Prof. Nicholas Economides
Last Updated: 12/15/2009
Current Position: Professor of Economics,
Past / Concurrent Positions: Executive Director, NET Institute, http://www.netinst.org/, December 2002 - .
Visiting Professor,
Education
Ph.D. 1981, University of California,
Berkeley
M.A. 1979, University of California, Berkeley
B.Sc. 1976, London School of Economics. First Class Honors
Research Interests: Industrial Organization, Network Industries, Structure of Financial Markets, Law and Economics.
Teaching Experience: Network Economics and the "New Economy" for Executive MBAs, Ph.D. level Industrial Organization, Topics in Industrial Organization, Ph.D. level Microeconomic Theory, Strategic Interaction in Markets and Industries, Undergraduate Industrial Organization, Seminar in Industrial Organization, Ph.D. level Advanced Microeconomics, MBA Microeconomics, Seminar in Microeconomics, and The New Economy, Networks, and Digital Convergence.
Biographical Information: Married.
Papers are cross-listed in the following subject categories:
[N] = Network
Economics
[F] = Finance
[L] =
Differentiated Products, Variety, Quality, and Location Theory
1. [N] A
Critical Appraisal of Remedies in the EU Microsoft Cases, (with Ioannis
Lianos), forthcoming, Columbia Business
Law Review (2010).
2. [N] Pricing
of Complementary Goods and Network Effects, (with V. Brian Viard), forthcoming,
Regulation and the Economic Performance of
Communication and Information Networks, Gary Madden (ed.). Edward Elgar (2010).
3. [N]
The
Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at
the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, (with Ioannis Lianos), Antitrust
Law Journal 76/3 (2009).
4. [N]
Loyalty/Requirement
Rebates and the AMC: What is the Appropriate Liability Standard?, Antitrust
Bulletin vol. 54, no. 2, Summer 2009, pp. 259-279.
5.
[N] Competition
Policy Issues in the Consumer Payments Industry, in Robert E. Litan and
Martin Neil Baily, eds., Moving Money:
The Future of Consumer Payment. Brookings Institution (2009).
6.
[N] Strategic Commitments
and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing, (with Giuseppe
Lopomo and Glenn Woroch), chapter 5 (pp. 62-99), in Gary Madden (ed.) The
Economics of Digital Markets, Edward Elgar (2009).
7. [N] Antitrust
Issues in Network Industries, The
Reform of EC Competition Law,
Ioannis Kokkoris and Ioannis Lianos (eds.), Kluwer (2009).
8. [N]
On the Rise and Fall of ISPs,
with Ashlesh Sharma, Nathan Silberman, and Lakshminarayanan Subramanian. Economics of Networks, Systems and
Computation (NetEcon), 2009.
9.
Why
we Need Net Neutrality, Financial
Times, November 9, 2009.
10. [N]
Quantifying
the Benefits of Entry into Local Phone Service, Rand Journal of
Economics, (with Katja Seim
and V. Brian Viard) (2008)
vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 2008 pp. 699-730.
11. [N]
Net Neutrality, Non-Discrimination, and Digital Distribution of Content Through
the Internet, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society vol.
4, no. 2, pp. 209-233 (2008).
12. [N] Patents
and Antitrust: Application to Adjacent Market, Journal on
Telecommunications & High Technology Law vol. 6, pp. 455-481 (2008)
(with William Hebert).
13. [N]
Public
Policy in Network Industries, in Paolo Buccirossi (ed.), Handbook of
Antitrust Economics, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008.
14. [N] Hit and Miss:
Leverage, Sacrifice, and Refusal to Deal and the Supreme Court Decision in Trinko,
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law vol. 10,
no.1, pp. 121-146 (2007).
15. [N]
The
Economics of the Internet, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
London: Macmillan, 2007.
16. [N]
Nonbanks
in the Payments System: Vertical Integration Issues, Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City. Proceedings of the 2007 Santa Fe Conference on Payment Systems.
17. [N]
Two-sided
Competition of Proprietary vs. Open Source Technology Platforms and the
Implications for the Software Industry, Management Science vol. 52,
no. 7, pp. 1057-1071 (July 2006) (with Evangelos Katsamakas).
18. [N]
The
Internet and Network Economics, in Eric Brousseau and Nicolas Curien (eds.)
Internet and Digital Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006.
19. [N]
Linux
vs. Windows: A Comparison of Application and Platform Innovation Incentives for
Open Source and Proprietary Software Platforms (with Evangelos Katsamakas), in
Juergen Bitzer and Philip J.H. Schroeder (eds.) The Economics of Open Source
Software Development. Elsevier Publishers, 2006.
20. [N] Competition
Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction, in Dennis Jansen (ed.)
The New Economy and Beyond: Past, Present and Future, London: Edward Elgar,
2006.
21. [N] Vertical
Leverage and the Sacrifice Principle: Why The Supreme Court Got Trinko
Wrong, New York University Annual Survey of American Law vol. 63,
no. 3, (2005), pp. 379-413.
22. [F] [N] A Parimutuel
Market Microstructure for Contingent Claims Trading, (jointly with Jeffrey
Lange), European Financial Management, vol. 11, no.1, (2005), pp. 25-49.
23. [N]
The
Economics of the Internet Backbone, in Handbook of Telecommunications.
Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers, 2006.
24. [N] Telecommunications
Regulation: An Introduction, in Richard R. Nelson (ed.) The Limits and
Complexity of Organizations. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Press, 2005.
25. [N]
US
Telecommunications Today, IS Management Handbook Brown, Carol V. and
Topi, Heikki (eds.), Boca Raton: Auerbach Publications, 2003.
26. [N] The Tragic
Inefficiency of M-ECPR, A. Shampine (ed.) Down to the Wire: Studies in
the Diffusion and Regulation of Telecommunications Technologies. New York:
Nova Science Publishers, 2003.
27. [N]
Dial
'C' for Competition, SternBusiness, Fall 2003.
28. [N] Comment
of Nicholas S. Economides on the Revised Proposed Final Judgment in United
States v. Microsoft, January 22, 2002.
29. [N] The
Microsoft Antitrust Case, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade:
From Theory to Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 7-39 (August 2001), lead article.
30. [N] The
Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder, Journal of Industry, Competition
and Trade: From Theory to Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, pp.71-79 (August 2001).
31. [N] United States
v. Microsoft: A Failure of Antitrust in the New Economy, Symposium: Cyber Rights, Protection, and Markets,
UWLA Law Review,
(April 2001), lead article.
32. [F] [N] The
Impact of the Internet on Financial Markets, Journal of Financial
Transformation, vol. 1, no. 1 (2001), pp. 8-13.
33. [N] Coming
Apart, Coming Together: The AT&T Breakup (Round Three) and the Remonopolization
of Telecommunications, SternBusiness, Spring / Summer 2001.
34. [N] Durable Goods Monopoly
with Network Externalities with Application to the PC Operating Systems Market,
Quarterly Journal of Electronic Commerce, vol. 1, no. 3
(2000).
35. [N]
The Real Losers
in the Microsoft Anti-Trust Case, SternBusiness, Spring/Summer 2000.
36. [N] Comment
on 'A Note on N. Economides: The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an
Input Monopolist' by Mats Bergman, International Journal of Industrial
Organization, vol. 18 (2000), pp. 989-991.
37. [L] Quality
Choice and Vertical Integration, International Journal of Industrial
Organization, vol. 17 (1999), pp. 903-914.
38. [N] The Telecommunications Act
of 1996 and its Impact, Japan and the World Economy. vol. 11 (1999),
pp. 455-483, lead article.
39. [N] US Telecommunications
Today, April 1999, Handbook of IS Management 2000, Carol V. Brown
(ed.). Boca Raton: Auerbach/CRC Press, 2000.
40. [N]
Real Options and the Costs
of the Local Telecommunications Network, in The New Investment Theory of
Real Options and its Implications for Cost Models in Telecommunications,
James Alleman and Eli Noam (eds.), Kluwer, 1999.
41. [F] Federal Deposit
Insurance: Economic Efficiency or Politics? Regulation, vol. 22, no.
3 (September 1999) (with R. Glenn Hubbard and Darius Palia).
42. [N] The
Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an Input Monopolist, International
Journal of Industrial Organization vol. 16 (May 1998), pp. 271-284.
43. [L] The Max-Min-Min Principle of
Product Differentiation, Journal of Regional Science vol. 38 (1998),
pp. 207-230 (with Asim Ansari and Joel Steckel).
44. [N] Equilibrium
Coalition Structures in Markets for Network Goods, Annales d'Economie et de
Statistique vol. 49/50 (1998), pp. 361-380 (with Fredrick Flyer).
45. [N] The Inefficiency of the ECPR
Yet Again: A Reply to Larson, The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. XLIII,
no. 2, pp. 429-444 (with Lawrence J. White).
46. [N]
Competition
and Vertical Integration in the Computing Industry, in Competition,
Innovation, and the Role of Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, Jeffrey
A. Eisenach and Thomas M. Lenard (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
47. [N] U.S. Telecommunications
Today, Business Economics, vol. XXXIII, no. 2 (April 1998), pp.
7-13.
48. Trademarks, in
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, New York, 1998.
49. [F] [N] [L] The Economics of Networks,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 14, no. 6, pp.
673-699 (October 1996).
50. [F] [L] The
Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of
Monopolistic Competition of Small and Large Banks, Journal of Law
and Economics vol. XXXIX (October 1996), pp. 667-704 (with R. Glenn Hubbard
and Darius Palia).
51. [N] Network Externalities,
Complementarities, and Invitations to Enter, European Journal of
Political Economy vol. 12, (1996), pp. 211-232.
52. [F] [N] [L] Special Issue on
Network Economics: Business Conduct and Market Structure, International
Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 669-671 (October
1996).
53. [N] Regulatory Pricing Policies
to Neutralize Network Dominance, Industrial and Corporate Change,
vol. 5, no. 4, (1996), pp. 1013-1028 (with Giuseppe Lopomo and Glenn Woroch).
54. [F] [N] One-Way
Networks, Two-Way Networks, Compatibility, and Public Policy (with Lawrence
J. White), in Opening Networks to Competition: The Regulation and Pricing of
Access. David Gabel and David Weiman (eds.). Kluwer Academic Press. 1996.
55. [F] [N] Equity
Trading Practices and Market Structure: Assessing Asset Managers' Demand for
Immediacy, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, vol.
4, no. 4, (November 1995) pp. 1-46 (with Robert A. Schwartz).
56. [N] Access
and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the 'Efficient Component Pricing
Rule'?, Antitrust Bulletin vol. XL, no. 3, pp. 557-579 (1996), (with
Lawrence J. White).
57. [F] [N] Electronic
Call Market Trading, Journal of Portfolio Management, vol. 21, no.
3, pp. 10-18, (Spring 1995) (with Robert Schwartz).
58. [F] [N] Critical Mass and Network
Evolution in Telecommunications, with Charles Himmelberg, Toward a
Competitive Telecommunications Industry: Selected Papers from the 1994
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Gerard Brock (ed.), 1995.
59. [N] The
Quality of Complex Systems and Industry Structure, with Bill Lehr, in
William Lehr (ed.), Quality and Reliability of Telecommunications Infrastructure.
Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994.
60. [F] [N] How to Enhance Market
Liquidity, in R. Schwartz (ed.) Global Equity Markets, New York:
Irwin Professional, 1995.
61. [F] [N] Making the Trade: Equity
Trading Practices and Market Structure, TraderForum,
Institutional Investor (with Robert Schwartz).
62. [F] [N] Commentary on Antitrust
Economics of Credit Card Networks, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review November- December 1995, pp. 60-63.
63. [L] Competitive
Positioning with Non-Uniform Preferences, Marketing Science, vol.
13, no. 3, (Summer 1994), pp. 248-273 (with Asim Ansari and Avijit Ghosh).
64. [F] [N] Networks
and Compatibility: Implications for Antitrust, European Economic Review,
vol. 38, (March 1994), pp. 651-662 (with Lawrence J. White).
65. Comments
on 'Ranking Alternative Trade-Restricting Policies Under Duopoly', by Jota
Ishikawa, Japan and the World Economy, vol. 6, (1994), pp.
171-173.
66. Quantity
Leadership and Social Inefficiency, International Journal of
Industrial Organization, vol. 11, no. 2, (1993), pp. 219-237.
67. [L] Quality
Variations in the Circular Model of Differentiated Products, Regional
Science and Urban Economics, vol. 23, no. 2 (1993), pp. 235-257.
68. [L] Hotelling's
'Main Street' With More Than Two Competitors, (1993), Journal of
Regional Science, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 303-319.
69. [F] [N] Network Economics with
Application to Finance, Financial Markets, Institutions &
Instruments, vol. 2, no. 5, (December 1993), pp. 89-97.
70. [L] Differentiated
Public Goods: Privatization and Optimality, (1993), with Susan
Rose-Ackerman, in Does Economic Space Matter? Essays in Honour of Melvin L.
Greenhut, edited by H. Ohta & J.-F. Thisse. New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1993.
71. [N] A Monopolist's Incentive to
Invite Competitors to Enter in Telecommunications Services, in Gerard
Pogorel (ed.), Global Telecommunications Strategies and Technological
Changes, pp. 227-239, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1993.
72. [F] Proposal to the Bank
of Greece on the Organization of Primary and Secondary Markets in Greek State
Bills, Notes, and Bonds.
73. [N] Competition
and Integration Among Complements, and Network Market Structure, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.
XL, no. 1 (1992), pp. 105-123 (with Steven C. Salop).
74. [F] [N] Liquidity and
Markets, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Finance, London: Macmillan,
1992.
75. [F] [N] [L] Compatibility
and the Creation of Shared Networks, in Electronic Services Networks: A
Business and Public Policy Challenge, edited by Margaret Guerin-Calvert and
Steven Wildman, Praeger Publishing Inc., New York: 1991.
76. [N] Desirability
of Compatibility in the Absence of Network Externalities, American
Economic Review, vol. 79, (December 1989), no. 5, pp. 1165-1181.
77. [L] Symmetric
Equilibrium Existence and Optimality in Differentiated Products Markets, Journal
of Economic Theory, vol. 47, no.1 (1989), pp. 178-194.
78. [L] Quality
Variations and Maximal Product Differentiation, Regional Science and
Urban Economics, vol. 19, (1989), pp. 21-29.