Econometric Measures of Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors

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We propose several econometric measures of systemic risk to capture the interconnectedness among the monthly returns of hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurance companies based on principal components analysis and Granger-causality tests. We find that all four sectors have become highly interrelated over the past decade, increasing the level of systemic risk in the finance and insurance industries. These measures can also identify and quantify financial crisis periods, and seem to contain predictive power for the current financial crisis. Our results suggest that hedge funds can provide early indications of market dislocation, and systemic risk arises from a complex and dynamic network of relationships among hedge funds, banks, insurance companies, and brokers.

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1 Introduction

The Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 has created renewed interest in systemic risk, a concept originally associated with bank runs and currency crises, but which is now applied more broadly to shocks to other parts of the financial system, e.g., commercial paper, money market funds, repurchase agreements, consumer finance, and OTC derivatives markets. Although most regulators and policymakers believe that systemic events can be identified after the fact, a precise definition of systemic risk seems remarkably elusive, even after the demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 2008, the government takeover of AIG in that same year, the Troubled Asset Relief Program of 2009–2010, and the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010.

Like Justice Potter Stewart’s description of pornography, systemic risk seems to be hard to define but we think we know it when we see it. Such an intuitive definition is hardly amenable to measurement and analysis, a pre-requisite for macroprudential regulation of systemic risk. But there is a growing consensus that the “four L’s of financial crises”—leverage, liquidity, linkages, and losses—are central to systemic risk, regardless of the financial institutions involved. When leverage is used to boost returns, losses are also magnified, and when too much leverage is applied, a small loss can easily turn into a broader liquidity crunch via the network of linkages within the financial system. This mechanism is well understood in the case of the banking industry, perhaps the most highly regulated industry in the economy, but the channels and institutions through which disruptive “flights to liquidity” can now occur are manifold and not always visible to regulators.

Therefore, we propose to define systemic risk as any set of circumstances that threatens the stability of or public confidence in the financial system.\textsuperscript{1} Under this definition, the stock market crash of October 19, 1987 was not systemic but the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010 was, because the latter event called into question the credibility of the price discovery

\textsuperscript{1}For an alternate perspective, see De Bandt and Hartmann’s (2000) review of the systemic risk literature, which led them to the following definition:

A systemic crisis can be defined as a systemic event that affects a considerable number of financial institutions or markets in a strong sense, thereby severely impairing the general well-functioning of the financial system. While the “special” character of banks plays a major role, we stress that systemic risk goes beyond the traditional view of single banks’ vulnerability to depositor runs. At the heart of the concept is the notion of “contagion”, a particularly strong propagation of failures from one institution, market or system to another.
process, unlike the former. Under this definition, the 2006 collapse of the $9 billion hedge fund Amaranth Advisors was not systemic, but the 1998 collapse of the $5 billion hedge fund Long Term Capital Management was, because the latter event affected a much broader swath of financial markets and threatened the viability of several important financial institutions, unlike the former. And under this definition, the failure of a few regional banks is not systemic, but the failure of a single highly interconnected money market fund can be.

While this definition does seem to cover most, if not all, of the historical examples of “systemic” events, it also implies that the risk of such events is multifactorial and unlikely to be captured by any single metric. After all, how many ways are there of measuring “stability” and “public confidence”? Nevertheless, there is one common thread running through all of these events: they all involve the financial system, i.e., the connections and interactions among financial stakeholders. Therefore, one important aspect of systemic risk is the degree of connectivity of market participants. In this paper, we propose two measures of connectivity, and apply them to the monthly returns of hedge funds and publicly traded banks, broker/dealers, and insurance companies. Specifically, we use principal components analysis to estimate the number and importance of common factors driving the returns of our sample of financial institutions, and we use pairwise Granger-causality tests to identify the network of Granger-causal relations among those institutions.

For banks, brokers, and insurance companies, we confine our attention to publicly listed entities and use their monthly equity returns in our analysis. For hedge funds—which are private partnerships—we use their monthly reported net-of-fee fund returns. Our emphasis on market returns is motivated by the desire to incorporate the most current information in our systemic risk measures; market returns reflect information more rapidly than non-market-based measures such as accounting variables. We consider individual returns of the 25 largest entities in each of the four sectors, as well as asset- and market-capitalization-weighted return indexes of these sectors. While smaller institutions can also contribute to systemic risk, such risks should be most readily observed in the largest entities. We believe our study is the first to capture the network of causal relationships between the largest financial institutions in these four sectors.

Our focus on hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurance companies is not random, but

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For example, in a recent study commissioned by the G-20, the IMF (2009) determined that systemically important institutions are not limited to those that are the largest, but also include others that are highly interconnected and that can impair the normal functioning of financial markets when they fail.
motivated by the extensive business ties between them, many of which have emerged only in the last decade. For example, insurance companies have had little to do with hedge funds until recently. However, as they moved more aggressively into non-core activities such as insuring financial products, credit-default swaps, derivatives trading, and investment management, insurers created new business units that competed directly with banks, hedge funds, and broker/dealers. These activities have potential implications for systemic risk when conducted on a large scale (see Geneva Association, 2010). Similarly, the banking industry has been transformed over the last 10 years, not only with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, but also through financial innovations like securitization that have blurred the distinction between loans, bank deposits, securities, and trading strategies. The types of business relationships between these sectors have also changed, with banks and insurers providing credit to hedge funds but also competing against them through their own proprietary trading desks, and hedge funds using insurers to provide principal protection on their funds while simultaneously competing with them by offering capital-market-intermediated insurance such as catastrophe-linked bonds.

Our empirical findings show that linkages within and across all four sectors are highly dynamic over the past decade, varying in quantifiable ways over time and as a function of market conditions. Specifically, we find that over time, all four sectors have become highly interrelated, increasing the level of systemic risk in the finance and insurance industries prior to crisis periods. These patterns are all the more striking in light of the fact that our analysis is based on monthly returns data. In a framework where all markets clear and past information is fully impounded into current prices, we should not be able to detect significant statistical relationships on a monthly timescale.

Our principal components estimates and Granger-causality tests also point to an important asymmetry in the connections: the returns of banks and insurers seem to have more significant impact on the returns of hedge funds and brokers than vice versa. This asymmetry became highly significant prior to the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, raising the possibility that these measures may be useful as early warning indicators of systemic risk. This pattern suggests that banks may be more central to systemic risk than the so-called shadow banking system. By competing with other financial institutions in non-traditional businesses, banks and insurers may have taken on risks more appropriate for hedge funds, leading to the emergence of a “shadow hedge-fund system” in which systemic risks could not be managed.
by traditional regulatory instruments. Another possible interpretation is that, because they are more highly regulated, banks and insurers are more sensitive to Value-at-Risk changes through their capital requirements (Basel II and Solvency II), hence their behavior may generate endogenous feedback loops with perverse externalities and spillover effects to other financial institutions.

In Section 2 we provide a brief review of the literature on systemic risk measurement, and describe our proposed measures in Section 3. The data used in our analysis is summarized in Section 4, and the empirical results are reported in Sections 5. The practical relevance of our measures as early warning signals is considered in Section 6, and we conclude in Section 7.

2 Literature Review

Since there is currently no widely accepted definition of systemic risk, a comprehensive literature review of this rapidly evolving research area is difficult to provide. If we consider financial crises the realization of systemic risk, then Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) volume encompassing eight centuries of crises is the new reference standard. If we focus, instead, on the four “L”s of financial crises, several measures of the first three—leverage, liquidity, and losses—already exist. Therefore, we choose to focus our attention on the fourth “L”: linkages.

From a theoretical perspective, it is now well established that the likelihood of major financial dislocation is related to the degree of correlation among the holdings of financial institutions, how sensitive they are to changes in market prices and economic conditions (and the directionality, if any, of those sensitivities, i.e., causality), how concentrated the risks are among those financial institutions, and how closely linked they are with each other and the

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3With respect to leverage, in the wake of the sweeping Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill of 2010, financial institutions are now obligated to provide considerably greater transparency to regulators, including the disclosure of positions and leverage. There are many measures of liquidity for publicly traded securities, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000, 2001, 2002), Glosten and Harris (1988), Lillo, Farmer, and Mantegna (2003), Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2001), Lo and Wang (2000), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), and Sadka (2006). For private partnerships such as hedge funds, Lo (2001) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) propose serial correlation as a measure of their liquidity, i.e., more liquid funds have less serial correlation. Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon (2009) use Large-Small and VIX factors as liquidity proxies in hedge fund analysis. And the systemic implications of losses are captured by CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2010) and SES (Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2010).
rest of the economy. Three measures have been proposed recently to estimate these linkages: Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2010) conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR), Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson’s (2010) marginal expected shortfall (MES), and Huang, Zhou, and Zhu’s (2011) distressed insurance premium (DIP). MES measures the expected loss to each financial institution conditional on the entire set of institutions’ poor performance; CoVaR measures the value-at-risk (VaR) of financial institutions conditional on other institutions experiencing financial distress; and DIP measures the insurance premium required to cover distressed losses in the banking system.

The common theme among these three closely related measures is the magnitude of losses during periods when many institutions are simultaneously distressed. While this theme may seem to capture systemic exposures, it does so only to the degree that systemic losses are well represented in the historical data. But during periods of rapid financial innovation, newly connected parts of the financial system may not have experienced simultaneous losses, despite the fact that their connectedness implies an increase in systemic risk. For example, prior to the 2007–2008 crisis, extreme losses among monoline insurance companies did not coincide with comparable losses among hedge funds invested in mortgage-backed securities because the two sectors had only recently become connected through insurance contracts on collateralized debt obligations. Moreover, measures based on probabilities invariably depend on market volatility, and during periods of prosperity and growth, volatility is typically lower than in periods of distress. This implies lower estimates of systemic risk until after a volatility spike occurs, which reduces the usefulness of such a measure as an early warning indicator.

Of course, loss probabilities conditioned on system-wide losses also depend on correlations, so if correlations are increasing during periods of calm, this could cause such conditional loss probabilities to increase prior to a systemic shock. However, as we have witnessed over the last decade, correlations among distinct sectors of the financial system like hedge funds and the banking industry tend to become much higher after a shock occurs, not before. Therefore, by conditioning on extreme events, we are pre-selecting time periods with unusually high correlation among financial institutions, which implies that during non-crisis periods, correlation will play little role in indicating a build-up of systemic risk.

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Our approach is to simply measure correlation directly—through principal components analysis and by pairwise Granger-causality tests—and use these metrics to gauge the degree of connectedness of the financial system. During normal times, such connectivity will, no doubt, be much lower than during periods of distress, but by focusing on unconditional measures of connectedness, we are able to detect new linkages between parts of the financial system that have nothing to do with simultaneous losses (yet). In fact, while aggregate correlations may decline during bull markets—implying lower conditional loss probabilities—our measures show increased correlations among certain sectors and financial institutions, yielding finer-grain snapshots of linkages throughout the financial system.

Moreover, our Granger-causality network measures have, by definition, a time dimension that is missing in conditional loss probability measures which are based on contemporaneous relations. In particular, Granger causality is defined as a predictive relation between past values of one variable and future values of another. Our out-of-sample analysis shows that these lead/lag relations are important, even after accounting for leverage measures, contemporaneous connections, and liquidity.

In summary, our two risk measures complement the three conditional loss-probability-based measures, CoVaR, MES, and DIP in providing direct estimates of the statistical connectivity of a network of financial institutions’ asset returns.

Our work is also related to Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) who investigate contagion from lagged bank- and broker-returns to hedge-fund returns. We consider these relations as well, but also consider the possibility of reverse contagion, i.e., causal effects from hedge funds to banks and brokers. Moreover, we add a fourth sector—insurance companies—to the mix, which has become increasingly important, particularly during the most recent financial crisis.

3 Systemic Risk Measures

In this section we present two measures of systemic risk that are designed to capture changes in correlation and causality among financial institutions. In Section 3.1, we construct a measure based on principal components analysis to identify increased correlation among the asset returns of financial institutions. To assign directionality to these correlations, in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we use pairwise linear and nonlinear Granger-causality tests to estimate the network of statistically significant relations among financial institutions.
3.1 Principal Components

Increased commonality among the asset returns of banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds can be empirically detected by using principal components analysis (PCA), a technique in which the asset returns of a sample of financial institutions are decomposed into orthogonal factors of decreasing explanatory power (see Muirhead, 1982 for an exposition of PCA). More formally, let \( R^i \) be the stock return of institution \( i, i = 1, \ldots, N \), let the system’s aggregate return be represented by the sum \( R^S = \sum_i R^i \), and let \( E[R^i] = \mu_i \) and \( \text{Var}[R^i] = \sigma_i^2 \). Then we have:

\[
\sigma^2_S = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \sigma_i \sigma_j E[z_i z_j] , \text{ where } z_k \equiv (R^k - \mu_k)/\sigma_k , \quad k = i, j .
\] (1)

We now introduce \( N \) zero-mean uncorrelated variables \( \zeta_k \) for which

\[
E[\zeta_k \zeta_l] = \begin{cases} 
  \lambda_k & \text{if } k = l \\ 
  0 & \text{if } k \neq l 
\end{cases}
\]
and all the higher order co-moments are equal to those of the \( z \)'s, where \( \lambda_k \) is the \( k \)-th eigenvalue. We express the \( z \)'s as a linear combination of the \( \zeta_k \)’s

\[
z_i = \sum_{k=1}^{N} L_{ik} \zeta_k
\]
(3)

where \( L_{ik} \) is a factor loading for \( \zeta_k \) for an institution \( i \). Thus we have

\[
E[z_i z_j] = \sum_{k=1}^{N} \sum_{l=1}^{N} L_{ik} L_{jl} E[\zeta_k \zeta_l] = \sum_{k=1}^{N} L_{ik} L_{jk} \lambda_k
\] (4)

\[
\sigma^2_S = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \sum_{k=1}^{N} \sigma_i \sigma_j L_{ik} L_{jk} \lambda_k
\]
(5)

PCA yields a decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of returns of the \( N \) financial institutions into the orthonormal matrix of loadings \( L \) (eigenvectors of the correlation matrix of returns) and the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues \( \Lambda \). Because the first few eigenvalues usually explain most of the variation of the system, we focus our attention on only a subset \( n < N \) of them. This subset captures a larger portion of the total volatility when the majority of
returns tend to move together, as is often associated with crisis periods. Therefore, periods when this subset of principal components explains more than some fraction $H$ of the total volatility are indicative of increased interconnectedness between financial institutions.\footnote{In our framework, $H$ is determined statistically as the threshold level that exhibits a statistically significant change in explaining the fraction of total volatility with respect to previous periods. The statistical significance is determined through simulation as described in Appendix A.1.}

Defining the total risk of the system as $\Omega \equiv \sum_{k=1}^{N} \lambda_k$ and the risk associated with the first $n$ principal components as $\omega_n \equiv \sum_{k=1}^{n} \lambda_k$, we compare the ratio of the two (i.e., the Cumulative Risk Fraction) to the pre-specified critical threshold level $H$ to capture periods of increased interconnectedness:

$$\frac{\omega_n}{\Omega} \equiv h_n \geq H . \quad (6)$$

When the system is highly interconnected, a small number $n$ of $N$ principal components can explain most of the volatility in the system, hence $h_n$ will exceed the threshold $H$. By examining the time variation in the magnitudes of $h_n$, we are able to detect increasing correlation among institutions, i.e., increased linkages and integration as well as similarities in risk exposures, which can contribute to systemic risk.

The contribution $\text{PCAS}_{i,n}$ of institution $i$ to the risk of the system—conditional on a strong common component across the returns of all financial institutions ($h_n \geq H$)—is a univariate systemic risk measure for each company $i$, i.e.:

$$\text{PCAS}_{i,n} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\sigma^2_i \partial \sigma^2_S}{\sigma^2_S \partial \sigma^2_i} \bigg|_{h_n \geq H}$$

It is easy to show that this measure also corresponds to the exposure of institution $i$ to the total risk of the system, measured as the weighted average of the square of the factor loadings of the single institution $i$ to the first $n$ principal components, where the weights are simply the eigenvalues. In fact:

$$\text{PCAS}_{i,n} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\sigma^2_i \partial \sigma^2_S}{\sigma^2_S \partial \sigma^2_i} \bigg|_{h_n \geq H} = \sum_{k=1}^{n} \frac{\sigma^2_i}{\sigma^2_S} L_{ik}^2 \lambda_k \bigg|_{h_n \geq H} . \quad (7)$$

Intuitively, since we are focusing on endogenous risk, this is both the contribution and the exposure of the $i$-th institution to the overall risk of the system given a strong common
component across the returns of all institutions.

In Appendix A.2 we show how, in a Gaussian framework, this measure is related to the co-kurtosis of the multivariate distribution. When fourth co-moments are finite, PCAS captures the contribution of the $i$-th institution to the multivariate tail dynamics of the system.

### 3.2 Linear Granger Causality

To investigate the dynamic propagation of systemic risk, it is important to measure not only the degree of interconnectedness between financial institutions, but also the directionality of such relationships. To that end, we propose using Granger causality, a statistical notion of causality based on the relative forecast power of two time series. Time series $j$ is said to “Granger-cause” time series $i$ if past values of $j$ contain information that helps predict $i$ above and beyond the information contained in past values of $i$ alone. The mathematical formulation of this test is based on linear regressions of $R_{i,t+1}^i$ on $R_{t}^i$ and $R_{t}^j$.

Specifically, let $R_{i,t}$ and $R_{j,t}$ be two stationary time series, and for simplicity assume they have zero mean. We can represent their linear inter-relationships with the following model:

$$
R_{i,t+1} = a^i R_{i,t} + b^{ij} R_{j,t} + e_{i,t+1}^i , \\
R_{j,t+1} = a^j R_{i,t} + b^{ji} R_{i,t} + e_{j,t+1}^j 
$$

(8)

where $e_{i,t+1}^i$ and $e_{j,t+1}^j$ are two uncorrelated white noise processes, and $a^i, a^j, b^{ij}, b^{ji}$ are coefficients of the model. Then $j$ Granger-causes $i$ when $b^{ij}$ is different from zero. Similarly, $i$ Granger-causes $j$ when $b^{ji}$ is different from zero. When both of these statements are true, there is a feedback relationship between the time series.\(^6\)

In an informationally efficient financial market, short-term asset-price changes should not be related to other lagged variables,\(^7\) hence a Granger-causality test should not detect any causality. However, in presence of Value-at-Risk constraints or other market frictions

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\(^{6}\)We use the “Bayesian Information Criterion” (BIC; see Schwarz, 1978) as the model-selection criterion for determining the number of lags in our analysis. Moreover, we perform $F$-tests of the null hypotheses that the coefficients $\{b^{ij}\}$ or $\{b^{ji}\}$ (depending on the direction of Granger causality under consideration) are equal to zero.

\(^{7}\)Of course, predictability may be the result of time-varying expected returns, which is perfectly consistent with dynamic rational expectations equilibria, but it is difficult to reconcile short-term predictability (at monthly and higher frequencies) with such explanations. See, for example, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004, Section 3) for a calibration exercise in which an equilibrium two-state Markov switching model is used to generate autocorrelation in asset returns, with little success.
such as transactions costs, borrowing constraints, costs of gathering and processing information, and institutional restrictions on shortsales, we may find Granger causality among price changes of financial assets. Moreover, this type of predictability may not easily be arbitrated away precisely because of the presence of such frictions. Therefore, the degree of Granger causality in asset returns can be viewed as a proxy for return-spillover effects among market participants as suggested by Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2010), Battiston et al. (2009), and Buraschi et al. (2010). As this effect is amplified, the tighter are the connections and integration among financial institutions, heightening the severity of systemic events as shown by Castiglionesi, Periozzi, and Lorenzoni (2009) and Battiston et al. (2009).

Accordingly, we propose a Granger-causality measure of systemic risk to capture the lagged propagation of return spillovers in the financial system, i.e., the network of Granger-causal relations among financial institutions.

We consider a GARCH(1,1) baseline model of returns:

\[
R^i_t = \mu_i + \sigma^i_t \epsilon^i_t, \quad \epsilon^i_t \sim WN(0,1)
\]

\[
\sigma^2_{it} = \omega_i + \alpha_i (R^i_{t-1} - \mu_i)^2 + \beta_i \sigma^2_{i,t-1}
\]

conditional on the system information:

\[
I^S_{t-1} = \mathcal{G}\left(\left\{\{R^i_{\tau}\}^t_{\tau=-\infty}\right\}^N_{i=1}\right),
\]

where \(\mathcal{G}(\cdot)\) represents the sigma-algebra. Since our interest is in obtaining a measure of systemic risk, we focus on the dynamic propagation of shocks from one institution to others, controlling for return autocorrelation for that institution.

A rejection of a linear Granger-causality test as defined in (8) on \(\tilde{R}^i_t = \frac{R^i_t}{\tilde{\sigma}_it}\), where \(\tilde{\sigma}_it\) is estimated with a GARCH(1,1) model to control for heteroskedasticity, is the simplest way to statistically identify the network of Granger-causal relations among institutions, as it implies that returns of the \(i\)-th institution linearly depend on the past returns of the \(j\)-th institution:

\[
E[R^i_t | I^S_{i-1}] = E\left[R^i_t \mid \left\{ (R^i_{\tau} - \mu_i)^2 \right\}^{t-2}_{\tau=-\infty}, R^i_{i-1}, R^j_{i-1}, \left\{ (R^j_{\tau} - \mu_j)^2 \right\}^{t-2}_{\tau=-\infty}\right]
\] (9)
Now define the following indicator of causality:

\[(j \rightarrow i) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } j \text{ Granger causes } i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\]

and let \((j \rightarrow j) = 0\). These indicator functions may be used to define the connections of the network of \(N\) financial institutions, from which we can then construct the following network-based measures of systemic risk.

1. **Degree of Granger Causality.** Denote by the *degree of Granger Causality* (DGC) the fraction of statistically significant Granger causality relationships among all \(N(N-1)\) pairs of \(N\) financial institutions:

\[
DGC \equiv \frac{1}{N(N-1)} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j \neq i} (j \rightarrow i) .
\] (10)

The risk of a systemic event is high when DGC exceeds a threshold \(K\) which is well above normal sampling variation as determined by our Monte Carlo simulation procedure (See Appendix A.3).

2. **Number of Connections.** To assess the systemic importance of single institutions, we define the following simple counting measures:

\[
\#\text{Out} : (j \rightarrow S)|_{DGC \geq K} = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{i \neq j} (j \rightarrow i)|_{DGC \geq K}
\]

\[
\#\text{In} : (S \rightarrow j)|_{DGC \geq K} = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{i \neq j} (i \rightarrow j)|_{DGC \geq K}
\]

\[
\#\text{In}+\text{Out} : (j \leftrightarrow S)|_{DGC \geq K} = \frac{1}{2(N-1)} \sum_{i \neq j} (i \rightarrow j) + (j \rightarrow i)|_{DGC \geq K} .
\] (11)

\#Out measures the number of financial institutions that are significantly Granger-caused by institution \(j\), \#In measures the number of financial institutions that significantly Granger-cause institution \(j\), and \#In+Out is the sum of these two measures.

3. **Sector-Conditional Connections.** Sector-conditional connections are similar to (11), but they condition on the type of financial institution. Given \(M\) types (four in our case: banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds), indexed by \(\alpha, \beta = 1, \ldots, M\).
we have the following three measures:

\[ \text{Out-to-Other} : \]
\[
\left( (j|\alpha) \rightarrow \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} (S|\beta) \right) \bigg|\bigg|_{\text{DGC} \geq K} = \frac{1}{(M-1)N/M} \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} \sum_{i \neq j} \left( (j|\alpha) \rightarrow (i|\beta) \right) \bigg|\bigg|_{\text{DGC} \geq K}
\]

\[ \text{In-from-Other} : \]
\[
\left( \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} (S|\beta) \rightarrow (j|\alpha) \right) \bigg|\bigg|_{\text{DGC} \geq K} = \frac{1}{(M-1)N/M} \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} \sum_{i \neq j} \left( i|\beta \rightarrow (j|\alpha) \right) \bigg|\bigg|_{\text{DGC} \geq K}
\]

\[ \text{In+Out-Other} : \]
\[
\left( (j|\alpha) \leftrightarrow \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} (S|\beta) \right) \bigg|\bigg|_{\text{DGC} \geq K} = \frac{1}{2(M-1)N/M} \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} \sum_{i \neq j} \left( (i|\beta) \rightarrow (j|\alpha) \right) + \left( (j|\alpha) \rightarrow (i|\beta) \right) \bigg|\bigg|_{\text{DGC} \geq K}
\]

where Out-to-Other is the number of other types of financial institutions that are significantly Granger-caused by institution \( j \), In-from-Other is the number of other types of financial institutions that significantly Granger-cause institution \( j \), and In+Out-Other is the sum of the two.

4. Closeness. Closeness measures the shortest path between a financial institution and all other institutions reachable from it, averaged across all other financial institutions. To construct this measure, we first define \( j \) as weakly causally \( C \)-connected to \( i \) if there exists a causality path of length \( C \) between \( i \) and \( j \), i.e., there exists a sequence of nodes \( k_1, \ldots, k_{C-1} \) such that:

\[
(j \rightarrow k_1) \times (k_1 \rightarrow k_2) \cdots \times (k_{C-1} \rightarrow i) \equiv (j \xrightarrow{C} i) = 1 .
\]

Denote by \( C_{ji} \) the length of the shortest \( C \)-connection between \( j \) to \( i \):

\[
C_{ji} \equiv \min_{C} \left\{ C \in [1, N-1] : (j \xrightarrow{C} i) = 1 \right\}
\]
where we set $C_{ji} = N - 1$ if $(j \rightarrow i) = 0$ for all $C \in [1, N - 1]$. The closeness measure for institution $j$ is then defined as:

$$C_{js}\big|_{DGC \geq K} = \frac{1}{N - 1} \sum_{i \neq j} C_{ji}(j \rightarrow i)\big|_{DGC \geq K}$$ (17)

5. **Eigenvector Centrality.** The *eigenvector centrality* measures the importance of a financial institution in a network by assigning relative scores to financial institutions based on how connected they are to the rest of the network. First define the adjacency matrix $A$ as the matrix with elements:

$$[A]_{ji} = (j \rightarrow i)$$ (18)

The eigenvector centrality of $j$ is the sum of eigenvector centralities of institutions caused by $j$:

$$e_j\big|_{DGC \geq K} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} [A]_{ji} e_i\big|_{DGC \geq K}$$ (19)

or in matrix form:

$$Ae = e.$$ (20)

Thus, the eigenvector centrality is the eigenvector of the adjacency matrix associated with eigenvalue 1. If the matrix has non-negative entries, we are guaranteed by the Perron-Frobenius theorem that a unique solution exists.

### 3.3 Nonlinear Granger Causality

The standard definition of Granger causality is linear, hence it cannot capture nonlinear and higher-order causal relationships. This limitation is potentially relevant for our purposes since we are interested in whether an increase in riskiness (e.g., volatility) in one financial institution leads to an increase in the riskiness of another. To capture these higher-order effects, we consider a second causality measure in this section that we call *nonlinear Granger*
causality, which is based on a Markov-switching model of asset returns.\textsuperscript{8} This nonlinear extension of Granger causality can capture the effect of one financial institution’s return on the future mean and variance of another financial institution’s return, allowing us to detect the volatility-based interconnectedness hypothesized by Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2010), for example.

More formally, consider the case of hedge funds and banks, and let $Z_{h,t}$ and $Z_{b,t}$ be Markov chains that characterize the expected returns and volatilities of the two financial institutions, respectively, i.e.:

$$R_{j,t} = \mu(Z_{j,t}) + \sigma(Z_{j,t})u_{j,t}$$

where $R_{j,t}$ is the excess return of institution $j$ in period $t$, $j = h, b$, $u_{j,t}$ is independently and identically distributed (IID) over time, and $Z_{j,t}$ is a two-state Markov chain with transition probability matrix $P_{z,j}$ for institution $j$.

We can test the nonlinear causal interdependence between these two series by testing the two hypotheses of causality from $Z_{h,t}$ to $Z_{b,t}$ and vice versa (the general case of nonlinear Granger-causality estimation is considered in the Appendix A.4). In fact, the joint stochastic process $Y_t \equiv (Z_{h,t}, Z_{b,t})$ is itself a first-order Markov chain with transition probabilities:

$$P(Y_t \mid Y_{t-1}) = P(Z_{h,t}, Z_{b,t} \mid Z_{h,t-1}, Z_{b,t-1}) .$$

where all the relevant information from the past history of the process at time $t$ is represented by the previous state, i.e., regimes at time $t-1$. Under the additional assumption that the transition probabilities do not vary over time, the process can be defined as a Markov chain with stationary transition probabilities, summarized by the transition matrix $P$. We can then decompose the joint transition probabilities as:

$$P(Y_t \mid Y_{t-1}) = P(Z_{h,t}, Z_{b,t} \mid Z_{h,t-1}, Z_{b,t-1})$$

$$= P(Z_{b,t} \mid Z_{h,t}, Z_{h,t-1}, Z_{b,t-1}) \times P(Z_{h,t} \mid Z_{h,t-1}, Z_{b,t-1}) .$$

According to this decomposition and the results in Appendix A.4, we run the following two

\textsuperscript{8}Markov-switching models have been used to investigate systemic risk by Chan, Getmansky, Haas and Lo (2006) and to measure Value-at-Risk by Billio and Pelizzon (2000).
tests of nonlinear Granger causality:

1. Granger Non-Causality from \( Z_{h,t} \) to \( Z_{b,t} \) \( (Z_{h,t} \not\Rightarrow Z_{b,t}) \):

Decompose the joint probability:

\[
P(Z_{h,t}, Z_{b,t} \mid Z_{h,t-1}, Z_{b,t-1}) = P(Z_{h,t} \mid Z_{b,t}, Z_{h,t-1}, Z_{b,t-1}) \times P(Z_{b,t} \mid Z_{h,t-1}, Z_{b,t-1}) . \tag{25}
\]

If \( Z_{h,t} \not\Rightarrow Z_{b,t} \), the last term becomes

\[
P(Z_{b,t} \mid Z_{h,t-1}, Z_{b,t-1}) = P(Z_{b,t} \mid Z_{b,t-1}) .
\]

2. Granger Non-Causality from \( Z_{b,t} \) to \( Z_{h,t} \) \( (Z_{b,t} \not\Rightarrow Z_{h,t}) \):

This requires that if \( Z_{b,t} \not\Rightarrow Z_{h,t} \), then:

\[
P(Z_{h,t} \mid Z_{h,t-1}, Z_{b,t-1}) = P(Z_{h,t} \mid Z_{b,t-1}) .
\]

4 The Data

For the main analysis, we use monthly returns data for hedge funds, brokers, banks, and insurers, described in more detail in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Summary statistics are provided in Section 4.3.

4.1 Hedge Funds

We use individual hedge-fund data from the TASS Tremont database. We use the September 30, 2009 snapshot of the data, which includes 8,770 hedge funds in both Live and Defunct databases.

Our hedge-fund index data consists of aggregate hedge-fund index returns from the CS/Tremont database from January 1994 to December 2008, which are asset-weighted indexes of funds with a minimum of $10 million in assets under management, a minimum one-year track record, and current audited financial statements. The following strategies are included in the total aggregate index (hereafter, known as Hedge Funds): Dedicated Short
Bias, Long/Short Equity, Emerging Markets, Distressed, Event Driven, Equity Market Neutral, Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Multi-Strategy, and Managed Futures. The strategy indexes are computed and rebalanced monthly and the universe of funds is redefined on a quarterly basis. We use net-of-fee monthly excess returns. This database accounts for survivorship bias in hedge funds (Fung and Hsieh, 2000). Funds in the TASS Tremont database are similar to the ones used in the CS/Tremont indexes, however, TASS Tremont does not implement any restrictions on size, track record, or the presence of audited financial statements.

4.2 Banks, Brokers, and Insurers

Data for individual banks, broker/dealers, and insurers are obtained from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices Database, from which we select the monthly returns of all companies with SIC Codes from 6000 to 6199 (banks), 6200 to 6299 (broker/dealers), and 6300 to 6499 (insurers). We also construct value-weighted indexes of banks (hereafter, called Banks), brokers (hereafter, called Brokers), and insurers (hereafter, called Insurers).

4.3 Summary Statistics

Table 1 reports annualized mean, annualized standard deviation, minimum, maximum, median, skewness, kurtosis, and first-order autocorrelation coefficient $\rho_1$ for individual hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurers from January 2004 through December 2008. We choose the 25 largest financial institutions (as determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered) in each of the four index categories. Brokers have the highest annual mean of 23% and the highest standard deviation of 39%. Hedge funds have the lowest mean, 12%, and the lowest standard deviation, 11%. Hedge Funds have the highest first-order autocorrelation of 0.14, which is particularly striking when compared to the small negative autocorrelations of brokers ($-0.02$), banks ($-0.09$), and insurers ($-0.06$). This finding is consistent with the hedge-fund industry’s higher exposure to illiquid assets and return-smoothing (see Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004).

periods encompass both tranquil, boom, and crisis periods in the sample. For each 36-month rolling-window time period the largest 25 hedge funds, brokers, insurers, and banks are included. In the last period, 2006–2008 which is characterized by the recent Financial Crisis, we observe the lowest mean across all financial institutions: 1%, −5%, −24%, and −15% for hedge funds, brokers, banks, and insurers, respectively. This period is also characterized by very large standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis. Moreover, this period is unique, as all financial institutions exhibit positive first-order autocorrelations.

5 Empirical Analysis

In this section, we implement the measures defined in Section 3 using historical data for individual company returns corresponding to the four sectors of the finance and insurance industries described in Section 4. Section 5.1 contains the results of the principal components analysis applied to returns of individual financial institutions, and Sections 5.2 and 5.3 report the outcomes of linear and nonlinear Granger-causality tests, respectively, including simple visualizations via network diagrams.

5.1 Principal Components Analysis

Since the heart of systemic risk is commonality among multiple institutions, we attempt to measure commonality through PCA applied to the individual financial and insurance companies described in Section 4 over the whole sample period, 1994–2008. The time-series results for the Cumulative Risk Fraction (i.e. eigenvalues) are presented in Figure 1. The time-series graph of eigenvalues for all principal components (PC1, PC2–10, PC11–20, and PC21–100) shows that the first 20 principal components capture the majority of return variation during the whole sample, but the relative importance of these groupings varies considerably. The time periods when few principal components explain a larger percentage of total variation are associated with an increased interconnectedness between financial institutions as described in Section 3.1. In particular, Figure 1 shows that the first principal component is very dynamic, capturing from 24% to 43% of return variation, increasing significantly during crisis periods. The PC1 eigenvalue was increasing from the beginning of the sample, peaking at 43% in August 1998 during the LTCM crisis, and subsequently decreased. The PC1 eigenvalue started to increase in 2002 and stayed high through 2005 (the period when the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Skew.</th>
<th>Kurt.</th>
<th>Autocorr.</th>
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<td><strong>Hedge Funds</strong></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<td>19%</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
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<td>15%</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>3.84</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Jan 1994 to Dec 1996</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>3.63</td>
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<td>29%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>3.63</td>
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<td>3.18</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hedge Funds</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>6.13</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.10</td>
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<td>-22%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>4.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hedge Funds</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brokers</td>
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<td>32%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insurers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hedge Funds</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-40%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-0.84</td>
<td>8.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Summary statistics for monthly returns of individual hedge funds, brokers, banks, and insurers for the full sample: January 2004 to December 2008, and five time periods: 1994-1996, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2006-2008. The annualized mean, annualized standard deviation, minimum, maximum, median, skewness, kurtosis, and first-order autocorrelation are reported. We choose 25 largest financial institutions (as determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered) in each of the four financial institution sectors.
Federal Reserve intervened and raised interest rates, declining slightly in 2006–2007, and increasing again in 2008, peaking in October 2008. As a result, the first principal component explained 37% of return variation over the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. In fact, the first 10 components explained 83% of the return variation over the recent financial crisis, which was the highest compared to all other sub-periods.

In addition, we tabulate eigenvalues and eigenvectors from the principal components analysis over five time periods: 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–2008. The results in Table 2 show that the first 10 principal components capture 67%, 77%, 72%, 73%, and 83% of the variability among financial institutions in 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 1994–2000, and 2006–2008, respectively. The first principal component explains 33% of the return variation on average. The first 10 principal components explain 74% of the return variation on average, and the first 20 principal components explain 91% of the return variation on average, as shown by the Cumulative Risk Fractions in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Principal components analysis of the monthly standardized returns of individual hedge funds, brokers, banks, and insurers over January 1994 to December 2008. 36-month rolling-window of the Cumulative Risk Fraction (i.e., eigenvalues) that corresponds to the fraction of total variance explained by principal components 1-100 (PC 1, PC 2-10, PC 11-20, and PC 21-100) are presented from January 2004 to December 2008.

Table 2 contains the mean, minimum, and maximum of our PCAS systemic risk measures.
Table 2: Mean, minimum, and maximum values for Principal Component Analysis Systemic Risk Measures: PCAS 1, PCAS 1-10, and PCAS 1-20. These measures are based on the monthly returns of individual hedge funds, brokers, banks, and insurers for the five time periods: 1994-1996, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2006-2008. Cumulative Risk Fraction (i.e. eigenvalues) is calculated for PC 1, PC 1-10, and PC 1-20 for all five time periods.
defined in (7) for the 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–2008 periods. Our PCAS measures are quite persistent over time for all financial and insurance institutions. However, we find variation in the sensitivities of the financial sectors to the four principal components. PCAS 1–20 for brokers, banks, and insurances are on average 0.85, 0.30, and 0.44, respectively for the first 20 principal components. This is compared to 0.12 for hedge funds, which represents the lowest average sensitivity out of the four sectors. However, we also find variation in our systemic risk measure for individual hedge funds. For example, the maximum PCAS 1–20 for hedge funds in 2006–2008 time period is 1.91.

As a result, hedge funds are not greatly exposed to the overall risk of the system of financial institutions. Brokers, banks, and insurers have greater PCAS, thus, result in greater systemic risk exposures. However, we still observe large cross-sectional variability, even among hedge funds.\(^9\)

### 5.2 Linear Granger-Causality Tests

To fully appreciate the impact of Granger-causal relationships among various financial institutions, we provide a visualization of the results of linear Granger-causality tests presented in Section 3.2, applied over 36-month rolling sub-periods to the 25 largest institutions (as determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered) in each of the four index categories.\(^10\)

The composition of this sample of 100 financial institutions changes over time as assets under management change, and as financial institutions are added or deleted from the sample. Granger-causality relationships are drawn as straight lines connecting two institutions, color-coded by the type of institution that is “causing” the relationship, i.e., the institution at date \(t\) which Granger-causes the returns of another institution at date \(t+1\). Green indicates a broker, red indicates a hedge fund, black indicates an insurer, and blue indicates a bank. Only those relationships significant at 5% level are depicted. To conserve space, we tabulate results only for two of the 145 36-month rolling-window sub-periods in Figures 2 and 3: 1994–1996 and 2006–2008. These are representative time-periods encompassing both tranquil and

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\(^9\) We repeated the analysis by filtering out heteroskedasticity with a GARCH(1,1) model and adjusting for autocorrelation in hedge funds returns using the algorithm proposed by Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), and the results are qualitatively the same. These results are available upon request.

\(^10\) Given that hedge-fund returns are only available monthly, we impose a minimum of 36 months to obtain reliable estimates of Granger-causal relationships. We also used a rolling window of 60 months to control the robustness of the results. Results are provided upon request.
crisis periods in the sample. We see that the number of connections between different financial institutions dramatically increases from 1994–1996 to 2006–2008.

Figure 2: Network Diagram of Linear Granger-causality relationships that are statistically significant at 5% level among the monthly returns of the 25 largest (in terms of average AUM) banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds over January 1994 to December 1996. The type of institution causing the relationship is indicated by color: green for brokers, red for hedge funds, black for insurers, and blue for banks. Granger-causality relationships are estimated including autoregressive terms and filtering out heteroskedasticity with a GARCH (1,1) model.

For our five time periods: (1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–2008), we also provide summary statistics for the monthly returns of 100 largest (with respect to market value and AUM) financial institutions in Table 3, including the asset-weighted autocorrelation, the normalized number of connections, and the total number of connections.

We find that Granger-causality relationships are highly dynamic among these financial institutions. Results are presented in Table 3 and Figures 2 and 3. For example, the total

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11To fully appreciate the dynamic nature of these connections, we have created a short animation using 36-month rolling-window network diagrams updated every month from January 1994 to December 2008, which can be viewed at [http://web.mit.edu/alo/www](http://web.mit.edu/alo/www).

12The normalized number of connections is the fraction of all statistically significant connections (at the 5% level) between the N financial institutions out of all N(N−1) possible connections.
Figure 3: Network diagram of linear Granger-causality relationships that are statistically significant at 5% level among the monthly returns of the 25 largest (in terms of average AUM) banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds over January 2006 to December 2008. The type of institution causing the relationship is indicated by color: green for brokers, red for hedge funds, black for insurers, and blue for banks. Granger-causality relationships are estimated including autoregressive terms and filtering out heteroskedasticity with a GARCH (1,1) model.
Table 3: Summary statistics of asset-weighted autocorrelations and linear Granger-causality relationships (at the 5% level of statistical significance) among the monthly returns of the largest 25 banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds (as determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered) for five sample periods: 1994-1996, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2006-2008. The normalized number of connections, and the total number of connections for all financial institutions, hedge funds, brokers, banks, and insurers are calculated for each sample including autoregressive terms and filtering out heteroskedasticity with a GARCH (1,1) model.
number of connections between financial institutions was 583 in the beginning of the sample (1994–1996), but it more than doubled to 1,244 at the end of the sample (2006–2008). We also find that during and before financial crises the financial system becomes much more interconnected in comparison to more tranquil periods. For example, the financial system was highly interconnected during the LTCM 1998 crisis and the most recent Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. In the relatively tranquil period of 1994–1996, the total number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections was 6% and the total number of connections among financial institutions was 583. Just before and during the LTCM 1998 crisis (1996–1998), the number of connections increased by 50% to 856 encompassing 9% of all possible connections. In 2002–2004, the total number of connections was just 611 (6% of total possible connections), and that more than doubled to 1244 connections (13% of total possible connections) in 2006–2008, which was right before and during the recent Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 according to Table 3. Both the LTCM 1998 crisis and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 were associated with liquidity and credit problems. The increase in interconnections between financial institutions is a significant systemic risk indicator, especially for the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 which experienced the largest number of interconnections compared to other time-periods.\textsuperscript{13}

The time series of the number of connections as a percent of all possible connections is depicted in Figure 4 in black, against a threshold of 0.055, the 95th percentile of the simulated distribution obtained under the hypothesis of no causal relationships, depicted in red. Following the theoretical framework of Section 3.2, this figure displays the DGC measure which indicates greater systemic exposure when DGC exceeds the threshold. According to Figure 4, the number of connections are large and significant during the LTCM 1998 crisis, 2002–2004 (period of low interest rates and high leverage in financial institutions), and the recent Financial Crisis of 2007–2008.\textsuperscript{14}

By measuring Granger-causal connections among individual financial institutions, we find that during the LTCM 1998 crisis (1996–1998 period), hedge funds were greatly interconnected with other hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurers. Their impact on other financial institutions was substantial, though less than the total impact of other financial institutions on them. In the aftermath of the crisis (1999–2001 and 2002–2004 time periods),

\textsuperscript{13}The results are similar when we adjust for the S&P 500, and are available upon request.
\textsuperscript{14}More detailed analysis of the significance of Granger-causal relationships is provided in the robustness analysis of Appendix A.3.
Figure 4: The time series of linear Granger-causality relationships (at the 5% level of statistical significance) among the monthly returns of the largest 25 banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds (as determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and hedge funds) for 36-month rolling-window sample periods from January 1994 to December 2008. The number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections (our DGC measure) is depicted in black against 0.055, the 95% of the simulated distribution obtained under the hypothesis of no causal relationships depicted in red. The number of connections is estimated for each sample including autoregressive terms and filtering out heteroskedasticity with a GARCH (1,1) model.
the number of financial connections decreased, especially links affecting hedge funds. The total number of connections clearly started to increase just before and in the beginning of the recent Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 (2006–2008 time period). In that time period, hedge funds had significant bi-lateral relationships with insurers and brokers. Hedge funds were highly affected by banks (23% of total possible connections), though they did not reciprocate in affecting the banks (5% of total possible connections). The number of significant Granger-causal relations from banks to hedge funds, 142, was the highest between these two sectors across all five sample periods. In comparison, hedge funds Granger-caused only 31 banks. These results for the largest individual financial institutions suggest that banks may be of more concern than hedge funds from the perspective of systemic risk, though hedge funds may be “canary in the cage” that first experience losses when financial crises hit.¹⁵

Lo (2002) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) suggest using return autocorrelations to gauge the illiquidity risk exposure, hence we report asset-weighted autocorrelations in Table 3. We find that the asset-weighted autocorrelations for all financial institutions were negative for the first four time periods, however, in 2006–2008, the period that includes the recent financial crisis, the autocorrelation becomes positive. When we separate the asset-weighted autocorrelations by sector, we find that during all periods, hedge-fund asset-weighted autocorrelations were positive, but were mostly negative for all other financial institutions.¹⁶ However, in the last period (2006–2008), the asset-weighted autocorrelations became positive for all financial institutions. These results suggest that the period of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 exhibited the most illiquidity and connectivity among financial institutions.

In summary, we find that, on average, all companies in the four sectors we studied have become highly interrelated and generally less liquid over the past decade, increasing the level of systemic risk in the finance and insurance industries.

To separate contagion and common-factor exposure, we regress each company’s monthly returns on the S&P 500 and re-run the linear Granger causality tests on the residuals. We find the same pattern of dynamic interconnectedness between financial institutions, and the resulting network diagrams are qualitatively similar to those with raw returns, hence we omit

¹⁵These results are also consistent if we consider indices of hedge funds, brokers, banks, and insurers. The results are available in Appendix A.5.
¹⁶Starting in the October 2002–September 2005 period, the overall system and individual financial-institution 36-month rolling-window autocorrelations became positive and remained positive through the end of the sample.
them to conserve space. In Appendix A.6 we also include controls for alternative sources of predictability.

For completeness, in Table 4 we present summary statistics for the other network measures proposed in Section 3.2, including the various counting measures of the number of connections, and measures of centrality. These metrics provide somewhat different but largely consistent perspectives on how the Granger-causality network of banks, brokers, hedge funds, and insurers changed over the past 15 years.

17 Network diagrams for residual returns (from a market-model regression against the S&P 500) are available upon request.

18 To compare these measures with the classical measure of correlation, see Appendix A.7.
Table 4: Summary statistics of network measures of linear Granger-causality networks (at the 5% level of statistical significance) among the monthly returns of the largest 25 banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds (as determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered) for five sample periods: 1994-1996, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2006-2008. The normalized number of connections, and the total number of connections for all financial institutions, hedge funds, brokers, banks, and insurers are calculated for each sample including autoregressive terms and filtering out heteroskedasticity with a GARCH (1,1) model.
5.3 Nonlinear Granger-Causality Tests

Table 5 presents $p$-values of nonlinear Granger causality likelihood ratio tests (see Section 3.3) for the monthly residual returns indexes of Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds over the two samples: 1994–2000 and 2001–2008. Given the larger number of parameters in nonlinear Granger-causality tests as compared to linear Granger-causality tests, we use monthly indexes instead of individual financial institutions returns and two longer sample periods. Index returns are constructed by value-weighting the monthly returns of individual institutions as described in Section 4. Residual returns are obtained from regressions of index returns against the S&P 500 returns. Index results for linear Granger-causality tests are presented in Appendix A.5. This analysis shows that causal relationships are even stronger if we take into account both the level of the mean and the level of risk that these financial institutions may face, i.e., their volatilities. The presence of strong nonlinear Granger-causality relationships is detected in both samples. Moreover, in the 2001–2008 sample, we find that almost all financial institutions were affected by the past level of risk of other financial institutions.\(^\text{19}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>Hedge Funds</th>
<th>Brokers</th>
<th>Banks</th>
<th>Insurers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1994 to 2000</strong></td>
<td>Hedge Funds</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brokers</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insurers</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001 to 2008</strong></td>
<td>Hedge Funds</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brokers</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insurers</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: $p$-values of nonlinear Granger-causality likelihood ratio tests for the monthly residual returns indexes (from a market-model regression against S&P 500 returns) of Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds for two sub-samples: January 1994 to December 2000, and January 2001 to December 2008. Statistics that are significant at 5% level are shown in bold.

\(^{19}\)We consider only pairwise Granger causality due to significant multicollinearity among the returns.
means, whereas nonlinear Granger-causality tests also take into account the linkages among the volatilities of financial institutions. With nonlinear Granger-causality tests we find more interconnectedness between financial institutions compared to linear Granger-causality results, which supports the endogenous volatility feedback relationship proposed by Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2010). The nonlinear Granger-causality results are also consistent with the results of the linear Granger-causality tests in two respects: the connections are increasing over time, and even after controlling for the S&P 500, shocks to one financial institution are likely to spread to all other financial institutions.

6 Out-of-Sample Results and Early Warning Signals

One important application of any systemic risk measure is to provide early warning signals to regulators and the public. To this end, we explore the out-of-sample performance of our PCAS and Granger-causality measures in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. In particular, following the approach of Acharya et al. (2010), we consider two 36-month samples, October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007, as estimation periods in which systemic risk measures are estimated, and the period from July 2007–December 2008 as the “out-of-sample” period encompassing the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. In Section 6.3, we show that both measures yielded useful early warning indications of the recent financial crisis based on the two 36-month samples of October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007.

6.1 Out-of-Sample PCAS Results

When the Cumulative Risk Fraction, $h_n$, is large, this means that we observe a significant amount of interconnectedness between financial institutions, and therefore, systemic risk in the data. To identify when this percentage is large, i.e., to identify a threshold $H$, we use a simulation approach described in Appendix A.1. We find that $h_1$ (i.e., when $n = 1$) should be larger than 33.74% (i.e. $H$ is 33.74%) to exhibit a large degree of systemic risk (where $n$ is the fraction of eigenvalues considered, as defined in Section 3.1). When $n = 10$ and 20, $H$ is estimated to be 74.48% and 91.67%, respectively.

The two sample periods have been selected to provide two different examples characterized by high and low levels of systemic risk in the sample. In the October 2002–September 2005 period, the Cumulative Risk Fraction measure $h_n$ is statistically larger than $H$. In the
July 2004–June 2007, $h_n$ is statistically smaller than $H$.

For each of the four financial and insurance categories we consider the top 25 financial institutions as determined by the average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered, yielding 100 entities in all. For PCAS measures, financial institutions are ranked from 1 to 100.

To evaluate the predictive power of PCAS, we first compute the maximum percentage financial loss (Max%Loss) suffered by each of the 100 institutions during the crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008.\textsuperscript{20} We then rank all financial institutions from 1 to 100 according to Max%Loss. We then estimate univariate regressions for Max%Loss rankings on the institutions’ systemic-risk rankings. We consider PCAS 1, PCAS 1–10, and PCAS 1–20 systemic risk measures as reported in (7). PCAS 1, PCAS 1–10, and PCAS 1–20 measure the squared exposure of a financial institution to the first 1, 10, and 20 principal components, respectively, weighted by the percentage of the variance explained by each principal component.

The results are reported in Table 6 for two samples: October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. For each regression, we report the $\beta$ coefficient, the $t$-statistic, $p$-value, and the Kendall (1938) $\tau$ rank-correlation coefficient.

Specifically, we find that companies that were more exposed to the overall risk of the system, i.e. they show larger PCAS, were more likely to suffer significant losses during the recent crisis. In this way, PCAS measure is similar to the MES measure proposed by Acharya et al. (2010). Institutions that have the largest exposures to the 20 largest principal components (the most contemporaneously interconnected) are those that lose the most during the crisis.

As Table 6 shows, the rank correlation demonstrates that there is a strict relationship between PCAS and losses during the recent Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. The beta coefficients are all significant at 5%, indicating that PCAS correctly identifies firms that will be more affected during crises, i.e., will face larger losses.

The percentage of volatility explained by the principal components decreased in July 2004–June 2007 as Figure 1 shows. In this case, there is not a strict relationship between the

\textsuperscript{20} The maximum percentage loss for a financial institution is defined to be the difference between the market capitalization of the institution (fund size in the case of hedge funds) at the end of June 2007 and the minimum market capitalization during the period from July 2007 to December 2008 divided by the market capitalization or fund size of the institution at the end of June 2007.
exposure of a single institution to principal components and the losses it may face during the crisis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Kendall τ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2002 to September 2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAS 1</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAS 1-10</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAS 1-20</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2004 to June 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAS 1</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAS 1-10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAS 1-20</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Regression coefficients, t-statistics, p-values, and Kendall τ rank-correlation coefficients for regressions of Max % Loss loss on PCA-based systemic risk measures: PCAS 1, PCAS 1-10, and PCAS 1-20. The maximum percentage loss (Max%Loss) for a financial institution is the dollar amount of the maximum cumulative decline in market capitalization or fund size for each financial institution during July 2007–December 2008 divided by the market capitalization or total fund size of the institution at the end of June 2007. Systemic risk measures are calculated over two samples: October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. Statistics that are significant at 5% level are displayed in bold.

### 6.2 Out-of-Sample Granger-Causality Results

We use the same estimation and out-of-sample periods to evaluate our Granger-causality measures as in Section 6.1, and for each financial institution, we compute 8 Granger-causality systemic risk measures. As before, for each of the four categories of financial institutions, we consider the top 25 as determined by the average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered, yielding 100 entities in all. For each systemic risk measure, financial institutions are ranked from 1 to 100.\(^{21}\)

To evaluate the predictive power of these rankings, we repeated the out-of-sample analysis done with PCAS measures by first ranking all financial institutions from 1 to 100 according to Max%Loss. We then estimate univariate regressions for Max%Loss rankings on the institutions’ Granger-causal systemic-risk rankings. The results are reported in Table 7 for two samples: October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. For each regression, we

\(^{21}\)The institution with the highest value of a measure is ranked 1 and the one with the lowest is ranked 100. However, for the Closeness measure, the ranking is reversed: an institution with the lowest Closeness measure is ranked 1, and the one with the highest is 100.
report the $\beta$ coefficient, the $t$-statistic, $p$-value, and the Kendall (1938) $\tau$ rank-correlation coefficient.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>October 2002 to September 2005</th>
<th>Max % Loss</th>
<th>Kendall $\tau$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff  t-stat  p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of &quot;In&quot; Connections</td>
<td>0.03   0.25   0.80</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of &quot;Out&quot; Connections</td>
<td>0.23   2.23   0.03</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of &quot;In+Out&quot; Connections</td>
<td>0.16   1.51   0.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of &quot;In-from-Other&quot; Connections</td>
<td>0.12   1.15   0.25</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of &quot;Out-to-Other&quot; Connections</td>
<td>0.32   3.11   0.00</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of &quot;In+Out Other&quot; Connections</td>
<td>0.23   2.23   0.03</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>0.23   2.23   0.03</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvector Centrality</td>
<td>0.24   2.31   0.02</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                                      | July 2004 to June 2007         |            |                |
|                                      | Coeff  t-stat  p-value          |            |                |
| # of "In" Connections                | -0.01  -0.07   0.94             | -0.01      |
| # of "Out" Connections               | 0.25   2.53   0.01             | 0.20       |
| # of "In+Out" Connections            | 0.19   1.89   0.06             | 0.13       |
| # of "In-from-Other" Connections     | -0.02  -0.19   0.85             | -0.02      |
| # of "Out-to-Other" Connections      | 0.17   1.68   0.10             | 0.13       |
| # of "In+Out Other" Connections      | 0.09   0.84   0.41             | 0.06       |
| Closeness                            | 0.25   2.53   0.01             | 0.20       |
| Eigenvector Centrality               | 0.24   2.44   0.02             | 0.17       |

Table 7: Regression coefficients, $t$-statistics, $p$-values, and Kendall $\tau$ rank-correlation coefficients for regressions of Max % Loss loss on Granger-causality-based systemic risk measures. The maximum percentage loss (Max%Loss) for a financial institution is the dollar amount of the maximum cumulative decline in market capitalization or fund size for each financial institution during July 2007–December 2008 divided by the market capitalization or total fund size of the institution at the end of June 2007. Systemic risk measures are calculated over two samples: October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. Statistics that are significant at 5% level are displayed in bold.

We find that Out, Out-to-Other, In+Out Other, Closeness, and Eigenvector Centrality are significant determinants of the Max%Loss variable.

Based on the Closeness and Eigenvector Centrality measures, financial institutions that are systemically important and are very interconnected are the ones that suffered the most during the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. However, the institutions that declined the most during the Crisis were the ones that greatly affected other institutions—both their own and other types—and not the institutions that were affected by others. Both Out and Out-to-Other are significant, whereas In and In-from-Other are not.
6.3 Early Warning Signals

To evaluate the usefulness of the PCA and Granger-causality network measures as early warning signals, we first compute the maximum percentage financial loss (Max%Loss) suffered by each of the 100 institutions during the crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008. We then rank all financial institutions from 1 to 100 according to Max%Loss. We then estimate univariate regressions for Max%Loss rankings on the institutions’ systemic-risk rankings. The results are reported in Table 8 for two samples: October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. For each regression, we report the β coefficient, the t-statistic, p-value, and the Kendall (1938) τ rank-correlation coefficient.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coeff t-stat</th>
<th>Coeff t-stat</th>
<th>Coeff t-stat</th>
<th>Coeff t-stat</th>
<th>Coeff t-stat</th>
<th>Coeff t-stat</th>
<th>Coeff t-stat</th>
<th>Coeff t-stat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>16.33 2.08</td>
<td>7.59 1.00</td>
<td>8.83 1.13</td>
<td>16.19 2.17</td>
<td>6.86 0.94</td>
<td>10.40 1.38</td>
<td>7.59 1.00</td>
<td>8.97 1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage</td>
<td>0.23 2.26</td>
<td>0.25 2.59</td>
<td>0.25 2.54</td>
<td>0.23 2.22</td>
<td>0.28 2.87</td>
<td>0.25 2.52</td>
<td>0.25 2.59</td>
<td>0.25 2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAS 1-20</td>
<td>0.33 3.17</td>
<td>0.29 2.93</td>
<td>0.31 3.11</td>
<td>0.31 2.97</td>
<td>0.22 2.15</td>
<td>0.27 2.67</td>
<td>0.29 2.93</td>
<td>0.29 2.89</td>
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<tr>
<td># of “In” Connections</td>
<td>0.06 0.57</td>
<td>0.28 2.77</td>
<td>0.23 2.26</td>
<td>0.08 0.76</td>
<td>0.34 3.26</td>
<td>0.23 2.21</td>
<td>0.28 2.77</td>
<td>0.25 2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of “Out” Connections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of “In-from-Other” Connections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of “Out-to-Other” Connections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvector Centrality</td>
<td>0.16 0.23</td>
<td>0.21 0.21</td>
<td>0.16 0.26</td>
<td>0.21 0.21</td>
<td>0.23 0.22</td>
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<td>R-square</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Parameter estimates of a multivariate regression of Max%Loss for each financial institution during July 2007–December 2008 on PCAS 1–20, Leverage, and systemic risk measures based on Granger causality. The maximum percentage loss (Max%Loss) for a financial institution is the dollar amount of the maximum cumulative decline in market capitalization or fund size for each financial institution during July 2007–December 2008 divided by the market capitalization or total fund size of the institution at the end of June 2007. PCAS 1-20, Leverage, and systemic risk measures based on Granger causality are calculated over October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. Parameter estimates that are significant at the 5% level are shown in bold.

We find that Out, Out-to-Other, In+Out Other, Closeness, Eigenvector Centrality, and PCAS are significant determinants of the Max%Loss variable. We also analyzed the maximum financial loss in dollar terms (MaxLoss) for each of the 100 institutions...
and Eigenvector Centrality measures, financial institutions that are systemically important and are very interconnected are the ones that suffered the most during the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. However, the institutions that declined the most during the Crisis were the ones that greatly affected other institutions—both their own and other types—and not the institutions that were affected by others. Both Out and Out-to-Other are significant, whereas In and In-from-Other are not. The top names in the Out and Out-to-Other categories include Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Citigroup, Federal National Mortgage Association, UBS, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Wachovia, Bank New York, American International Group, and Washington Mutual.  

In addition to causal relationships, contemporaneous correlations between financial institutions served as predictors of the crisis. Based on the significance of the PCAS 1–20 measure, companies that were more correlated with other companies and were more exposed to the overall risk of the system, were more likely to suffer significant losses during the recent crisis. As early as 2002–2005, important connections among these financial institutions were established that later contributed to the Financial Crisis and the subsequent decline of many of them.

It is possible that some of our results can be explained by leverage effects. Leverage has the effect of a magnifying glass, expanding small profit opportunities into larger ones, but also expanding small losses into larger losses. And when unexpected adverse market conditions reduce the value of the corresponding collateral, such events often trigger forced liquidations of large positions over short periods of time. Such efforts to reduce leverage can lead to systemic events as we have witnessed during the recent crisis. Since leverage information is not directly available, for publicly traded banks, brokers, and insurers, we

---

23 The top 20 ranked financial institutions with respect to the Out-to-Other systemic risk measure are listed in Table A.4 in Appendix A.8.

24 PCAS 1 and PCAS 1–10 are also significant as early warning signals. Results are available upon request.

25 The significance of the PCAS measures decreased in July 2004–June 2007. This is consistent with the result in Figure 1 where, for the monthly return indexes, the first principal component captured less of return variation during this time period than in the October 2002–September 2005 period.

26 We also consider time periods just before and after October 2002–September 2005 that show a significant number of interconnections, and the results are still significant for Out, Out-to-Other, In+Out Other, Closeness, Eigenvector Centrality, and PCAS measures.

27 We thank Lasse Pedersen and Mark Carey for suggesting this line of inquiry.
estimate their leverage as the ratio of Total Assets minus Equity Market Value to Equity Market Value. For hedge funds, we use reported average leverage for a given time period. Using these crude proxies, we find that estimated leverage is positively related to future losses (Max%Loss).  

Leverage is also problematic, largely because of illiquidity—in the event of a margin call on a leveraged portfolio, forced liquidations may cause even larger losses and additional margin calls, ultimately leading to a series of insolvencies and defaults as financial institutions withdraw credit. Lo (2002) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) suggest using return autocorrelation to gauge the illiquidity risk exposure of a given financial institution, hence the multivariate regression of Table 8 is estimated by including the first-order autocorrelation of monthly returns as an additional regressor.

These robustness checks lead us to conclude that, in both sample periods (October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007 periods), our results are robust—systemic risk measures based on Granger causality and principal components analysis seem to be early warning signals for the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008.

Finally, we consider spillover effects by measuring the performance of firms highly connected to the best-performing and worst-performing firms. Specifically, during the crisis period, 2007–2008, we rank 100 firms by performance and construct quintiles from this ranking. Using the “Out” measure of connectedness, we find that firms that have the highest number of significant connections to the worst-performing firms (1st quintile) do worse than firms that are less connected to these poor performers. More specifically, firms in the 2nd quintile exhibit 119 connections with the 1st quintile, and those that have the smallest number of connections (69) with the 1st quintile perform the best, i.e., they are in the 5th quintile. This pattern suggests that there are, indeed, spillover effects in performance that are being captured by Granger-causality networks.

7 Conclusion

The financial system has become considerably more complex over the past two decades as the separation between hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, and bro-

\footnote{We also adjusted for asset size (as determined by AUM for hedge funds and market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks) and the results are not altered by including this additional regressor. In all regressions, asset size is not significant for Max%Loss. This may be due to the fact that our analysis is concentrated on large financial institutions (the top 25 for each sector). Results are available upon request.}
ker/dealers have blurred thanks to financial innovation and deregulation. While such changes are inevitable consequences of competition and economic growth, they are accompanied by certain consequences, including the build-up of systemic risk.

In this paper, we propose to measure systemic risk indirectly via econometric techniques such as principal components analysis and Granger-causality tests. These measures seem to capture unique and different facets of such risk. Principal components analysis provides a broad view of connections among all four groups of financial institutions, and Granger-causality networks capture the intricate web of statistical relations among individual firms in the finance and insurance industries.

The sheer complexity of the global financial system calls for a multidimensional approach to systemic risk measurement. For example, in a recent simulation study of the U.S. residential housing market, Khandani, Lo, and Merton (2009) show that systemic events can arise from the simultaneous occurrence of three trends: rising home prices, falling interest rates, and increasing efficiency and availability of refinancing opportunities. Individually, each of these trends is benign, and often considered harbingers of economic growth. But when they occur at the same time, they inadvertently cause homeowners to synchronize their equity withdrawals via refinancing, ratcheting up homeowner leverage simultaneously without any means for reducing leverage when home prices eventually fall, ultimately leading to waves of correlated defaults and foreclosures. While excessive risk-taking, overly aggressive lending practices, pro-cyclical regulations, and government policies may have contributed to the recent problems in the U.S. housing market, this study shows that even if all homeowners, lenders, investors, insurers, rating agencies, regulators, and policymakers behaved rationally, ethically, and with the purest of intentions, financial crises can still occur.

Using monthly returns data for hedge-fund indexes and portfolios of publicly traded banks, insurers, and brokers, we show that such indirect measures are indeed capable of picking up periods of market dislocation and distress, and may be used as early warning signals to identify systemically important institutions. Moreover, over the recent sample period, our empirical results suggest that the banking and insurance sectors may be even more important sources of systemic risk than other parts, which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence from the current financial crisis. The illiquidity of bank and insurance assets, coupled with fact that banks and insurers are not designed to withstand rapid and large losses (unlike hedge funds), make these sectors a natural repository for systemic risk.
The same feedback effects and dynamics apply to bank and insurance capital requirements and risk management practices based on VaR, which are intended to ensure the soundness of individual financial institutions, but may amplify aggregate fluctuations if they are widely adopted. For example, if the riskiness of assets held by one bank increases due to heightened market volatility, to meet its VaR requirements the bank will have to sell some of these risky assets. This liquidation may restore the bank’s financial soundness, but if all banks engage in such liquidations at the same time, a devastating positive feedback loop may be generated unintentionally. These endogenous feedback effects can have significant implications for the returns of financial institutions, including autocorrelation, increased correlation, changes in volatility, Granger causality, and, ultimately, increased systemic risk, as our empirical results seem to imply.

As long as human behavior is coupled with free enterprise, it is unrealistic to expect that market crashes, manias, panics, collapses, and fraud will ever be completely eliminated from our capital markets. The best hope for avoiding some of the most disruptive consequences of such crises is to develop methods for measuring, monitoring, and anticipating them. By using a broad array of tools for gauging systemic exposures, we stand a better chance of identifying “black swans” when they are still cygnets.
A Appendix

In this Appendix we provide robustness checks and more detailed formulations and derivations for our systemic risk measures. We conduct PCA significance tests in Section A.1. In Section A.2 we relate our PCAS measures to the multivariate tail dynamics of the system. Tests for statistical significance of Granger-causal network measures are in Section A.3. Section A.4 provides some technical details for nonlinear Granger-causality tests. In Section A.5, we present the results of linear Granger-causality tests on index returns. In Section A.6, we consider alternative sources of return predictability. Section A.7 presents the results of correlation analysis. Finally, Section A.8 provides a list of systemically important institutions based on our measures.

A.1 PCA Significance Tests

For the PCA analysis we employ a 36-month rolling estimate of the principal components over the 1994–2008 sample period. According to Figure 1 we observe significant changes around August 1998, September 2005, and November 2008 for the first principal component. Below we devise a test for structural changes in the estimates within the PCA framework across all sample periods to test the significance of these changes.

Defining the Total Risk of the system as \( \Omega = \sum_{k=1}^{N} \lambda_k \) and Cumulative Risk at \( n \) eigenvalue as \( \omega_n = \sum_{k=1}^{n} \lambda_k \), the Cumulative Risk Fraction is:

\[
\frac{\omega_n}{\Omega} \equiv h_n
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A.1)

where \( N \) is the total number of eigenvalues, \( \lambda_k \) is the \( k \)-th eigenvalue, and \( h_n \) is the fraction of total risk explained by the first \( n \) eigenvalues.

In our analysis we consider 100 institutions and 145 overlapping 36-month time periods. Therefore, \( h_{1\%} \) is the fraction of total risk corresponding to the first principal component for each period. For each of the 145 periods, we calculate \( h_{1\%} \), and select the time periods corresponding to the lowest quintile of the \( h_{1\%} \) measure (the 20\% of the 145 periods having the lowest \( h_{1\%} \)).

Excluding periods with \( h_{1\%} \) values above the lowest quintile, we averaged elements of covariance matrix over the remaining periods obtaining an average covariance matrix, which we used in simulating 100 multivariate normal series for 1,000 times.

For each simulation we compute \( h_n \) for each integer \( n \) and compute the mean, 95\%, 99\%, and 99.5\% confidence intervals of the simulated distributions. We then test whether \( h_n \), the fraction of total risk explained by the first \( n \) eigenvalues, for each rolling-window time periods considered in the analysis is statistically different by checking if it is outside the significance bounds of the simulated distribution.

Figure A.1 presents results for the following 36-month rolling periods: September 1995–August 1998, October 2002–September 2005, December 2005–November 2008, and April 1995–March 1998. For September 1995–August 1998, October 2002–September 2005, and December 2005–November 2008 we observe statistically significant changes; however, not for the April 1995–March 1998 period. This is consistent with our analysis in Figure 1 where
we observe significant changes around August 1998, September 2005, and November 2008 for the first principal component.

Figure A.1: The fraction of total risk explained by the first 25 principal components (i.e., eigenvalues). The mean and the 95% confidence interval of the simulated distributions are graphed. Tests of the significance of differences in the Cumulative Risk Fraction are presented for the following 36-month rolling periods: September 1995-August 1998, October 2002-September 2005, December 2005-November 2008, and April 1995-March 1998.

A.2 PCAS and Co-Kurtosis

In this section we prove that our systemic risk measure based on the principal components analysis, PCAS, is directly related to the multivariate tail dynamics of the system.

In the following we will assume that the returns of institutions are distributed as a multivariate normal distribution and we will parametrize the covariance matrix $\Sigma$ with standard deviations $\sigma_i$ and correlations $\rho_{ij}$. 
Given (1) and (7) and considering negligible the 6-th co-moments we have

\[
PCAS_i = \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_i \sigma^2_S \partial_S^2 \partial_i \nabla^2 \approx 1 - \frac{1}{2} \rho_i^{-1} \nabla R_i \partial \left( \frac{R^S - \mu_S}{\sigma^2_S} \right) \left( R^i - \mu_i \right)^2 \right] - \\
\sum_j \rho_i^{-1} \nabla \left[ \frac{(R^S - \mu_S)^2}{\sigma^2_S} \left( R^i - \mu_i \right) \left( R^j - \mu_j \right) \right]
\]

(A.2)

Proof of (A.2):

Define

\[
\Sigma = D \rho D
\]

(A.3)

\[
D_{ij} = \begin{cases} 
\sigma_i & \text{if } i = j \\
0 & \text{if } i \neq j 
\end{cases}
\]

(A.4)

\[
Q = \sum_{ij} \left( \frac{R^i - \mu_i}{\sigma_i} \right) \rho_i^{-1} \left( \frac{R^j - \mu_j}{\sigma_j} \right)
\]

(A.5)

Then PCAS_i can be written as:

\[
PCAS_i = \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_i \sigma^2_S \partial_S^2 \partial_i \nabla^2 \left\{ \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N |D| |\rho| |D|}} \prod_{i=1}^N dR^i \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 e^{-\frac{Q}{2}} \right\}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_i \nabla \nabla \left\{ \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N |\Sigma|}} \prod_{i=1}^N dR^i \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 e^{-\frac{Q}{2}} \right\} + \\
\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_i \nabla \nabla \left\{ \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N |\Sigma|}} \prod_{i=1}^N dR^i \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 e^{-\frac{Q}{2}} \right\} \left( -\frac{1}{2} \right) \nabla Q \right\} + \\
\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_i \nabla \nabla \left\{ \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N |\Sigma|}} \prod_{i=1}^N dR^i \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 e^{-\frac{Q}{2}} \right\} \left( -\frac{1}{2} \right) \nabla Q \right\} \\
\sum_j \left( \rho_i^{-1} + \rho_j^{-1} \right) \left( \frac{R^j - \mu_j}{\sigma_j} \right) \right\}
\]
\[ -\frac{1}{2} \sigma_i^2 \sigma_j \partial_{\sigma_i} \left\{ \prod_{k \neq i}^{N} \sigma_k \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 \right\} + \]

\[ \frac{1}{2} \sigma_i^2 \partial_{\sigma_i} \left\{ \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N |\Sigma|}} \prod_{i=1}^{N} dR^i \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 e^{-\frac{1}{2} \frac{(R^i - \mu_i)}{\sigma_i^2} \sum_j \rho_{ij}^{-1} \frac{1}{\sigma_j} \left( R^j - \mu_j \right)} \right\} \]

\[ = -\frac{1}{2} \sigma_i^2 \partial_{\sigma_i} \left\{ \frac{1}{\sigma_i} E \left[ \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 \right] \right\} - \]

\[ \frac{1}{2} \sigma_i^2 \left\{ \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N |\Sigma|}} \prod_{i=1}^{N} dR^i \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 e^{-\frac{1}{2} \frac{(R^i - \mu_i)}{\sigma_i^2} \sum_j \rho_{ij}^{-1} \frac{1}{\sigma_j} \left( R^j - \mu_j \right)} \right\} \]

\[ = \frac{1}{2} \sigma_i^2 \partial_{\sigma_i} \left\{ \frac{1}{\sigma_i} E \left[ \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 \right] \right\} - \]

\[ \frac{3}{2} \sigma_i^2 \left\{ \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N |\Sigma|}} \prod_{i=1}^{N} dR^i \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 e^{-\frac{1}{2} \frac{(R^i - \mu_i)}{\sigma_i^2} \sum_j \rho_{ij}^{-1} \frac{1}{\sigma_j} \left( R^j - \mu_j \right)} \right\} \]

\[ \frac{\rho_{ii}^{-1}}{2} E \left[ \frac{(R^S - \mu_S)^2}{\sigma_i^2} \frac{(R^i - \mu_i)^2}{\sigma_i^2} \right] + \]

\[ \frac{1}{2} \sigma_i^2 \left\{ \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N |\Sigma|}} \prod_{i=1}^{N} dR^i \left( R^S - \mu_S \right)^2 e^{-\frac{1}{2} \frac{(R^i - \mu_i)}{\sigma_i^2} \sum_j \rho_{ij}^{-1} \frac{1}{\sigma_j} \left( R^j - \mu_j \right)} \right\} \]
Neglecting the last term (the sixth co-moments) we have the result.

Therefore, in a Gaussian framework our PCAS\textsubscript{i} measure is related to the co-kurtosis of the multivariate distribution, hence when fourth co-moments are finite, PCAS\textsubscript{i} captures the contribution of the \( i \)-th institution to the multivariate tail dynamics of the system.
A.3 Significance of Granger-Causal Network Measures

In Figure 4 we graph the total number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections we observe in the real data at the 5% significance level (in black) against 0.055, the 95th percentile of the simulated distribution obtained under the hypothesis of no causal relationships (in red). We find that for the 1998–1999, 2002–2004, and 2007–2008 periods, the number of causal relationships observed far exceeds the number obtained purely by chance. Therefore, for these time-periods we can affirm that the observed causal relationships are statistically significant.\(^{29}\)

To test whether Granger-causal relationships between individual financial and insurance institutions are due to chance, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation analysis. Specifically, assuming independence among financial institutions, we randomly simulate 100 time series representing the 100 financial institutions’ returns in our sample, and test for Granger causality at the 5% level among all possible causal relationships (as in the empirical analysis in Section 5.2, there are a total of 9,900 possible causal relationships), and record the number of significant connections. We repeat this exercise 500 times, and the resulting distribution is given in Figure A.2a. This distribution is centered at 0.052, which represents the fraction of significant connections among all possible connections under the null hypothesis of no statistical relation among any of the financial institutions. The area between 0.049 and 0.055 captures 90% of the simulations. Therefore, if we observe more than 5.5% of significant relationships in the real data, our results are unlikely to be the result of type I error.

We also conduct a similar simulation exercise under the null hypothesis of contemporaneously correlated returns with the S&P 500, but no causal relations among financial institutions. The results are essentially the same, as seen in the histogram in Figure A.2b: the histogram is centered around 0.052, and the area between 0.048 and 0.055 captures 90% of the simulations.

The following provides a step-by-step procedure for identifying Granger-causal linkages:

Because we wish to retain the contemporaneous dependence structure among the individual time series, our working hypothesis is that the dependence arises from a common factor, i.e., the S&P 500. Specifically, to simulate 100 time series (one for each financial institution), we start with the time-series data for these institutions and filter out heteroskedastic effects with a GARCH(1,1) process, as in the linear Granger-causality analysis of Section 5.2. We then regress the standardized residuals on the returns of the S&P 500 index: \(R_{i}^{\text{S&P}500}\):

\[
\tilde{R}_{i}^{t} = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{i} R_{i}^{\text{S&P}500} + \sigma_{i} \epsilon_{i}^{t}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, 100, \quad \epsilon_{i}^{t} \text{ IID } \mathcal{N}(0, 1)
\]

and store the parameter estimates \(\hat{\alpha}_{i}, \hat{\beta}_{i}, \text{ and } \hat{\sigma}_{i}\), to calibrate our simulation’s data-generating process, where “IID” denotes independently and identically distributed random variables.

Next, we simulate 36 monthly returns (corresponding to the 3-year period in our sample) of the common factor and the residual returns of the 100 hypothetical financial institutions. Returns of the common factor come from a normal random variable with mean and standard deviation set equal to that of the S&P 500 return, \(Y_{t}^{\text{S&P}500}\). The residuals \(\eta_{i}^{t}\) are IID standard normal random variables. We repeat this simulation 500 times and obtain the resulting

\(^{29}\)The results are similar for the 1%-level of significance.
Figure A.2: Histograms of simulated Granger-causal relationships between financial institutions. 100 time series representing 100 financial institutions’s returns are simulated and tested for Granger causality at the 5% level. The number of significant connections out of all possible connections is calculated for 500 simulations. In histogram (a), independence among financial institutions is assumed. In histogram (b), contemporaneous correlation among financial institutions, captured through the dependence on the S&P 500 is allowed.
population of our simulated series \( Y_{jt}^i \):

\[
Y_{jt}^i = \hat{\alpha}_i + \hat{\beta}_i Y_{jt}^{S&P500} + \hat{\sigma}_i \eta_{jt}^i, \quad i = 1, \ldots, 100, \quad j = 1, \ldots, 500, t = 1, \ldots, 36
\]

For each simulation \( j \), we perform our Granger-causality analysis and calculate the number of significant connections, and compute the empirical distribution of the various test statistics which can then be used to assess the statistical significance of our empirical findings.

In summary, using several methods we show that our Granger-causality results are not due to chance.

### A.4 Nonlinear Granger Causality

In this section we provide a framework for conducting nonlinear Granger-causality tests.

Let us assume that \( Y_t = (S_t, Z_t) \) is a first-order Markov process (or Markov chain) with transition probabilities:

\[
P(Y_t|Y_{t-1}, \ldots, Y_0) = P(Y_t|Y_{t-1}) = P(S_t, Z_t|S_{t-1}, Z_{t-1}).
\]

Then, all the information from the past history of the process, which is relevant for the transition probabilities in time \( t \), is represented by the previous state of the process, i.e. the state in time \( t-1 \). Under the additional assumption that transition probabilities do not vary over time, the process is defined as a Markov chain with stationary transition probabilities, summarized in the transition matrix \( \Pi \).

We can further decompose the joint transition probabilities as follows:

\[
\Pi = P(Y_t|Y_{t-1}) = P(S_t, Z_t|S_{t-1}, Z_{t-1}) = P(S_t|S_{t-1}, Z_{t-1}) \times P(Z_t|S_{t-1}, Z_{t-1}). \tag{A.6}
\]

and thus define the Granger non-causality for a Markov chain as:

**Definition 1** *Strong one-step ahead non-causality for a Markov chain with stationary transition probabilities, i.e. \( Z_{t-1} \) does not strongly cause \( S_t \) given \( S_{t-1} \) if:

\[
\forall t \quad P(S_t|S_{t-1}, Z_{t-1}) = P(S_t|S_{t-1}).
\]

*Similarly, \( S_{t-1} \) does not strongly cause \( Z_t \) given \( Z_{t-1} \) if:

\[
\forall t \quad P(Z_t|Z_{t-1}, S_{t-1}) = P(Z_t|Z_{t-1}).
\]

The Granger non-causality tests in this framework are based on the transition matrix \( \Pi \) that can be represented using an alternative parametrization. The transition matrix \( \Pi \) can, in fact, be represented through a logistic function. More specifically, when we consider two-state
Markov chains, the joint probability of $S_t$ and $Z_t$ can be represented as follows:

$$P(S_t, Z_t | S_{t-1}, Z_{t-1}) = P(S_t | S_{t-1}, Z_{t-1}) \times P(Z_t | S_{t-1}, Z_{t-1})$$

$$= \frac{\exp(\alpha' V_t)}{1 + \exp(\alpha' V_t)} \times \frac{\exp(\beta' U_t)}{1 + \exp(\beta' U_t)},$$

(A.7)

where

$$V_t = (1, Z_t)' \otimes (1, S_{t-1})' \otimes (1, Z_{t-1})'$$

$$= (1, Z_{t-1}, S_{t-1}Z_{t-1}, Z_t, Z_tZ_{t-1}, Z_tS_{t-1}, Z_tZ_{t-1}S_{t-1})',$$

the vectors $\alpha$ and $\beta$ have dimensions $(8 \times 1)$ and $(4 \times 1)$, respectively,

$$U_t = (1, S_{t-1}, Z_{t-1}, Z_{t-1}S_{t-1})' = (1, Z_{t-1})' \otimes (1, S_{t-1})',$$

where $\otimes$ denotes the Kronecker product. $U_t$ is an invertible linear transformation of:

$$U_t^* = [(1 - S_{t-1})(1 - Z_{t-1}), S_{t-1} (1 - Z_{t-1}), (1 - S_{t-1}) Z_{t-1}, S_{t-1}Z_{t-1}]',$$

that represents the four mutually exclusive dummies representing the four states of the process at time $t-1$, i.e., $[00, 10, 01, 11]'$. Given this parametrization, the conditions for strong one-step ahead non-causality are easily determined as restrictions on the parameter space.

To impose Granger non-causality (as in Definition 1), it is necessary that the dependence on $S_{t-1}$ disappears in the second term of the decomposition. Thus, it is simply required that the parameters of the terms of $U_t$ depending on $S_{t-1}$ are equal to zero:

$$H_{S \not\rightarrow Z} \ (S \not\rightarrow Z) : \beta_2 = \beta_4 = 0.$$ 

Under $H_{S \not\rightarrow Z}$, $S_{t-1}$ does not strongly cause one-step ahead $Z_t$ given $Z_{t-1}$. The terms $S_{t-1}$ and $S_{t-1}Z_{t-1}$ are excluded from $U_t$, hence $P(Z_t | S_{t-1}, Z_{t-1}) = P(Z_t | Z_{t-1})$.

Both hypotheses can be tested in a bivariate regime-switching model using a Wald test or a Likelihood ratio test. In the empirical analysis, bivariate regime-switching models have been estimated by maximum likelihood using the Hamilton’s filter (Hamilton (1994)) and in all our estimations we compute the robust covariance matrix estimators (often known as the sandwich estimator) to calculate the standard errors (see Huber (1981) and White (1982)).

### A.5 Linear Granger-Causality Tests: Index Results

In this section we conduct linear Granger causality tests using index returns for Hedge Funds, Banks, Insurers, and Brokers. Overall, our results are consistent with the analysis conducted in Section 5.2.
In Table A.1 we present \( p \)-values for linear Granger causality tests between months \( t \) and \( t+1 \) among the monthly return indexes of Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds for two samples: 1994–2000 and 2001–2008. The causality relationships for these two samples are depicted in Figure A.3. Relationships that are significant at 5% level are captured with arrows. Black arrows represent uni-directional causal relationships, and red arrows represent bi-directional causal relationships. Granger-causality relationships have been estimated for each sample including autoregressive terms and filtering out heteroskedasticity with a GARCH (1,1) model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Hedge Funds</th>
<th>Brokers</th>
<th>Banks</th>
<th>Insurers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1994 to 2000</td>
<td>Hedge Funds</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>69.4</td>
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<td>40.0</td>
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<td>87.2</td>
<td>88.3</td>
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<td>44.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>S&amp;P 500</td>
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<td>89.0</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insurers</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.1: \( p \)-values of linear Granger-causality test statistics for the monthly returns of Hedge Funds, Brokers, Banks, and Insurers over two samples: January 1994 to December 2000, and January 2001 to December 2008. Statistics that are significant at 5% level are shown in bold.

We do not observe any significant causal relationships between Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds in the first part of the sample (1994–2000). However, in the second half of the sample (2001–2008) we find that all financial institutions became highly linked. Hedge Funds were causally affected by Banks, Brokers, and Insurers, though, they did not affect any other financial institutions. Moreover, bi-directional relationships between Brokers and Insurers emerged. Banks were only affected by Insurers. Therefore, in stark contrast to 1994–2000, all four sectors of the finance and insurance industry became connected in 2001–2008.

These results are surprising because these financial institutions invest in different assets and operate in different markets. However, all these financial institutions rely on leverage, which may be innocuous from each institution’s perspective, but from a broader perspective, diversification may be reduced and systemic risk increased. The linear Granger-causality tests show that a liquidity shock to one sector propagates to other sectors, eventually culminating in losses, defaults, and a systemic event. These results are consistent with results presented in Section 5.2.

We also investigate dynamic causality among the return indexes of Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds using a 36-month rolling window. The results are presented in Figure A.4. Specifically, we calculate the proportion of significant causal relationships at
Figure A.3: Linear Granger-causality relationships (at the 5% level of statistical significance) among the monthly returns of Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds over two samples: (a) January 1994 to December 2000, and (b) January 2001 to December 2008. Granger-causality relationships are estimated for each sample including autoregressive terms and filtering out heteroskedasticity with a GARCH (1,1) model.

1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels out of the total possible causal relationships (12 for 4 indexes) and graph this fraction over time. We find Granger causality is generally present in the second part of the sample (after 2001). This is in line with our original methodology of splitting the total time periods into two samples: 1994–2000 and 2001–2008. The presence of significant causal relationships can be attributed to the existence of frictions in the financial and insurance system. As discussed above, Value-at-Risk constraints and other market frictions such as transaction costs, borrowing constraints, costs of gathering and processing information, and institutional restrictions on shortsales may lead to Granger causality among price changes of financial assets. Specifically, after the LTCM crisis and the Internet Crash of 2000, the financial system started to exhibit these frictions. Figure A.4 also depicts the presence of Granger causality to Hedge Funds over time at the 5% level of significance. Consistent with results found in Table A.1 and depicted in Figure A.3, Hedge Funds are largely causally affected by other financial institutions starting in 2001. The exception is the period associated with the failure of the Amaranth hedge fund in 2006.

These results are also surprising since we have filtered out heteroskedasticity with a GARCH (1,1) model and included autoregressive terms in the Granger-causality test for the monthly returns of aggregate indexes. In a framework where all markets clear and past information is reflected in current prices, returns should not exhibit any systemic time-series patterns. However, our results are consistent with Danielsson et al. (2009) who show that risk-neutral traders operating under Value-at-Risk constraints can amplify market shocks through feedback effects. Our results are also consistent with Battiston et al. (2009) who generate the endogenous emergence of systemic risk in a credit network among financial institutions. Individual financial fragility feeds back on itself, amplifying the initial shock.
terms and filtering out heteroscedasticity with a GARCH (1,1) model.

Grunger-causal relationships are estimated for each sample including autoregressive
and (b) for the monthly returns of banks, brokers, and insurers to Hedge Funds at the 5%
brokers, insurers, and Hedge Funds at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance.
the period from January 1994 to December 2005: (a) amount the monthly returns of banks,
relationships based on 36-month rolling-window linear Granger-causal relationships over
relationships and a possible total of 12
and leading to systemic crisis.

Overall, our index results are consistent with individual financial institutions results presented in the main text.

### A.6 Alternative Sources of Predictability

Our Granger-causality systemic risk measures capture return predictability across financial and insurance institutions. As a result, we are capturing time periods when the financial system is not working properly and is generating predictability that cannot be exploited. When a large number of financial institutions exhibit predictability in returns, then the financial system is susceptible to instability, and we are capturing systemic risk. Systemic risk is strictly related to any set of circumstances that threatens the stability of or public confidence in the financial system.

Other potential sources of return predictability are liquidity and leverage that are already addressed in Section 6. We show that even after re-estimating all our results by controlling for liquidity effects captured through autocorrelation and leverage, all results stay the same.

An additional way to make sure that predictability is specific to the financial sector would be to add exogenous predictor variables in the Granger regressions in Section 5.2. We use inflation and industrial production growth\(^{30}\) as macro predictor variables and SMB, HML, UMD, and DPR (dividend price ratio) as additional predictor variables.\(^{31}\) The Fama-French variables are not tightly linked to systemic risk and financial industry.\(^{32}\) Therefore, we extend (8) to include these predictors:

\[
R_{it+1}^i = a^i R_{it}^i + b^{ij} R_{jt}^j + \gamma^i X_t + \epsilon_{t+1}^i, \\
R_{jt+1}^j = a^j R_{jt}^j + b^{ij} R_{jt}^i + \gamma^j X_t + \epsilon_{t+1}^j
\]  

(A.8)

where \(\epsilon_{t+1}^i\) and \(\epsilon_{t+1}^j\) are two uncorrelated white noise processes, and \(a^i, a^j, b^{ij}, b^{ji}, \gamma^i, \text{and} \gamma^j\) are coefficients of the model. \(X_t\) is a vector of inflation, industrial production growth and Fama-French factors. The Granger causality would then be the significance of \(b^{ij}\) and \(b^{ji}\) variables.

Figure A.5 depicts the time series of linear Granger-causality relationships (at the 5% level of statistical significance) among the monthly returns of the largest 25 banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds for 36-month rolling-window sample periods from January 1994 to December 2008. The number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections is depicted for the original model (N-lines), the model adjusted by exogenous macro predictors (N-Lines with Macro Variables), and the model adjusted by all exogenous predictors (N-lines with All Predictors). As is evident from the figure, all models generate very similar

\(^{30}\)CPI and industrial production are obtained from Datastream.

\(^{31}\)These Fama-French factors are downloaded from Kenneth French website. SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios, UMD (Up minus Down) is a Momentum factor, and DPR (Dividend Price Ratio) is the difference between the log-dividends and the log-prices of the S&P 500.

\(^{32}\)We thank the referee for suggesting this approach and predictor variables.
time-series results.

Table A.2 shows that the total number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections is the same when the results are adjusted for predictors and when they are not, as in Table 3. The results for both estimations are identical for 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, and 2002–2004. For 2006–2008, the results are similar: 13% of connections predicted using the original Granger-causality model and the model adjusted by exogenous macro predictors, and 15% of connections predicted using all predictors. Actually, adjusting for all predictors, the total number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections is even higher compared to the results when predictors are not included in the analysis.

In summary, our main Granger-causality results still hold after adjusting for alternative sources of predictability like liquidity, leverage, and exogenous predictors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>N-Lines Original</th>
<th>N-Lines with Macro Variables</th>
<th>N-Lines with All Predictors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan1994-Dec1996</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan1996-Dec1998</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan1999-Dec2001</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan2002-Dec2004</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan2006-Dec2008</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.2: The total number of connections (at the 5% level of statistical significance) as a percentage of all possible connections (our DGC measure) for three models for 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006-2008: Original Granger regression model (N-lines), the model adjusted by exogenous macro predictors (N-Lines with Macro Variables), and the model adjusted by all exogenous predictors (N-lines with All Predictors). Inflation and industrial production growth are used as macro predictor variables, and SMB, HML, UMD, and PDR (dividend price ratio) as additional predictor variables.

A.7 Correlations Analysis

In this section we consider whether correlations can proxy for the Granger-causal number of connections tabulated in Table 3. Correlations between hedge funds, brokers, banks, and insurers are provided in Table A.3 for 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–2008 time periods. The average correlations between financial institutions are 0.23, 0.34, 0.16, 0.27, and 0.30 for 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–2008, respectively. According to Table 3, the number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections are 6%, 9%, 5%, 6%, and 13% for 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–2008, respectively. As a result, the maximum average correlation was during 1996–1998 period that encompasses the LTCM crisis. However, the DGC Granger-causality measure, the number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections peaked in the recent financial crisis period: 2006–2008. Another difference between the measures is the fact
Figure A.5: The time series of the total number of connections (at the 5% level of statistical significance) as a percentage of all possible connections among the monthly returns of the largest 25 banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds for 36-month rolling-window sample periods from January 1994 to December 2008. The number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections is depicted for the original Granger regression model (N-lines), the model adjusted by exogenous macro predictors (N-Lines with Macro Variables), and the model adjusted by all exogenous predictors (N-lines with All Predictors). Inflation and industrial production growth are used as macro predictor variables, and SMB, HML, UMD, and PDR (dividend price ratio) as additional predictor variables.
that correlations are symmetric. However, our Granger-causality measures are not symmetric by construction. One institution can cause another institution, but the relationship is not necessarily symmetric. Therefore, correlations and the number of connections measures capture different phenomena.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan1994-Dec1996</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Rank Correlation</th>
<th>Spearman Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HFunds</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokers</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurers</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A.8 Systemically Important Institutions

Another robustness check of our systemic risk measures is to explore their implications for individual financial institutions. In this section we provide a simple comparison between the
rankings of individual institutions according to our measures of systemic risk with the rankings based on subsequent financial losses. Consider first the Out-to-Other Granger-causality network measure, estimated over the October 2002–September 2005 sample period. We rank all financial institutions based on this measure, and the 20 highest-scoring institutions are presented in Table A.4, along with the 20 highest-scoring institutions based on the maximum percentage loss (Max%Loss) during the crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008. We find an overlap of 7 financial institutions between these two rankings.

In Table 8 we showed that in addition to Out-to-Other, Leverage and PCAS were also significant in predicting Max%Loss. Therefore, it is possible to sharpen our prediction by ranking financial institutions according to a simple aggregation of all three measures. To that end, we multiply each institution’s ranking according to Out-to-Other, Leverage, and PCAS 1-20 by their corresponding beta coefficients from Table 8, sum these products, and then re-rank all financial institutions based on this aggregate sum. The 20 highest-scoring institutions according to this aggregate measure, estimated using date from October 2002–September 2005, are presented in Table A.4. In this case we find an overlap of 12 financial institutions (among the top 20) and most of the rest (among the top 30) with financial institutions ranked on Max%Loss. This improvement in correspondence and reduction in “false positives” suggest that our aggregate ranking may be useful in identifying systemically important entities.

33 The first 11 financial institutions in Max%Loss ranking were bankrupt, therefore, representing the same Max%Loss equalled to 100%.
Table A.4: Granger-causality-network-based measures of systemic risk for a sample of 100 financial institutions consisting of the 25 largest banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds (as determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered) for the sample period from October 2002 to September 2005. Only the 20 highest-scoring institutions based on Out-to-Other and aggregate measures are displayed. The aggregate measure is an aggregation of the Out-to-Other, Leverage and PCAS 1-20 measures. The maximum percentage loss (Max%Loss) for a financial institution is the dollar amount of the maximum cumulative decline in market capitalization or fund size for each financial institution during July 2007–December 2008 divided by the market capitalization or total fund size of the institution at the end of June 2007. All connections are based on Granger-causal statistics at the 5% level of statistical significance.
References


