


Results and implications of benchmark choice for performance measurement and rankings

Currency Managers Have Performed Well in the Past (or Have They?)

The Barclay Currency Traders Index





Source: The Barclay Group, www.barclaygrp.com

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Currency Returns and Currency Risk Factors







Propose a standard factor model of the form:

$$R_t = \alpha + \sum_i \beta_i F_{i,t} + \varepsilon_t$$

where

- » *R* is the excess return generated by the currency manager, defined as the total return less the periodic risk-free rate
- » α is a measure of active manager skill,
- » *F* is a beta factor, that requires a systematic risk premium in the market,
- » β is a coefficient or factor loading that measures the sensitivity of the manager's returns to the factor, and
- » ε is a random error term

Excess Currency Index Returns as a Function of Four Factors

$R_{t} = \alpha + \sum_{i} \beta_{i} F_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{t}$

Barclay Currency Traders Index		Citibank Beta1 G10 Carry Index	AFX Index	Citibank Beta1 G10 PPP Index	Implied Volatility
	Alpha	Carry Beta	Trend Beta	Value Beta	Vol. Beta
Jan 1990 - Dec 2006 R ² =0.66	-9 bps (-0.72)	0.70 (3.30)	1.28 (17.44)	-1.01 (-2.25)	0.04 (0.43)


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Excess Currency Index Returns as a Function of Four Factors (split sample)

Barclay Currency Traders Index		Carry Index	AFX Index	PPP Index	Implied Volatility
	Alpha	Carry Beta	Trend Beta	Value Beta	Vol. Beta
Jan 1990 - Dec 2000 R ² =0.68	-16bps (-0.72)	0.74 (2.78)	1.44 (14.91)	-1.38 (-2.44)	-0.04 (-0.38)
Jan 2001 - Dec 2006 R ² =0.77	-11bps (-1.00)	1.03 (3.99)	0.77 (9.71)	-0.64 (-1.01)	0.33 (3.09)

Regression Results for 34 Individual Managers



- R² exceeds 50% for 9 of the 34 managers. Substantial part of the excess returns stems from exposure to our risk factors
- The highest exposure remains towards the trend-following factor (15 managers). The carry factor is significant for 8 managers and volatility and value for only 7 and 5 managers
- Twenty-one managers have a significant exposure to at least one factor
 - » 9 of those have significant exposure to two factors, and
 - » 2 managers have significant exposure to three factors
 - » One manager has a significant exposure to all four factors
- Thirteen managers (38%) have no significant exposure towards any style. True alpha hunters?

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
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
Alpha hunters and Beta grazers?

Consider managers M2 and M28


- » Both earned about 3% p.a. or so above LIBID. That's good.
- » M2's returns were highly correlated with 3 factors (β grazer)
- » M28's returns were not correlated with the factors (α hunter)
- » A style factor benchmark changes performance measures

Jan 01-	Excess	Alpha	Carry	Trend	Value	Vol.
Dec 06	Return		Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
M2	3.70%	-2bps	2.27	0.90	0.33	0.37
R²=0.69		(-1.12)	(5.40)	(6.98)	(0.32)	(2.14)
M28	3.02%	3bps	-0.07	-0.00	-0.19	0.16
R ² =0.03		(2.02)	(-0.23)	(-0.06)	(-0.23)	(1.17)






Number of Funds on the DB FXSelect Platform



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Grouping Managers into Fund of Funds

An investible index of all funds on the DB FXSelect platform

$$R_{FOF,t} = \sum_{j=1}^{n_t} R_{j,t} / n_t$$

 $R_{j,t}$ is weekly return for manager *j* at time *t* n_t is number of managers on the platform at time *t*

Indices to measure the performance of "live" and "dead" funds

$$R_{L,t} = \sum_{j=1}^{n_{L,t}} R_{j,t}^L / n_{L,t} \qquad \qquad R_{D,t} = \sum_{j=1}^{n_{D,t}} R_{j,t}^D / n_{D,t}$$

for funds that are

- live (L) as of April 2008 and on the platform at time t
- dead (D) as of April 2008 but available at time t

Excess Currency Index Returns as a Function of Four Factors

Fund	Alpha	F ₁ (Carry)	F ₂ (Trend)	F ₃ (Value)	F₄ (Volatility)	R ²
Investible	0.1 bps	0.14	0.40	-0.08	0.12	0.534
FoF	(0.31)	(6.03)	(10.88)	(-3.85)	(1.53)	
"Live"	2.7 bps	0.19	0.45	-0.10	0.15	0.550
FoF	(1.16)	(7.21)	(10.70)	(-4.25)	(1.74)	
"Dead"	-6.4 bps	-0.06	0.23	0.02	-0.01	0.183
FoF	(-2.31)	(-2.12)	(4.57)	(0.75)	(-0.15)	


$R_t = \alpha + \sum_i \beta_i F_{i,t} + \varepsilon_t$

Based on 156 weekly returns, 4/06/2005 – 3/26/2008. T-values in parentheses.

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
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
Cumulative Performance: Investible FoF Portfolio



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Cumulative Performance: "Live" and "Dead" Portfolios





Regression Results for Individual Managers

15 Managers with full 3-year sample

- » None have significant alpha
- » All but 2 have significant beta w.r.t. at least one factor
- Analyze individual managers in successive yearly samples
 - » Years 1, 2 and 3 with N= 22, 52, and 46 managers
 - » Fraction of managers with significant betas

	Carry Beta	Trend Beta	Value Beta	Volatility Beta
April 05 – March 06	9%	50%	14%	14%
April 06 – March 07	15%	35%	10%	13%
April 07 – March 08	50%	28%	37%	17%

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Performance and Style Persistence

Use successive one-year samples


- » Limited by those funds that survive for 24 months
- » Performance persistence using estimated alphas

$$\alpha_{jt} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \alpha_{jt-1} + \mu_{jt}$$

» Style persistence using estimated betas

$$\beta_{jt} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \beta_{jt-1} + \mu_{jt}$$

- » Results show "average" persistence of the group, not of an individual manager
- » Empirical results (in this sample)
 - No evidence of alpha persistence (contrary to our earlier study)
 - Significant evidence of beta, or style persistence



Crowded Fishing is Bad for Returns




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
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Crowded Places Can Be Dangerous





"There's a whiff of the lynch mob or the lemming migration about any overlarge concentration of like-thinking individuals, no matter how virtuous their cause." P. J. O'Rourke, *Parliament of Whores* (1991)





- » Value was crowded with contrarian positions prior to its surge
- » Trend crowdedness dissipated prior to a surge in returns
- Crowdedness data could inform both managers and regulators
 - » Managers want the first-mover advantage of finding uncrowded trades, that are then discovered by others
 - » As speculators enter into a trade, prices adjust leaving lower expected returns for future speculators
 - » Managers could assign greater risk to crowded trades
 - » Regulators could measure crowdedness and publicize results







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
Value Crowdedness – Updated to June 30, 2010



Trend Crowdedness – Updated to June 30, 2010







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Out-of-Sample Relative Performance to the MSCI World Index by Adding Currency Managers

	2% Allocation to Currency Managers				10% Allocation to Currency Managers			
	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info. Ratio	Std. Dev. of Returns	Excess Return	Tracking Error	Info. Ratio	Std. Dev. of Returns
Portfolio 1: Equity + Total Return FX	123 bps	76 bps	1.62	23.03%	614 bps	380 bps	1.62	20.05%
Portfolio 2: Equity + Beta Chasing FX	57 bps	74 bps	0.77	23.27%	284 bps	369 bps	0.77	20.96%
Portfolio 3: Equity + Alpha Hunting FX	182 bps	66 bps	2.78	23.62%	911 bps	328 bps	2.78	22.96%
Portfolio 4: Equity + Alpha Generating FX	257 bps	92 bps	2.80	22.84%	1284 bps	458 bps	2.80	19.48%

Sample period - April 2, 2008 - June 30, 2010

