Market Design with Blockchain Technology

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And the second second second second



McMaster

University



source: coinschedule (data from Sept 5, 2018)2.1

1. Multiple Trading Protocols are possible

BALANCE		BNT -					Chat 🖉 H	lelp 👻 🚯 Tokens 👻	Smart Contract	🖄 English 👻 🔐	Select account ·	nt ~
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BNT

2. High Level of Transparency

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TokenTracker Summary					Reputation OK		
Total Supply: 78,119,	117 . 3153 BNT (\$193,860,401.	53)	Contract Address: 0x1f573d6fb3f13d689ff844b4ce37794d79a7ff1c				
Value per Token: \$2.4816	6 @ 0.008665 Eth (-7.61%)		Token Decimals:	18			
Token Holders: 12842 a	Token Holders: 12842 addresses				8 🖸 🕸 ¥ \$		
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8 mins ago

3. You can tell who owns what

TokenTracker	Summary			Reputation OK 👍
Total Supply:	78,119,117.3153 BNT (\$193,860,401.53)	Contract Address:	0x1f573d6fb3f13d689ff844b4ce3	7794d79a7ff1c
Value per Toke	en: \$2.4816 @ 0.008665 Eth (-7.61%)	Token Decimals:	18	
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Rank	Address		Quantity	Percentage
1	0x5894110995b8c8401bd38262ba0c8ee41d4e4658		15865957	20.3103%
2	0x79e7ccb8e7a61ad4781c98864c40e380bb10dd26		14312616.4803711	18.3218%
3	0xad04835b1129c08be6093d683d725ff82cd24036		10539657.098791	13.4920%
4	0x7af1362060ec77ca30be2508cce10169210393ee		7853648.22	10.0536%
5	0xfbb1b73c4f0bda4f67dca266ce6ef42f520fbb98		4227754.51610493	5.4120%
6	0x7bb42206cddc93380ed1115d15fb1e65a1d754fc		1312102.22092	1.6796%
7	0x0c43eb0b18774a15bca2e639ba470796147b8d24		1207481.05212123	1.5457%
8	0x31fc2dbe295a8570b69c09c5aaec33459fc1a1b3		750000	0.9601%
9	0x696618b03604354787b631695bfc9d14c203360a		659100.152343954	0.8437%
10	0x86842054dd8802519dc7dcc458dc9311c1434639		426100	0.5455%

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Rank	Address		. +	Percentage	
1	0x5894110995b8c8401bd38262ba0c8ee41d4e4t	OWIS d IC		20.3103%	
2	0x79e7ccb8e7a61ad4781c98864c40e380bb10dd26		لىر3711	18.3218%	
3	0xad04835b1129c08be6093d683d725ff82cd24036		10539657.098791	13.4920%	
4	0x7af1362060ec77ca30be2508cce10169210393ee	;	7853648.22	10.0536%	
5	0xfbb1b73c4f0bda4f67dca266ce6ef42f520fbb98		4227754.51610493	5.4120%	
6	0x7bb42206cddc93380ed1115d15fb1e65a1d754fc		1312102.22092	1.6796%	
7	0x0c43eb0b18774a15bca2e639ba470796147b8d24		1207481.05212123	1.5457%	
8	0x31fc2dbe295a8570b69c09c5aaec33459fc1a1b3	;	750000	0.9601%	
9	0x696618b03604354787b631695bfc9d14c203360a	(659100.152343954 0.8437%		
10	0x86842054dd8802519dc7dcc458dc9311c1434639		426100	0.5455%	

Frictionless peer-topeer trading



Informational environment changes drastically

Frictionless peer-topeer trading



Informational environment changes drastically

Key: wallets/addresses = IDs but NOT = traders

Frictionless peer-topeer trading



Informational environment changes drastically

Key: wallets/addresses = IDs but NOT = traders



How does the design of ledger transparency and identifier-usage with possible P2P interactions affect trading behavior and economic outcomes?

Literature

- Economics of blockchain protocols and transaction costs
 - there is a large literature in computer science, e.g., Eyal and Sirer (2014)
 - Gans and Halaburda (2015); and Halaburda and Gandel (2016)
 - Budish (2018), Saleh (2017), Biais, Bidiere, Bouvard, Casamatta (2018)
 - Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi (2017), Easley, O'Hara, Basu (2018)
- Smart contracts and other uses of blockchain
 - Cong and He [2017], Yermack (2017)
- Blockchain and financial securities/markets
 - Boehm et al [2015]; Harvey [2016], Raskin and Yermack [2016; 2017]; Aune, Krellenstein, O'Hara, and Slama [2017]

Model Ingredients

- Risky asset, normally distributed
- Two large investors, one hit by liquidity shock, repeated interactions
- Continuum of small investors, half buys, half sells
- Shocked "liquidity trader" (LT) may trade
 - peer-to-peer with other large
 - with many small
 - with risk-averse intermediary

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inefficient risk transfer

Direct Costs

Data processing to contact small

• Linear *mining/validation* cost

Liquidity Providing peer may front-run Liquidity Trader

Indirect Costs

Benchmark: fully transparent (single ID) ownership

Requires a system design choice:

• allow an entity (individual,

ID per instrument

possible with private

investment fund) only a single

blockchain or ICO contracts.

Trade with small investors and intermediary

Trade with the large liquidity provider ("LP")

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- costs:
 - complexity + validation
 - Intermediation

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costs

LT may get "front-run" by LP

Single shot: LP extracts all surplus **Repeated setting:**

Front-running is punished by "grim trigger"



Trade with small investors and intermediary

Trade with the large liquidity provider ("LP")

Equilibrium

- "social norms" have bite: LT always trades with LP; share cost savings.
- Price concession: none for frequent interactions (=large enough discount factor)

Sarpias

grim trigger

Opaque single ID ownership



Opaque single ID ownership

Equilibrium

- %IDs contacted independent of intermediary's inventories, but depends on:
 - probability of small accepting
 - (il-)liquidity of intermediated market
 - complexity/data processing costs.
- For non-large validation cost, **LT** trades with small (and intermediary)

Opaque multi-ID ownership



Opaque multi-ID ownership

Closest and native to "public" blockchains:

- anyone can participate anonymously
- can create as many accounts as I want
- described by Ethereum founder as simple solution to achieve privacy
- private blockchains can choose to organize like this

Acceptance Probabilities in Opaque Settings



Decision problem LT

"target" IDs of both: large and small

- price concession "wasted" on small
- complexity costs: high
- intermediary costs: low

"target" small investors only

- no price concession
- complexity costs: low
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Equilibrium & More

Theorem: There exists an equilibrium with no front-running where:

- LP accepts
- price concession = 0

provided:

- frequent interactions
- or very liquid intermediated market (front running hard)
- or high validation costs (front running expensive)

Equilibrium & More

Theorem: There exists an equilibrium with no front-running where:

- LP accepts
- price concession = 0

Result 2 (numerical): For infrequent interactions, the equilibrium with no front-running where **LP** accept does *not* exist. Then:

- In equilibrium, LT offers p = 0 to the continuum, and
- LP's IDs reject the offer.

=> "over-trading" with intermediary

• Note: an increase in the validation cost may curb frontrunning.



Observations

- Intermediary involved \Rightarrow social inefficiency
- Small with large traders \Rightarrow complexity costs
- \Rightarrow Best if large interact
- payoffs under the full transparency highest *by construction*.



1. Large traders do interact:

- welfare single ID < welfare multi-ID
- payoff to large multi-ID (assume price=0) > payoff large single ID



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 - welfare single ID = welfare multi-ID.
 - payoff to large with single ID > payoff large multi-ID
- 3. (Numerical) *J* parametric configurations with
 - large interact in multi-ID & p > 0 s.t.
 - payoff to large with single ID > payoff large multi-ID

Summary

1. Blockchain="Back office" tech **with front office implications**!

- with peer-to-peer there are critical design choices
 - Who can see the ledger?
 - How are virtual identities managed?
- 2. Findings:
 - Transparent ledger with single IDs is welfare optimal and has lowest wealth redistribution (almost by construction)
 - Between (A) public blockchain solution with multiple IDs and (B) private, non-transparent ledger with single IDs:
 - public blockchain privacy solution has higher aggregate welfare
 - but does not necessarily lead to higher payoffs for large investors.