chapter 5 (pp. 62-99), in Gary Madden (ed.) The Economics of Digital Markets, Edward Elgar (2009).

7.     [N] Antitrust Issues in Network Industries, The Reform of EC Competition Law, Ioannis Kokkoris and Ioannis Lianos (eds.), Kluwer (2009).

8.     [N] On the Rise and Fall of ISPs, with Ashlesh Sharma, Nathan Silberman, and Lakshminarayanan Subramanian. Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon), 2009.

9.     Why we Need Net Neutrality, Financial Times, November 9, 2009.

10.    [N] Quantifying the Benefits of Entry into Local Phone Service,  Rand Journal of Economics, (with Katja Seim and V. Brian Viard) (2008) vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 2008 pp. 699-730.

11.    [N] Net Neutrality, Non-Discrimination, and Digital Distribution of Content Through the Internet, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 209-233 (2008).

12.    [N] Patents and Antitrust: Application to Adjacent Market, Journal on Telecommunications & High Technology Law vol. 6, pp. 455-481 (2008) (with William Hebert).

13.    [N] Public Policy in Network Industries, in Paolo Buccirossi (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008.

14.    [N] Hit and Miss: Leverage, Sacrifice, and Refusal to Deal and the Supreme Court Decision in Trinko, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law vol. 10, no.1, pp. 121-146 (2007).

15.    [N] The Economics of the Internet, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, London: Macmillan, 2007.

16.    [N] Nonbanks in the Payments System: Vertical Integration Issues, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Proceedings of the 2007 Santa Fe Conference on Payment Systems.

17.    [N]  Two-sided Competition of Proprietary vs. Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry, Management Science vol. 52, no. 7, pp. 1057-1071 (July 2006) (with Evangelos Katsamakas).

18.    [N] The Internet and Network Economics, in Eric Brousseau and Nicolas Curien (eds.) Internet and Digital Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

19.    [N] Linux vs. Windows: A Comparison of Application and Platform Innovation Incentives for Open Source and Proprietary Software Platforms (with Evangelos Katsamakas), in Juergen Bitzer and Philip J.H. Schroeder (eds.) The Economics of Open Source Software Development. Elsevier Publishers, 2006.

20.     [N] Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction, in Dennis Jansen (ed.) The New Economy and Beyond: Past, Present and Future, London: Edward Elgar, 2006.

21.    [N] Vertical Leverage and the Sacrifice Principle: Why The Supreme Court Got Trinko Wrong, New York University Annual Survey of American Law vol. 63, no. 3, (2005), pp. 379-413.

22.    [F] [N] A Parimutuel Market Microstructure for Contingent Claims Trading, (jointly with Jeffrey Lange), European Financial Management, vol. 11, no.1, (2005), pp. 25-49.

23.    [N] The Economics of the Internet Backbone, in Handbook of Telecommunications. Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers, 2006.

24.    [N] Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, in Richard R. Nelson (ed.) The Limits and Complexity of Organizations. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Press, 2005.

25.    [N] US Telecommunications Today, IS Management Handbook Brown, Carol V. and Topi, Heikki (eds.), Boca Raton: Auerbach Publications, 2003.

26.    [N] The Tragic Inefficiency of M-ECPR, A. Shampine (ed.) Down to the Wire: Studies in the Diffusion and Regulation of Telecommunications Technologies. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003.

27.    [N] Dial 'C' for Competition, SternBusiness, Fall 2003.

28.    [N] Comment of Nicholas S. Economides on the Revised Proposed Final Judgment in United States v. Microsoft, January 22, 2002.

29.    [N] The Microsoft Antitrust Case, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 7-39 (August 2001), lead article.

30.    [N] The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, pp.71-79 (August 2001).

31.     [N] United States v. Microsoft: A Failure of Antitrust in the New Economy, Symposium: Cyber Rights, Protection, and Markets, UWLA Law Review, (April 2001), lead article.

32.    [F] [N] The Impact of the Internet on Financial Markets, Journal of Financial Transformation, vol. 1, no. 1 (2001), pp. 8-13.

33.    [N] Coming Apart, Coming Together: The AT&T Breakup (Round Three) and the Remonopolization of Telecommunications, SternBusiness, Spring / Summer 2001.

34.    [N] Durable Goods Monopoly with Network Externalities with Application to the PC Operating Systems Market, Quarterly Journal of Electronic Commerce, vol. 1, no. 3 (2000).  

35.    [N] The Real Losers in the Microsoft Anti-Trust Case, SternBusiness, Spring/Summer 2000.

36.    [N] Comment on 'A Note on N. Economides: The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an Input Monopolist' by Mats Bergman, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 18 (2000), pp. 989-991.

37.    [L] Quality Choice and Vertical Integration, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 17 (1999), pp. 903-914.

38.    [N] The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its Impact, Japan and the World Economy. vol. 11 (1999), pp. 455-483, lead article.

39.    [N] US Telecommunications Today, April 1999, Handbook of IS Management 2000, Carol V. Brown (ed.). Boca Raton: Auerbach/CRC Press, 2000.

40.    [N] Real Options and the Costs of the Local Telecommunications Network, in The New Investment Theory of Real Options and its Implications for Cost Models in Telecommunications, James Alleman and Eli Noam (eds.), Kluwer, 1999. 

41.    [F] Federal Deposit Insurance: Economic Efficiency or Politics? Regulation, vol. 22, no. 3 (September 1999) (with R. Glenn Hubbard and Darius Palia).

42.    [N] The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an Input Monopolist, International Journal of Industrial Organization vol. 16 (May 1998), pp. 271-284.

43.    [L] The Max-Min-Min Principle of Product Differentiation, Journal of Regional Science vol. 38 (1998), pp. 207-230 (with Asim Ansari and Joel Steckel).

44.     [N] Equilibrium Coalition Structures in Markets for Network Goods, Annales d'Economie et de Statistique vol. 49/50 (1998), pp. 361-380 (with Fredrick Flyer).

45.    [N] The Inefficiency of the ECPR Yet Again: A Reply to Larson, The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. XLIII, no. 2, pp. 429-444 (with Lawrence J. White).

46.    [N] Competition and Vertical Integration in the Computing Industry, in Competition, Innovation, and the Role of Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Thomas M. Lenard (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.

47.    [N] U.S. Telecommunications Today, Business Economics, vol. XXXIII, no. 2 (April 1998), pp. 7-13.

48.    Trademarks, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, New York, 1998.

49.    [F] [N] [L] The Economics of Networks, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 673-699 (October 1996).

50.    [F] [L] The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition of Small and Large Banks, Journal of Law and Economics vol. XXXIX (October 1996), pp. 667-704 (with R. Glenn Hubbard and Darius Palia).

51.    [N] Network Externalities, Complementarities, and Invitations to Enter, European Journal of Political Economy vol. 12, (1996), pp. 211-232.

52.    [F] [N] [L] Special Issue on Network Economics: Business Conduct and Market Structure, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 669-671 (October 1996).

53.    [N] Regulatory Pricing Policies to Neutralize Network Dominance, Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 5, no. 4, (1996), pp. 1013-1028 (with Giuseppe Lopomo and Glenn Woroch).

54.    [F] [N] One-Way Networks, Two-Way Networks, Compatibility, and Public Policy (with Lawrence J. White), in Opening Networks to Competition: The Regulation and Pricing of Access. David Gabel and David Weiman (eds.). Kluwer Academic Press. 1996.

55.    [F] [N] Equity Trading Practices and Market Structure: Assessing Asset Managers' Demand for Immediacy, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, vol. 4, no. 4, (November 1995) pp. 1-46 (with Robert A. Schwartz).

56.    [N] Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the 'Efficient Component Pricing Rule'?, Antitrust Bulletin vol. XL, no. 3, pp. 557-579 (1996), (with Lawrence J. White).

57.    [F] [N] Electronic Call Market Trading, Journal of Portfolio Management, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 10-18, (Spring 1995) (with Robert Schwartz).

58.    [F] [N] Critical Mass and Network Evolution in Telecommunications, with Charles Himmelberg, Toward a Competitive Telecommunications Industry: Selected Papers from the 1994 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Gerard Brock (ed.), 1995.

59.    [N] The Quality of Complex Systems and Industry Structure, with Bill Lehr, in William Lehr (ed.), Quality and Reliability of Telecommunications Infrastructure. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994.

60.    [F] [N] How to Enhance Market Liquidity, in R. Schwartz (ed.) Global Equity Markets, New York: Irwin Professional, 1995.

61.    [F] [N] Making the Trade: Equity Trading Practices and Market Structure, TraderForum, Institutional Investor (with Robert Schwartz).

62.    [F] [N] Commentary on Antitrust Economics of Credit Card Networks, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review November- December 1995, pp. 60-63.

63.    [L] Competitive Positioning with Non-Uniform Preferences, Marketing Science, vol. 13, no. 3, (Summer 1994), pp. 248-273 (with Asim Ansari and Avijit Ghosh).

64.    [F] [N] Networks and Compatibility: Implications for Antitrust, European Economic Review, vol. 38, (March 1994), pp. 651-662 (with Lawrence J. White).

65.    Comments on 'Ranking Alternative Trade-Restricting Policies Under Duopoly', by Jota Ishikawa, Japan and the World Economy, vol. 6, (1994), pp. 171-173.

66.    Quantity Leadership and Social Inefficiency, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 11, no. 2, (1993), pp. 219-237.

67.    [L] Quality Variations in the Circular Model of Differentiated Products, Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 23, no. 2 (1993), pp. 235-257.

68.    [L] Hotelling's 'Main Street' With More Than Two Competitors, (1993), Journal of Regional Science, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 303-319.

69.    [F] [N] Network Economics with Application to Finance, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, vol. 2, no. 5, (December 1993), pp. 89-97.

70.    [L] Differentiated Public Goods: Privatization and Optimality, (1993), with Susan Rose-Ackerman, in Does Economic Space Matter? Essays in Honour of Melvin L. Greenhut, edited by H. Ohta & J.-F. Thisse. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

71.    [N] A Monopolist's Incentive to Invite Competitors to Enter in Telecommunications Services, in Gerard Pogorel (ed.), Global Telecommunications Strategies and Technological Changes, pp. 227-239, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1993.

72.    [F] Proposal to the Bank of Greece on the Organization of Primary and Secondary Markets in Greek State Bills, Notes, and Bonds.

73.    [N] Competition and Integration Among Complements, and Network Market Structure, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. XL, no. 1 (1992), pp. 105-123 (with Steven C. Salop).

74.    [F] [N] Liquidity and Markets, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Finance, London: Macmillan, 1992.

75.    [F] [N] [L] Compatibility and the Creation of Shared Networks, in Electronic Services Networks: A Business and Public Policy Challenge, edited by Margaret Guerin-Calvert and Steven Wildman, Praeger Publishing Inc., New York: 1991.

76.    [N] Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network Externalities, American Economic Review, vol. 79, (December 1989), no. 5, pp. 1165-1181.

77.    [L] Symmetric Equilibrium Existence and Optimality in Differentiated Products Markets, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 47, no.1 (1989), pp. 178-194.

78.    [L] Quality Variations and Maximal Product Differentiation, Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 19, (1989), pp. 21-29.