Algorithmic Trading and Minimum Trading Unit Restriction

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September 3, 2017

Abstract

Algorithmic (algo) traders use their advantage of speed to execute a large number of small-sized trades in a very short time. In the presence of minimum trading unit (MTU) restriction, they are forced to trade at the smallest possible sizes - often restricted by the MTU. Using a novel dataset of single stock futures market obtained from National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India, we show that MTU restriction acts as a binding constraint for traders while optimizing trade sizes. We also find that this restriction is more binding for algorithmic traders who participate in more than two-thirds of all the trades. We inspect the impact of a market-wide upward revision in minimum contract size on trading behavior in the Indian market during 2015. We find that algo traders continue to trade at the minimum possible sizes, but the difference in trade sizes between algo and non-algo trades reduce due to the revision. Overall traded volume seems to be largely unaffected by the contract size revision. However, we do observe a significant negative shock due to the announcement of contract size revision on traded volume.

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1   Introduction

Exchanges all over the world often impose a restriction on the minimum size of a trade. This restriction can be either imposed by explicitly specifying the minimum trading unit (MTU) for a security or by specifying the minimum size of a traded contract. Specification of MTU or minimum contract size is an intriguing question as it requires a consideration of trade-off between transaction cost and volume (Karagozoglu & Martell, 1999). While lower contract size can increase the transaction cost, higher contract size may force out certain market participants. In the absence of any trade size restrictions, traders are faced with a task to determine the optimum trade size that balances between impact cost and transaction cost. Presence of trade size restriction can, however, significantly impact this optimization exercise. Our objective in this paper is to observe how the trading behavior of different group of traders, more specifically algorithmic traders, is impacted in presence of trade size restrictions. Existing academic literature on trade size restriction primarily focuses on the reduction in contract size or MTU (Karagozoglu & Martell, 1999; Karagozoglu, Martell, & Wang, 2003) and its impact on improving liquidity, in terms of increase in traded volume or reduced bid-ask spread and vice-versa. Reduction in MTU (Amihud, Mendelson, & Uno, 1999; Hauser & Lauterbach, 2003a) is also seen to increase the number of individual shareholders and appreciation in share price, which is consistent with Merton (1987). However, we do not find any empirical study relating trade size restriction to trading behavior.

Trading behavior of algorithmic traders in a market with trade size restriction provides an interesting scenario. Algorithmic traders gain competitive advantage through their ability to execute a large number of small-sized trades in a small period. We base our analysis on the Indian derivatives market for single stock futures (SSF). We also use a natural experiment provided by the upward revision of minimum contract size as proposed by the Indian capital market regulator SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) in 2015, to observe how market participants react to such exogenous shocks. With the

introduction of de-materialized trading in the equity market in 1999, most of the trading in the Indian equity market at present is carried out in the paperless format with no concept of trading lots or minimum trading unit (MTU). Traders can buy or sell single units of equity shares. In the derivatives segment, however, the concept of trading in lots is still in vogue where the lot sizes are specific to an underlying security. We also look at how a market-wide upward revision of contract size revision affects traded volume in the SSF market.

With the introduction of algorithmic trading in various exchanges, presently a significant proportion of trades are initiated automatically from computer terminals without any real-time manual intervention. This paradigm shift in trading mechanism has led traders to adopt appropriate trading strategies to minimize impact costs. Over the last decade and a half, the average trade size in exchanges over the globe has significantly reduced [1] (Angel, Harris, & Spatt, 2011; O'Hara, Yao, & Ye, 2014), owing much of it to the increase in algorithmic trading activity. Aitken, Cumming, and Zhan (2014) show that introduction of Algo trading and High Frequency trading (HFT), proxied by colocation services, significantly impacts trade sizes. Traders often face the challenge to choose optimum trade sizes with the objective of reducing overall impact cost and transaction cost (Bertsimas & Lo, 1998), especially when faced with the problem of buying or selling a pre-defined quantity. Algorithmic traders use their advantage of speed to split a larger order into smaller segments so that the price impact is lowest. They are more likely to carry out a number of small trades throughout the day rather than a few bulk trades. Algo traders are also mostly intra-day traders who would rarely carry over their positions [2]. In this context, it may not be wise to assume that events such as contract size revision will affect all trader groups (algo vs. non-algo) uniformly.

Our work tries to draw from the existing strands of literature on algorithmic trading and minimum contract size. We look at how minimum contract size specification affects trading strategy for algorithmic traders vis-a-vis non-algorithmic traders. To the best

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[1] Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) release 34-61358, 2010

[2] This feature is more pronunced in case of High Frequency Trdaers

of our knowledge, this paper provides first empirical evidence of how a market-wide upward revision of minimum contract size impacts various group of traders. Using a novel intra-day dataset obtained from the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE), we can decompose the trading data for different trader groups namely proprietary, custodians and non-proprietary non-custodians (NCNP) traders. The dataset also allows to identify trades that were automatically generated from algorithmic trading terminals. We observe that algorithmic traders try to trade at the smallest possible trade sizes, limited by the MTU. Institutional investors, who have been known to trade on information, are observed to trade at relatively larger trade sizes while not using algorithms to execute their trades. While using algorithms, however, they are seen to trade at much smaller trade sizes, possibly to reduce the chances of being front-run.

The announcement by the regulator SEBI to increase minimum contract size had created a lot of hue and cry in the market, speculating that this move could force out retail traders from the market [3] [4]. Considering that retail traders contribute a significant proportion of the traded volume in the SSF market, that could have translated to a significant reduction in overall traded volume.

The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is threefold. First, algorithmic traders are more likely to influence trade sizes in trades they participate in. Next, we show that minimum trading unit restriction refrain market participants, especially algorithmic traders from optimizing their trade sizes and forces them to trade at the minimum specified trade size. Finally, we show that unlike the impact of MTU reduction that most certainly improves liquidity, the converse is not always true. The upward revision of the minimum size of derivative contracts in NSE Single Stock Futures (SSF) market had no significant impact on traded volume in contradiction to market expectations. We do find a transitory negative shock immediately after the announcement by SEBI followed a subsequent positive correction.

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[3]http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/increase-in-futures-lot-size-may-shut-out-retail-investors/articleshow/48430033.cms

[4]http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/lot-size-revision-in-fo-puts-small-traders-in-a-spot/articleshow/49105221.cms

The rest of the paper is arranged as follows - Section 2 describes the institutional setting of the Indian derivatives market and the revision in contract size. We also discuss the paradoxical growth of the NSE SSF market. In Section 3 we discuss the existing literature on lot size revision and algorithmic trading. Section 4 discusses our dataset and variables used for analysis. In the analysis section (Section 5), we separately study how MTU restriction impacts algo trading behavior, how algo trading behavior changes in response to MTU revision and what happens to the overall traded volume due to the revision. We conclude our discussion in Section 6.

2 Institutional Setting

2.1 Derivatives Trading in NSE

Derivatives trading was first introduced in India by National Stock Exchange (NSE) and Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) in 2000. First products to be introduced were index futures, followed by index options, options in individual stocks and futures in single stocks. Since then, trading in derivatives has seen a phenomenal growth in India. National Stock Exchange, set up in 1992 has surpassed the incumbent BSE (established in 1875) in terms of traded volume.

At present, NSE has the largest share of equity as well as derivative market activities in India. Globally NSE ranks as one of the largest exchange in terms of number of contracts traded and notional turnover in the derivatives segment, both in single stocks category as well as indices. As of 2015, NSE is the second largest exchange in the single stock futures segment both in terms of notional turnover and number of contracts traded. The impressive position of NSE among the exchanges over the world in the derivatives segment is further illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2. The statistics are equally impressive for other segments also. NSE is a completely order driven market which operates on a strict price-time priority. There is no traditional market maker or specialist in the trading system. NSE trading hours is from 9:15 AM IST (GMT+5:30) in the morning to 3:30

PM IST with no breaks in between.

Table 1: Global Rankings - Equity Derivatives (Stock Futures and Options) [5]

Exchange Name	Single Stock Options		Single Stock Futures	
	Number of contracts traded	Notional turnover (USD million)	Number of contracts traded	Notional turnover (USD million)
ICE Futures Europe	20,996,412	2,346,690	50,676,043	2,372,920
National Stock Exchange India	104,454,088	517,299	257,370,023	1,238,170
EUREX	186,407,925	931,097	122,859,539	600,270
Korea Exchange	742,743	-	163,931,217	151,297
TAIFEX	169,589	455	13,037,603	67,788
Moscow Exchange	5,783,093	943	306,782,671	49,887
Johannesburg SE	8,589,244	347	16,112,786	14,498
BME Spanish Exchanges	21,420,685	21,710	10,347,022	9,608
ASX Derivatives Trading	89,218,026	169,351	5,862,951	6,212
OMX Nordic Exchange	30,235,803	49,544	4,454,003	5,576
Global Position of NSE	**(8)**	**(3)**	**(2)**	**(2)**

As per the NSE annual report, the annual turnover in the NSE equity derivatives for the year 2014-15 was 556 trillion INR, which is equivalent to approx 8.8 trillion USD [7]. The turnover in the Single Stock Futures segment for the same period was approx 83 trillion INR. Daily average number of contracts traded during the period was 0.95 million.

2.2 Algorithmic Trading

On April 2008, the market regulator SEBI started allowing Direct Market Access (DMA) facility to the investors that allowed the market participants to directly access the exchange trading system through the broker's infrastructure but without the manual intervention of the broker. This particular provision is considered the first stepping stone for algorithmic trading in the Indian securities market. In 2010, NSE introduced colocation facility that enabled traders to place their servers at the exchange premises, a move that

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[5]Source: World federation of Exchanges Database (Dec 2015) - www.world-exchanges.org. Though the original list of exchanges covered under WFE is much larger, we list only the top few for representative purpose.

[7]Using the nominal USD-INR exchange rate as on 31st March 2015

[7]Source: World federation of Exchanges Database (Dec 2015) - www.world-exchanges.org.

Table 2: Global Rankings - Equity Derivatives (Index Futures and Options) [6]

Exchange Name	Stock Index Options		Stock Index Futures	
	Number of contracts traded	Notional turnover (USD million)	Number of contracts traded	Notional turnover (USD million)
China Financial Futures Exchange	-	-	334,048,894	66,636,500
CME Group	140,289,929	19,119,600	564,922,595	57,049,600
EUREX	401,387,669	17,279,800	429,805,326	23,644,100
Japan Exchange Group	38,324,847	-	312,436,348	11,289,500
Korea Exchange	483,597,487	83,317,700	39,169,147	7,965,730
Hong Kong Exchanges	23,898,672	2,325,280	72,199,611	6,171,630
ICE Futures US	29,374	3,555	47,993,899	4,314,430
Euronext	13,996,549	722,400	46,897,058	2,990,180
ICE Futures Europe	14,174,262	19,506	29,581,942	2,903,250
TAIFEX	192,190,964	2,702,780	56,522,378	2,228,300
ASX SFE Derivatives Trading	331,089	33,025	11,206,028	1,092,510
BME Spanish Exchanges	5,444,156	64,377	10,598,682	902,410
OMX Nordic Exchange	13,035,748	181,743	39,889,488	730,312
National Stock Exchange India	1,893,555,261	7,370,780	165,005,587	727,670
Bourse de Montreal	541,961	3,035	5,522,983	687,551
Global Position of NSE	**(1)**	**(4)**	**(6)**	**(14)**

certainly benefited algorithmic traders. Further, in November 2012, the charge to avail colocation facility was cut to almost in half, which has lead to an significant growth in algo trading activity in the subsequent years.

2.3   Contract Size Revision

The market regulator SEBI took first steps towards standardizing lot sizes for trading in derivatives securities in 2010 [8]. It was specified that the minimum contract size for trading in derivative securities would be INR 2 lacs [9]. The minimum trading units (MTU) for individual securities were derived from the price levels at the equity market. The MTUs were revised semi-annually in March and September every year and this continued till 2015. SEBI in its July 2015 circular revised the minimum contract size for derivative

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[8]SEBI Circular No. SEBI/DNPD/Cir- 50/2010 dated 8th Jan 2010

[9]one lac is equivalent to one tenth of a million

securities from INR 2 lacs (0.2 million) to INR 5 lacs (0.5 million) in notional value [10]. Because of the increased contract value, and hence the need for higher margins, it was speculated that small investors might be forced to shift from trading in stock futures to trading in options which is perceived to be riskier.

2.4   NSE & The SSF Market Paradox

Unlike many other developed markets where Single Stock Futures market is almost non-existent, NSE single stock futures market has shown incredible progress since its inception. Part of it can be attributed to lack of a stock-lending market and also restrictions on short-selling in the equity market [11]. SSFs, being linear payoff products, is extremely popular among the retail traders who find it easier to estimate their pay-offs.

Using NSE data for estimating the impact of contract size revision provides a number of advantages. Apart from being one of the largest exchanges for trading in SSF market, it also captures a significant proportion of trading activity in India. Unlike other large exchanges over the globe, NSE represents an almost un-fragmented capital market in one of the largest economies in the world. In terms of turnover in the Equity derivatives segment, NSE controls 73% of the market share in India [12].

In the Indian context, trading in SSF started in NSE as early as November 2001. The Securities Lending and Borrowing (SLB) scheme, however, was launched much later in April 2008. Since then, in spite of the tremendous growth of the Single Stock Futures market, the SLB market has not witnessed similar growth pattern. Existing literature argues that two functioning markets (equity and SSF market in this case) together can act as a redundancy for the third related market (SLB market in this case) (Kumar & Tse, 2009). In such cases, the market introduced later is less likely to grow at par with the incumbent markets.

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[10]SEBI Circular No. CIR/MRD/DP/14/2015 dated 13th July 2015

[11]SEBI banned short-selling in the equity market in March 2001. Only retail investors were allowed to short-sell. In early 2008, the restriction was revoked for institutional traders (like mutual funds) and they were allowed to trade under modified guidelines.

[12]Source: SEBI Annual Report 2014-15

Table 3: Market Growth Statistics for Spot Market, SLB Market, and SSF Market

	Market Turnover (in INR Cr)		
Year	Security Lending Borrowing	Cash/Spot Market	Single Stock Futures
2008-2009	0.01	2,752,023	3,479,642
2009-2010	0.07	4,138,024	5,195,247
2010-2011	1.11	3,577,412	5,495,757
2011-2012	7.38	2,810,893	4,074,671
2012-2013	16.34	2,708,279	4,223,872
2013-2014	13.28	2,808,488	4,949,282
2014-2015	11.41	4,329,655	8,291,766
2015-2016	29.58	4,236,983	7,828,606

3 Literature Review

Existing studies have looked primarily into the impact of reducing minimum trading unit or minimum contracts size specification on market liquidity. Results indicate that reduction of MTU in the equity market leads to increase in the number of individual shareholders (Amihud et al., 1999; Hauser & Lauterbach, 2003b; Ahn, 2014; Isaka, 2014). It has also been reported that reduction in MTU leads to an appreciation in share prices, not only in the short run(Amihud et al., 1999) but also in the long run (Isaka, 2014). Complete reduction of MTU to one unit similarly results in improving liquidity (Gozluklu, Perotti, Rindi, & Fredella, 2015). The improvement in liquidity is often due to the reduction in adverse selection. In the derivatives market, we observe similar results. Karagozoglu and Martell (1999) provide the unique example of both simultaneous upward and downward revision of contract sizes to demonstrate how MTU reduction improves liquidity while increasing contract size does the reverse, though the empirical evidence for the reverse is not as strong as that for contract size reduction. Bjursell, Frino, Tse, and Wang (2010) report that an increase (decrease) in contract size increases (decreases) trading frequency as well as daily price volatility.

Splitting of index futures contract is also deemed to have a similar impact as a reduction of the MTUs. Huang and Stoll (1998) predict that reduction in S&P 500 futures contract may attract new smaller investors. They also predict that it would also help

existing larger investors by providing them an option to fine tune their hedges and other transactions. Further work (Karagozoglu et al., 2003) shows that splitting of the S&P 500 futures contract resulted in a temporary narrowing of bid-ask spread and average transaction size. However, no significant change in volatility or other lasting measures of liquidity were observed following the split. Chen and Locke (2004), on the other hand, report that the splitting of the S&P 500 futures contract significantly increased the effective bid-ask spread. However, customer trading volume and proprietary trading revenue do not appear to have been affected by the redesign.

Existing studies on algorithmic trading suggest that such trading mechanisms provide liquidity to the financial markets (Hendershott, Jones, & Menkveld, 2011). Much of these research works are focused towards the inspection of the role of High-Frequency Traders (HFT), who are part of the Algorithmic Trader superset. HFTs have assumed the role of the modern market maker (Menkveld, 2013). Algorithmic traders (AT) are seen to help in narrowing spreads, reducing adverse selection and also speeding up price discovery. ATs also improve price efficiency (Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, & Vega, 2014; Brogaard, Hendershott, & Riordan, 2014). Trade sizes are also significantly affected by the introduction of algo trading and HFT (Aitken et al., 2014).

4 Data Description and Variable Measurement

Our study uses a proprietary dataset obtained from NSE. The dataset includes information on both intra-day order and trade level data for the derivatives segment. The order file records the entire set of order messages received by the exchange throughout the day. The dataset uses flags to identify whether an order was generated from an algorithmic trading terminal or not. It also allows us to identify if the order was placed by a proprietary trader (Prop), a custodian (Cust) or a non-proprietary non-custodian trader(NCNP). Proprietary traders trade on their accounts while the rest trade on behalf of a client. Financial institutions who are legally barred to have their own account with

the exchange, often use custodians to trade on their behalf [13]. Non-algorithmic NCNP traders can be assumed to be the closest available proxy for retail traders.

NSE has witnessed significant growth in algorithmic trading activity over the years. As illustrated in figure 1, which plots the algorithmic trading activity in the equity as well as SSF market on a monthly basis, we can see that both these markets have witnessed almost 100% growth in algorithmic trading over the last five years. There does not seem to be any significant difference in algo trading activity between the two markets. Considering that presently algo trades contribute almost 40% of the traded volume, their behavior remains a subject of significant interest to academics as well as market regulators.

Figure 1: Growth of Algorithmic Trading Over the Years

Among the various group of traders who use these markets, we can see that percentage contribution of the various trader groups in the spot market and single stock futures market are quite similar (Table 4). Retail traders, proxied by NCNP non-algo category, contribute almost one-third of the traded volume.

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[13]https://www.nseindia.com/products/content/derivatives/equities/cp_deals.htm

Table 4: Algo - Non Algo Trade proportions for the year 2015

Trader Category	Spot Market	SSF Market
Prop Algo	13.18%	17.20%
Cust Algo	21.34%	11.98%
NCNP Algo	7.76%	10.76%
Prop NonAlgo	7.45%	12.75%
Cust NonAlgo	11.40%	10.57%
NCNP NonAlgo	38.87%	36.74%

NSE equity market constitutes of 1704 stocks. Out of these stocks, 162 stocks are permitted to be traded in the derivatives segment [14]. Total market capitalization of all stocks traded in the equity segment is INR 99.41 trillion, out of which INR 73.62 trillion, or 74% of the total is contributed by the securities permitted for trading in the derivatives segment [15].

Since 2010, the lot sizes for derivative contracts on individual securities have been standardized, and minimum contract size had been fixed at INR 2 lacs. It was also mandated that the exchanges would review the lot sizes once every six months. Since then, this review of lot sizes has been carried out every year in the months of March and September till March-2015 [16]. As per the circular dated 31st March 2015, the revised lot sizes were applicable from May 4th, 2015. The August 2015 circular, that revised the minimum size of the derivative contracts from 2 lacs to 5 lacs, was applicable from August 28th, 2015 (only for contracts with November 2015 expiry or later). The events can be summarized using the following timeline Figure 2 which depicts the sequence of various relevant events throughout 2015.

So to examine the impact of the phenomenon of lot size revision on trading behavior, we consider two separate event windows. The pre-window constitutes of the months February and March 2015 and is hereafter referred to as Window 1. As lot size revision for all derivative contracts was applicable from the month of November, we define the post-

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[14]As on 31st December 2015

[15]Market Capitalization data collected from CMIE Prowess database. Data as on 31st Dec 2015

[16]NSE Circular on 'Revision in Market Lot of Derivative Contracts on Individual Stocks' dated 31st March 2015

Figure 2: Timeline of events

window, hereafter referred to as Window 2, as the months of November and December 2015. It is further illustrated in following Figure 3. Contrasting our results between only these two windows allows us to focus our attention on the impact caused solely due to the contract size revision. The period in between these two windows contains various other announcements and events that may impact our variables of interest.

As securities are traded at various price levels, and exchanges impose restrictions on the minimum size of the contract, the average traded quantities vary across securities. To standardize the trade sizes across securities, we define a new variable, $Lot\_multiplier_{i,t,contr}$ that is defined as the ratio of the traded quantity for any particular trade i on any date t for a specified contract z to the MTU of that contract z on that day. The advantage of using this measure over absolute values of trade is that it gives us the advantage of comparability across securities. We adjust for any changes in the MTU due to corporate actions (i.e., bonus share issue, stock split, etc.).

$$Lot\_multiplier_{i,t,z} = \frac{Trade\_q_{i,t,z}}{MTU_{t,z}} \tag{1}$$

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Figure 3: Proportion of Algorithmic Trading in 2015 - SSF vs. Spot Market

As previously mentioned, MTUs are revised periodically and as such the exchanges do not consider a continuous change in contract value due to any change of prices, barring that due to corporate actions. Therefore it is possible that at any particular time, the minimum contract size for a particular security is significantly different than the stipulated level. To resolve this problem, we propose an alternative measure of trade size - $Size\_multiplier_{i,t,z}$. We define $Size\_multiplier_{i,t,z}$ as the ratio of the value of each trade to the minimum specified size of the contract.

$$Size\_multiplier_{i,t,z} = \begin{cases} Trade\_val_{i,t,z}/200,000 & \text{before revision} \\ Trade\_val_{i,t,z}/500,000 & \text{after revision} \end{cases} \qquad (2)$$

We define the value of each trade i on a date t for a specified contract z as the product of traded quantity and the trade price.

$$Trade\_val_{i,t,z} = Trade\_q_{i,t,z} * Trade\_prc_{i,t,z} \qquad (3)$$

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It is important to consider that, by construction, the *Lot_multiplier* variable takes up only discrete integer values greater than or equal to 1. In contrast, *Size_multiplier* is a continuous variable that can take only positive values. In most cases the *Size_multiplier* variable will take up values greater than or equal to one. In some situations it is possible that the price level of a particular security is substantially lower than during the period when the MTU was fixed. It is possible that in this situation the traded value is lower than the minimum stipulated level. In such situations *Size_multiplier* takes up a value less than one as well.

For estimation of intra-day volatility, we use measures of unconditional volatility by Parkinson (1980) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001). Andersen et al. (2001) proposed that realized volatility can be calculated from intra-day return of every five minutes as

$$\sigma_{t,Anderson}^2 = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n_t} (r_{it})^2} \tag{4}$$

where r_{it} is the intra-day return of the i-th five-minute sub-period for the t-th day.

The volatility estimator as proposed by Parkinson (1980) measures the daily volatility based on daily-high and daily-low prices as

$$\sigma_{t,Parkinson}^2 = (\frac{(\ln (P_{high,t}) - \ln (P_{low,t}))^2}{4 \ln (2)})^{1/2} \tag{5}$$

where $P_{high,t}$ and $P_{low,t}$ are respectively maximum and minimum traded price for the t-th day.

5 Analysis

5.1 Algorithmic Trading and Minimum Trading Unit (MTU)

The competitive advantage of algorithmic traders lies in their ability to execute a large number of small trades at very high speed. In the absence of any restrictions on trade

sizes, they try to optimize their trade sizes so that it is not large enough so cause significant price impact and also not small enough so that to execute a predefined quantity, they need to carry out too many trades and subsequently incur higher transaction cost. We argue that trade size restrictions as imposed in the case of Indian derivative market, force the trade sizes, especially for the algorithmic traders to the minimum allowable limit or MTU as specified by the exchange.

In a particular trade, the trade size is determined by the smaller of the desired traded quantity of the buyer and the seller. We argue that because of their advantage of speed, algo traders would like to trade in smaller sizes. As such, the trade size ought to be determined by the algo trader. As such, our first testable hypothesis can be articulated as follows.

Hypothesis 1 *In a particular trade if one of the parties (buyer or seller) is algorithmic in nature, the trade size is more likely to be influenced by that trader. In other words, algo traders influence trade size.*

To test our first hypothesis, we first classify trades based on the type of the parties to the trade. We classify trades into three groups- both parties Non-Algo (Type-0), both parties Algo (Type-1) and one of the parties Algo & the other Non-Algo (Type-2) as illustrated in Table 5. It needs to be considered that we do not differentiate between the Buyer/Seller orientation of the Algo trader, as it should not logically have any impact on trade size. The idea behind this classification is that we expect the trade size for trades where both parties are algo traders (Type-1) to be much smaller than trades where both parties are non-algo traders (Type-0). If our null hypothesis that algo traders influence trade size is true, we would expect trade sizes for trades where one of the parties is algo trader and the other non-algo trader (Type-2), to be closer to the Type-1 trades compared to the Type-0 trades.

To compare the trade sizes for these various trade classes, we use relative trade size parameters - Lot-Size Multiplier(LM) and Size Multiplier(SM) as defined earlier. To

Table 5: Proposed Trade Classification Scheme

Buyer	Seller	Trade Type
Non-Algo	Non-Algo	Type-0
Algo	Algo	Type-1
Non-Algo	Algo	Type-2
Algo	Non-Algo	Type-2

account for the event of an increase in minimum contract size and subsequent increase in MTU, we compare the results across the two previously defined periods - February & March 2015 (Window 1) and November & December 2015 (Window 2). We calculate the mean of the relative trade size parameters of all trades during the period, without distinguishing between the securities. The mean and standard deviation of the trade size parameters for the two periods (Window 1 and Window 2) can be seen in Tables 6 and 8. As it can be most of the trades take place when one of the parties is an algo trader and the other non-algo trader, or in other words, algo traders are more likely to trade with a non-algo trader compared to a algo trader. We also observe that trade size of the Type-2 trades is much similar to the size of Type-1 trades compared to that of Type-0 trades. We use paired T-Test [17] (Tables 7 and 9) to show that the trade size parameters for Type-1 and Type-2 trades are very similar consistent with our stated hypothesis. Though the differences are statistically significant, the magnitudes are very small compared to the differences with Type-0 trades. Trade sizes are largest for Type-0 trades. These behaviors are consistent across Windows 1 and 2.

Table 6: Differences in Relative Trade Sizes (LM & SM) in Window1 (Feb-Mar 2015).

Trade Type	Type Flag	Trade Count	Lot Multiplier		Size Multiplier	
			Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev
Both Non-Algo (NA)	0	9,793,926	1.7422	4.4228	2.7760	6.6691
Both Algo	1	6,429,504	1.1654	1.1042	1.6345	1.4006
One Algo, Other NA	2	17,625,612	1.2067	1.1507	1.9043	1.8431

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[17]Satterthwaite's approximate t-test carried out following Moser, Stevens, and Watts (1989). Unequal varainces established through Folded F Test

Table 7: Paired T-Test to Compare Means

| | Lot Multiplier | | Size Multiplier | |
	Difference	t Stat	Difference	t Stat
Diff (0-1)	0.6899	471.68	1.1415	518.54
Diff (1-2)	-0.1544	-331.3	-0.2698	-382.37
Diff (0-2)	0.5355	371.97	0.8718	400.67

All differences significant at 1% level of significance

Table 8: Differences in Relative Trade Sizes (LM & SM) in Window2 (Nov-Dec 2015).

| Trade Type | Type Flag | Trade Count | Lot Multiplier | | Size Multiplier | |
			Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev
Both Non-Algo (NA)	0	6,100,370	1.5234	3.2283	1.5339	3.1996
Both Algo	1	3,365,595	1.0586	1.2365	1.0433	1.2048
One Algo, Other NA	2	10,359,230	1.1326	0.9930	1.1241	0.9210

Table 9: Paired T-Test to Compare Means

| | Lot Multiplier | | Size Multiplier | |
	Difference	t Stat	Difference	t Stat
Diff (0-1)	0.4648	316.04	0.4907	337.85
Diff (1-2)	-0.0739	-99.73	-0.0809	-112.87
Diff (0-2)	0.3908	291.02	0.4098	308.93

All differences significant at 1% level of significance

As we find that trade size for trades where both the parties are algo traders (Type-1) is very similar to trades where one of the parties is algo trader and the other not (Type-2), it makes logical sense to classify both these trades type of trades as one single class of algo-trade. We propose a modified classification scheme where trades are categorized as algo trades if either or both the parties in that particular trade is algorithmic in nature and it is categorized as a non-algo trade if both the parties are non-algorithmic in nature, as illustrated in Figure 10.

Our next testable hypothesis is a logical extension of our first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 *Trade sizes for Algo trades is much smaller than that for Non-Algo trades.*

We compare the trade sizes for the algo and non-algo trades within the two previously

Table 10: Proposed Trade Classification Scheme

Buyer	Seller	Trade Type
Non-Algo	Non-Algo	Type-0 [Non-Algo Trade]
Algo	Algo	Type-1 [Algo Trade]
Non-Algo	Algo	Type-1 [Algo Trade]
Algo	Non-Algo	Type-1 [Algo Trade]

defined windows 1 & 2. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the lot multiplier and size multiplier values for algo trades are much smaller (Tables 11 and 13) than those for non-algo trades. We use paired T-Test to show that the difference is statistically significant (Tables 12 and 14) in both the periods under consideration. Also, we find that for algo-trades, the value for the size multiplier is close to 1, indicating that algo traders are more likely to execute trades exactly at the MTU. The high standard deviation of Lot multipliers in the case of non-algo trades suggests that non-algo trade sizes are more dispersed compared to algo trades, which are more concentrated around the MTU.

Table 11: Differences in Relative Trade Sizes (LM & SM) between Algo and Non-Algo trades in Window1 (Feb-Mar 2015).

Trade Type	Type Flag	Trade Count	Lot Multiplier		Size Multiplier	
			Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev
Non-Algo	0	9,793,926	1.7422	4.4228	2.7760	6.6691
Algo	1	24,055,116	1.1654	1.1042	1.8322	1.7400

Table 12: Paired T-Test to Compare Means

	Lot Multiplier		Size Multiplier	
	Difference	t Stat	Difference	t Stat
Diff (0-1)	0.5768	403.03	0.9439	436.91

All differences significant at 1% level of significance

To contrast these results to the scenario in the spot market, we report the average trade sizes for the Nifty 50 stocks for the year 2015 in Table 15. These are the fifty stocks which have the highest market capitalization as on 31st Dec 2015. All of these stocks are also traded in the derivatives market.

Similar to the SSF market, it can be seen that average trade sizes for the algo trades

Table 13: Differences in Relative Trade Sizes (LM & SM) between Algo and Non-Algo trades in Window2 (Nov-Dec 2015).

Trade Type	Type Flag	Trade Count	Lot Multiplier		Size Multiplier	
			Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev
Non-Algo	0	6,100,370	1.5234	3.2283	1.5339	3.1996
Algo	1	13,724,825	1.1144	1.0584	1.1043	0.9987

Table 14: Paired T-Test to Compare Means

	Lot Multiplier		Size Multiplier	
	Difference	t Stat	Difference	t Stat
Diff (0-1)	0.4090	305.67	0.4297	324.72

All differences significant at 1% level of significance

are much smaller than that of the non-algo trades. In the absence of minimum trading unit restriction, the trade quantities are not de-facto set to the minimum units allowable (one unit in case of the spot market). Instead, traders optimize trade quantities to price impact and transaction costs. The average trade sizes (in INR terms) as well the trade quantities differ significantly across stocks. The average trade sizes are also significantly smaller than the minimum size specified in the derivatives market. Also, the trade sizes do not seem to have been impacted by the phenomenon of contract size revision.

5.2   How Do Algorithmic Traders React To Change in MTU?

As seen in the earlier section, algo-traders prefer to trade in small sizes, preferably as close as possible to the MTU. As a result of SEBI's revision of minimum contract sizes, the MTU for the various securities were also revised upward. This lead to increase in the value of individual trades and subsequently higher margin requirements. Algo traders have their incentive to continue to trade exactly at or close to the MTU. But for the non-algo traders, it is difficult to sustain higher relative trade sizes as previous to contract size revision. As such we expect that difference in lot multipliers between algo and non-algo trades to come down due to this revision.

Hypothesis 3 *Upward revision in minimum contract size leads to a reduction in the*

Table 15: Comparison of average trade sizes in the spot market for Nifty 50 stocks for the year 2015

| | Window-1 | | | | Window-2 | | | |
| | Non-Algo | | Algo | | Non-Algo | | Algo | |
NSE Symbol	ATS	ATQ	ATS	ATQ	ATS	ATQ	ATS	ATQ
ACC	44,691	28	30,976	19	38,635	29	27,499	20
ADANIPORTS	29,667	92	19,218	60	21,870	82	18,092	68
AMBUJACEM	22,516	86	16,230	62	31,694	158	17,106	86
ASIANPAINT	38,838	47	24,305	30	36,176	43	22,189	26
AXISBANK	38,272	66	41,417	72	50,376	110	29,286	64
BAJAJ-AUTO	94,844	44	38,037	18	50,402	20	27,929	11
BANKBARODA	18,364	102	23,426	131	22,012	134	27,812	169
BHEL	22,198	85	24,438	93	15,589	88	17,589	99
BOSCHLTD	147,937	6	116,615	4	102,631	5	55,590	3
BPCL	45,145	60	25,281	34	39,670	44	25,516	28
CAIRN	20,800	87	19,282	80	13,945	102	12,805	94
CIPLA	44,558	64	28,553	41	33,623	52	20,642	32
COALINDIA	51,835	141	33,908	91	35,356	108	21,804	66
DRREDDY	72,075	22	38,619	12	52,837	16	49,942	15
GAIL	41,762	104	19,260	48	27,469	79	17,360	51
GRASIM	77,566	21	36,613	10	56,699	15	30,977	8
HCLTECH	108,215	66	30,503	19	45,759	53	19,699	23
HDFC	67,109	51	38,301	29	52,833	44	35,797	30
HDFCBANK	95,495	91	63,069	60	87,359	82	55,319	52
HEROMOTOCO	234,080	88	40,736	15	76,026	29	35,851	14
HINDALCO	20,355	143	20,977	146	18,521	233	24,344	307
HINDUNILVR	40,400	44	27,131	30	41,542	50	22,307	27
ICICIBANK	35,470	107	35,643	107	38,831	148	30,947	118
IDEA	49,549	292	21,721	131	22,289	161	16,777	122
INDUSINDBK	73,328	83	38,358	44	58,020	62	24,094	26
INFRATEL	17,731	48	21,781	59	25,501	64	13,180	33
INFY	87,727	39	50,370	23	47,735	44	35,814	33
ITC	49,879	140	34,090	96	63,717	192	31,033	94
KOTAKBANK	100,699	76	40,205	30	42,230	62	31,785	46
LT	51,721	30	46,691	27	35,451	27	30,522	23
LUPIN	59,207	33	35,412	20	53,249	29	32,789	18
M&M	73,551	61	29,139	24	71,017	55	34,290	27
MARUTI	77,647	21	60,735	17	88,452	19	76,345	17
NTPC	41,839	277	26,130	174	37,959	277	18,273	135
ONGC	33,310	103	22,315	68	30,693	134	17,914	77
PNB	16,828	101	24,883	149	18,691	144	23,118	178
POWERGRID	30,830	205	26,706	178	47,900	356	21,452	159
RELIANCE	41,765	48	36,247	42	40,853	42	36,066	37
SBIN	26,162	90	34,539	119	27,522	116	33,004	139
SUNPHARMA	54,721	56	31,260	32	43,755	58	31,239	41
TATAMOTORS	41,408	73	30,383	54	36,229	91	30,032	75
TATAPOWER	15,200	183	19,821	238	16,007	241	15,108	228
TATASTEEL	21,108	60	26,764	77	21,656	90	30,681	128
TCS	72,700	28	41,244	16	94,367	39	40,409	17
TECHM	85,433	58	42,634	26	30,237	57	22,170	42
ULTRACEMCO	83,999	28	27,012	9	96,549	34	24,465	9
WIPRO	44,842	69	24,656	38	47,478	84	20,638	37
YESBANK	39,465	48	34,323	42	37,828	52	27,520	37
ZEEL	38,557	110	19,550	56	38,955	95	15,852	39

ATS refers to Average Trade Size of any trade in INR
ATQ refers to Average Trade Quantity of any trade

difference of relative trade sizes between algorithmic and non-algorithmic trades.

We try to estimate the impact of contract size revision through the following regression equation. Trade Dummy is 1 for algo trades and 0 for non algo trades. We expect the difference in lot multiplier and size multiplier between algo and non-algo trades to come down after the contract revision. Similar to the previous analysis, we only consider data points in window 1 and window 2. The *Revision_Dummy* is 1 for window 2 and 0 for window 1. We expect the coefficient of the *Trade_Dummy* to be negative as Algo trades sizes are supposed to be smaller than non-algo trade sizes. The *Revision_Dummy* is

also expected to have a negative sign as the denominators in the multiplier definitions increase post the revision. The revision is supposed to impact multiplier values for the non-algo trades more than the algo trades, for whom the multiplier values will anyways be close to one. As such we expect the interaction term to be positive.

$$Lot\_Multiplier_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * TradeDummy_i + \beta_2 * RevisionDummy + $$
$$\beta_3 * (TradeDummy_i * RevisionDummy) + \epsilon_i \qquad (6)$$

$$Size\_Multiplier_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * TradeDummy_i + \beta_2 * RevisionDummy + $$
$$\beta_3 * (TradeDummy_i * RevisionDummy) + \epsilon_i \qquad (7)$$

Consistent with our hypothesis we find that the interaction term comes out to be positive (Table 16 and Table 17), suggesting that the difference in lot-multiplier or trade size-multiplier between algo and non-algo trades reduces post the contract size revision. The trade dummy coefficient is negative suggesting that trade sizes are smaller for algorithmic trades. This implies that trade size restriction is more binding for algorithmic traders compared to non-algorithmic traders.

Table 16: Difference in Difference Regression Model to Estimate the Impact of Contract Size Revision on Algo-Trade Sizes

Dependent Variable: Lot multiplier

Variable	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	t Value	$Pr > |t|$
Intercept	1.74217	0.00076	2306.71	$< .0001$
Trade Dummy	-0.57675	0.00090	-643.76	$< .0001$
Revision Dummy	-0.21878	0.00122	-179.46	$< .0001$
(Trade Dummy)* (Revision Dummy)	0.16779	0.00146	115.09	$< .0001$
Number of Obs	53,674,237			
Adj R-Sq	0.0103			

Next, we inspect further into the trading behavior of individual trading groups. In our dataset, we can identify traders as Propitiatory (Traders trading on their own account) or Clients. Clients are further classified into Custodians [18] or Non-Prop Non-Custodians

[18]NSE provides a service to entities like FIIs, Mutual Funds, NRIs, Domestic Body Corporates &

Table 17: Difference in Difference Regression Model to Estimate the Impact of Contract Size Revision on Algo-Trade Sizes

Dependent Variable: Size multiplier

Variable	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	t Value	$Pr > |t|$
Intercept	2.77603	0.00105	2632.49	< .0001
Trade Dummy	-0.94387	0.00125	-754.55	< .0001
Revision Dummy	-1.24209	0.0017	-729.71	< .0001
(Trade Dummy)* (Revision Dummy)	0.51421	0.00204	252.61	< .0001
Number of Obs	53,674,237			
Adj R-Sq	0.0273			

(NCNP). For our analysis, the non-algorithmic NCNP traders can be considered as the closest available proxy to retail traders.

As the value of individual trades increases because of the contract size revision, we expect the number of trades to go down. Custodian traders are primarily institutional investors and institutional traders are known to trade on information. Pre-HFT literature (Easley & O'Hara, 1987; Kim & Verrecchia, 1991) suggests that the trade sizes for the institutional traders are supposed to be higher than others. But using higher trade sizes makes them vulnerable to front-running. As such it may be expected that institutional traders would be using algorithms to reduce their trade sizes.

Table 18: Trader Group Wise Behaviour [Window 1: Feb & Mar 2015]

Trader Group	Trade Count	Avg Lot Multiplier	SD Lot Multiplier	Avg Size Multiplier	SD Size Multiplier
Algo Cust	4,096,744	1.25	1.66	1.94	2.53
Algo Prop	7,118,949	1.09	0.68	1.70	1.12
Algo NCNP	4,026,618	1.13	0.86	1.79	1.37
NonAlgo Cust	1,768,314	2.81	8.15	4.31	12.38
NonAlgo Prop	3,920,683	1.45	2.47	2.28	3.69
NonAlgo NCNP	12,917,736	1.32	2.15	2.12	3.26

As reported in Table 18 and Table 19 we find that Prop Algo (Superset of High-Frequency Traders) and Retail traders remain most active traders in the Single stock

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Domestic Financial Institutions etc. to execute trades through Custodians

Table 19: Trader Group Wise Behaviour [Window 2: Nov & Dec 2015]

Trader Group	Trade Count	Avg Lot Multiplier	SD Lot Multiplier	Avg Size Multiplier	SD Size Multiplier
Algo Cust	2,975,991	1.16	1.65	1.14	1.57
Algo Prop	3,514,480	1.07	0.57	1.06	0.50
Algo NCNP	2,054,739	1.07	0.72	1.07	0.70
NonAlgo Cust	1,103,409	2.53	6.39	2.50	6.30
NonAlgo Prop	2,493,373	1.28	1.60	1.28	1.54
NonAlgo NCNP	7,683,203	1.20	1.44	1.20	1.44

futures segment. As expected we find that trade counts go down following the revision. Lot multipliers and size multipliers for algo traders remain lower than non-algo traders. For algo traders the value of the $Lot\_Multiplier$ and the $Size\_Multiplier$ remain close to 1. The multiplier values for the Custodian traders is largest for both algorithmic as well as non-algorithmic group, but the values are significantly lower in the case of the algo group. As such it may be concluded that institutional investors use algorithms to split up their trades to remain less identifiable. As expected, Prop Algo traders, who are the superset of HFT traders trade in smallest trade sizes among these groups.

5.3 Impact of Contract Size Revision on Overall Traded Volume

The SEBI circular regarding the modification of contract size for derivative segments was issued on 13th July 2015[19]. Following the circular, NSE issued another circular on 7th August 2015 specifying the revised market lots of the derivative securities. For all the securities, the revision was effective for securities expiring on November 2015 and later. NSE futures contracts generally expire on the last Thursday of the expiry month. In the case where the last Thursday is a trading holiday, the contracts expire on the previous trading day. As illustrated in Table 20, till 27th August 2015, the minimum value for all SSF contracts was 0.2 million INR. During 28th August 2015 to 24th September 2015, only the far month contract, i.e. the one expiring on 26th Nov 2015 was revised while

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[19]SEBI Circular No. CIR/MRD/DP/14/2015 dated 13th July 2015

the rest were not. For the period between 25th September 2015 to 29th October 2015, the middle and farmonth contracts, i.e., those expiring on November and December 2015 were revised while the Near Month contracts were not. It was only post 30th October that all the available contracts had minimum contract specification size of 0.5 million INR.

Table 20: Minimum Value of SSF contracts (in INR million) according to NSE contract size revision schedule. The contract size was revised for contracts with November 2015 expiry or later.

Period	SSF Contract Type		
	Near Month	Middle Month	Far Month
Till 27 Aug 2015	0.2	0.2	0.2
28 Aug 2015 to 24 Sep 2015	0.2	0.2	0.5 (Revised)
25 Sep 2015 to 29 Oct 2015	0.2	0.5 (Revised)	0.5 (Revised)
30 Oct 2015 to 26 Nov 2015	0.5 (Revised)	0.5 (Revised)	0.5 (Revised)
26 Nov 2015 to 31 Dec 2015	0.5 (Revised)	0.5 (Revised)	0.5 (Revised)

Figure 4: Daily Traded Volume (INR) in NSE Single Stock Futures Market segregated according to contract expiries

In the existing literature, Karagozoglu and Martell (1999) inspect the impact of lot

size revision in index futures using an event study model controlling for intra-day volatility and futures price level.

Table 21: Panel Data Analysis of SEBI's announcement and subsequent implementation of contract size revision on Single Stock Futures traded volume (INR)

Dependent Variable: ln(Fut Traded Volume)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(5)	(6)
Announcement Dummy	-0.292***		-0.226***	-0.226***	-0.228***
	(-9.94)		(-8.78)	(-8.78)	(-8.87)
Event Dummy		0.135***	0.0651***	0.0651***	0.0757***
		(8.96)	(3.51)	(3.51)	(4.16)
Days to Expiry	-0.0826**	-0.0886***	-0.0873***	-0.0873***	-0.0856***
	(-19.14)	(-23.89)	(-21.81)	(-21.81)	(-21.78)
Fut Daily Return	-0.572*	-0.654***	-0.652***	-0.732***	-0.524**
	(-2.49)	(-3.62)	(-4.15)	(-4.28)	(-3.16)
ln(Spot Mkt Volume)	0.794***	0.669***	0.711***	0.711***	0.707***
	(34.33)	(44.24)	(53.62)	(52.89)	(44.79)
$\sigma_{Fut,Anderson}$				-1.474**	
				(-2.83)	
$\sigma_{Spot,Anderson}$				1.407	
				(1.26)	
$\sigma_{Fut,Parkinson}$					337.1***
					(7.63)
$\sigma_{Spot,Parkinson}$					-265.2***
					(-8.61)
Constant	5.653***	8.255***	7.445***	7.437***	7.463***
	(11.23)	(24.55)	(24.48)	(24.22)	(21.82)
N	16854	34748	51602	51602	51602
Adj R Square	0.39	0.448	0.424	0.424	0.434

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

For our panel data estimation, we consider our period of interest from 13th June 2015 (1 month prior to SEBI's announcement of minimum contract size revision) to 31st December 2015. *Announcement Dummy* takes up the value 1 if the date is within the period of 14th July 2015 to 13th August 2015 (within one month of SEBI's announcement regarding contract size revision), else it takes up the value 0. *FUTSTK Daily Return* is the logarithmic return of SSF prices. To control for the various other parameters which may affect traded volume specifically in the SSF market, we refer to Białkowski and Jakubowski (2012). To control for the high correlation in traded volume between spot

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market and futures market, we use spot market traded volume as a control variable. Following Table **??** *Event Dummy* takes up the value of 1 if the size of the specified contract was revised, 0 otherwise.

The results obtained from panel data regression models are documented in Table 21. To study the impact of SEBI's announcement and subsequent actual implementation, we run two separate models (Model 1 and Model 2). As seen from the results, the announcements seem to reduce traded volume (INR) significantly, and the actual implementation seems to have a positive impact. To capture the effect of the announcement, we have considered a +1/-1 month window in the first model around the announcement date of 13th July 2015. In model 2, we consider our period from 14th August 2015 (the period following the one considered in model 1) to 31st December 2015. The significant negative value of the announcement dummy represents a psychological impact rather than an economic interpretation. The positive value of the *Event Dummy* is possibly counterintuitive, but we argue that rather than an actual positive impact it is more of a correction mechanism following the negative impact of the announcement. The standard errors have been adjusted for possible autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.

To demonstrate that the announcement effect is psychological and transient in nature, we do a week by week analysis of traded volume following the announcement on 13th July 2015. The results are reported in Table 22. Model 1 is same as in the earlier analysis where we consider a +1/-1 month window around the announcement date of 13th July 2015. In model 2, we introduce the effect of a *Week1* dummy variable which takes up the value 1 if the date is within the period of 14th July to 17th July 2015, i.e., immediate week after the revision. Similarly, in model 3 and 4, we introduce dummy variables for the following two weeks. Consistent with our hypothesis we find that magnitude of the interaction effect between the *Announcement Dummy* and week dummies is strongest in the immediate week and reduces as we move further away from the announcement date.

To explain why the minimum contract size revision did not reduce traded volume in the single stock futures market, we look at the average trade sizes over the year 2015 as de-

Table 22: Week by week impact of the SEBI's announcement of contract size revision

Dependent Variable: ln(Fut val)

|	(1) Overall	(2) Week 1	(3) Week 2	(4) Week 3
Constant	5.6529***	6.0828***	5.85762***	6.2010***
	(0.5032)	(0.5116)	(0.5077)	(0.5034)
Announcement Dummy	-0.2925***	-0.2335***	-0.2673***	-0.4028***
	(0.0294)	(0.0286)	(0.0295)	(0.0312)
Announcement*Week1		-0.2596***		
		(0.0235)		
Announcement*Week2			-0.1431***	
			(0.0214)	
Announcement*Week3				0.5257***
				(0.0218)
Days to Expiry	-0.0826***	-0.0819***	-0.0838***	-0.0777***
	(0 .0043)	(0.0043)	(0 .0043)	(0 .0042)
SSF Daily Return	-0.5725*	-0.2803	-0.6204***	-0.6698***
	(0.2298)	(0.2240)	(0.2306)	(0.2317)
ln(Cash Traded Volume)	0.7944***	0.7715***	0.7865***	0.7573***
	(0.0231)	(0.0234)	(0.0233)	(0.0231)
N	16854	16854	16854	16854

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

picted in Figure 5. As the revision was effective from a particular expiry(November 2015) rather than a particular date, the actual implementation took place on three different dates for three different types of contract, namely Near Month(NM), Middle Month(MM) and Far Month(FM). As seen from the plot, the average trade sizes for all contract types were much larger than the minimum stipulated level of INR 2 lacs. After the revision, we find that the average trade sizes are much closer to the level of minimum contract size. So rather than a complete overhaul to force out certain market participants, it seems that SEBI's revision notification was just a modification to adhere to current standards.

6 Conclusion

This paper has important implications for the academicians and regulatory authorities alike. We investigate how minimum contract size restrictions impact the trading behavior

Figure 5: Average Trade Size (INR) in NSE Single Stock Futures Market. Announcement refers to the date of SEBI's announcement - 13th July 2015. Implementation1, Implementation2, and Implementation3 refer to the three dates on which the revision was effective for Far Month, Middle Month and Near Month contracts. Old contract size refers to the value of INR 2 lacs, and new contract size refers to INR 5 lacs.

of various market participants, in particular, that of algorithmic traders. We find that in a market situation with significant participation of algorithmic traders, minimum trading unit restrictions effectively forces trade sizes to the MTU. Also, this constraint is more binding for algorithmic traders who participate in almost two-thirds of the total trades in the SSF market.

Consistent with the notion that institutional investors are informed and informed traders trade in larger trade sizes, we find that trade sizes for non algorithmic institutional traders are significantly larger. While using algorithms, however, they are able to significantly reduce the trade sizes, which prevents them from being easily identifiable.

To observe how these trading behaviors are impacted by regulatory changes, we utilize the natural laboratory setup provided by the market regulator SEBI's revision of minimum contract size for derivative securities. Form the regulatory point of view, this

research provides empirical evidence that upward revision of contract size does not necessarily have the opposite effect of downward revision of trade sizes. We do not find any evidence that trading volume in the SSF market decreased due to the revision. Algo traders continue to trade close to the minimum contract size, while Non-algo traders, who typically trade at relatively larger sizes are forced to trade closer to the minimum contract size post the revision. We find that though the actual implementation of contract size re-specification did not significantly affect overall traded volume, the announcement acted as a significant negative shock, from which the market subsequently recovered.

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