# Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Agents (Preliminary)

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## Puzzles

#### Asset pricing

- High, volatile and counter-cyclical risk premia
- Low and stable risk-free rate
- Hard to account for with standard macro models
- Asset markets
  - Rich asset markets
  - Poor consumption smoothing
  - Skewed wealth distribution
- Can portfolio behavior help explain all this?

## Heterogeneity of Portfolio Behavior

- No participation
  - Many households do not participate equity markets, 50% in US, 70% in Europe.
  - Many who hold equities only do so in a small way

Among participants: many still deviate from optimal portfolios

- Make only very infrequent adjustments inertia
- Adjust but based on past returns (miss market timing)
- "Sophisticated" investors earn higher return by increasing risk
- Want to include these different investors in our model.

## Heterogeneity of Preferences and Beliefs

Heterogeneity in portfolio behavior could result from

- Heterogeneity in preferences
  - Survey data: a wide dispersion in attitudes towards risk
  - Risk attitudes can be influenced by wealth, education, gender, experiences, and personality.
- Heterogeneity in beliefs
  - Survey data : a significant heterogeneity in beliefs on asset return and volatility
  - Different forecasts also reflect heterogeneity in beliefs
- Can this explain why those who trade, trade differently?

## What We Do

- Extend our methodology to compute the equilibria of economies with more heterogeneities
  - In addition to heterogeneity in trading technologies
  - Now includes heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs
- One quantitative experiment
  - Focus on heterogeneity in beliefs
  - Introduce recency bias: volatile beliefs

## Environment

- Aggregate endowment  $Y_t = \exp(z_t) Y_{t-1}$  comes in two forms
  - tradeable output  $(1 \gamma) Y_t$  depends on  $z^t$
  - non-tradeable output  $\gamma Y_t \eta_t$  depends on  $\eta_t$  too
- Idiosyncratic shocks
  - $\eta$  are i.i.d. across households and  $E\{\eta_t|z^t\}=1$
  - $\pi(z^t, \eta^t)$  is probability of observing event  $(z^t, \eta^t)$
- For now, assume a continuum of ex ante identical households with CRRA utility
- Our methodology builds on Arrow-Debreu environment

## Arrow-Debreu Economy

With standard Arrow-Debreu economy, household *i* chooses consumption sequence  $c_t^i(z^t, \eta^t)$  to

$$\max_{\left\{c_t^i\right\}} \sum_t \sum_{(z^t,\eta^t)} \beta^t \frac{c_t^i(z^t,\eta^t)^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha} \pi(z^t,\eta^t)$$

s.t. 
$$\sum_{t} \sum_{(z^t,\eta^t)} \left\{ \gamma Y(z^t) \eta_t - c_t^i(z^t,\eta^t) \right\} \widetilde{P}(z^t,\eta^t) + \omega_0 \ge 0.$$

- subject to present-value budget constraint
- $\widetilde{P}(z^t, \eta^t) = P_t(z^t)\pi(z^t, \eta^t)$  is the time zero state price.
- $\omega_0$  is the initial wealth.
- $\gamma Y(z^t) \eta_t$  is risky "labor" income

# Add Trading Technologies

- Trading Technologies: restrictions on asset holdings over time
- How to impose restrictions on asset holding in time zero trading problem?
  - Remember that "Arrow" = "Arrow-Debreu"
  - Net assets  $(a_t(z^t, \eta^t)) = \text{net savings}$
  - $a_t(z^t, \eta^t)$  must be consistent with their consumption plan

 $S^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t}) = \sum_{\tau \geq t} \sum_{(z^{\tau},\eta^{\tau})} \widetilde{P}(z^{\tau},\eta^{\tau}) \left(\gamma Y(z^{\tau})\eta_{\tau} - c(z^{\tau},\eta^{\tau})\right)$ 

$$= -a_t(z^t, \eta^t)\widetilde{P}(z^t, \eta^t)$$

• Hence, any restriction on  $a_t(z^t, \eta^t)$  will also limit [·].

## Examples on Trading Technologies

Debt bounds

$$a_t(z^t, \eta^t) \geq \underline{D}(z^t),$$

No contingent claim on idiosyncratic shocks (Z-com traders)

$$a_t(z^t, \widehat{\eta}^t) = a_t(z^t, \eta^t)$$
, for all  $\widehat{\eta}^t$  and  $\eta^t$ 

Fix portfolio

$$\frac{a_t(z^t,\eta^t)}{R^p(z^t)} = \frac{a_t(\hat{z}^t,\hat{\eta}^t)}{R^p(\hat{z}^t)} = \hat{a}_{t-1}(z^{t-1},\eta^{t-1})$$

where  $R^{p}$  is the return on the fix portfolio

## Lagrangian Example

Take a household *i* with debt bounds and subject to fix portfolio restrictions as an example:

$$L = \max_{\{c,\hat{a}\}} \min_{\{\chi,\nu,\varphi\}} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \sum_{(z^{t},\eta^{t})} \frac{c_{t}^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t})^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha} \pi(z^{t},\eta^{t}) + \chi^{i} \left\{ \sum_{t\geq 1} \sum_{(z^{t},\eta^{t})} \widetilde{P}(z^{t},\eta^{t}) \left[ \gamma Y(z^{t})\eta_{t} - c^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t}) \right] + \mathcal{O}(z^{0}) \right\} + \sum_{t\geq 1} \sum_{(z^{t},\eta^{t})} \nu^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t}) \left\{ \begin{array}{c} S^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t}) \\ -\widetilde{P}(z^{t},\eta^{t})\hat{a}(z^{t-1},\eta^{t-1})R^{p}(z^{t}) \end{array} \right\} + \sum_{t\geq 1} \sum_{(z^{t},\eta^{t})} \varphi^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t}) \left\{ \frac{D_{t}^{i}(z^{t})\widetilde{P}(z^{t},\eta^{t}) - S^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t})}{2} \right\}.$$

where

$$S^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t}) = \sum_{\tau \geq t} \sum_{(z^{\tau},\eta^{\tau})} \widetilde{P}(z^{\tau},\eta^{\tau}) (\gamma Y(z^{\tau})\eta_{\tau} - c(z^{\tau},\eta^{\tau})).$$

## Time and State Varied Multiplier

Recursive multiplier (Marcet and Marimon(1998))

 $\zeta^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t}) = \zeta^{i}(z^{t-1},\eta^{t-1}) + \nu^{i}\left(z^{t},\eta^{t}\right) - \varphi^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t})$ 

All traders have first-order conditions

$$\beta^t u'(c_t^i(z^t,\eta^t)) = \zeta^i(z^t,\eta^t) P_t(z^t).$$

where  $\zeta^{i}(z^{t}, \eta^{t})$  varies to satisfy constraints on net savings and  $P_{t}(z^{t})$  is the state price.

 Law of motion on multiplier + FOC in consumption ⇒ Euler equations

## **Consumption Allocations**

The FOCs with respect to consumption for all traders:

$$\beta^t c_t^i(z^t, \eta^t)^{-\alpha} = \zeta^i(z^t, \eta^t) P_t(z^t)$$

► together with resource constraints  $C_t(z^t) = \sum_i c_t^i(z^t, \eta^t) \mu_i$ 

imply the consumption share rules

$$c_t^i(z^t,\eta^t) = \left(\frac{\zeta^i(z^t,\eta^t)^{-1/\alpha}}{\sum_i \zeta^i(z^t,\eta^t)^{-1/\alpha}\mu_i}\right) C(z^t) \,.$$

•  $h_t(z^t) \equiv \sum_i \zeta^i(z^t, \eta^t)^{-1/\alpha} \mu_i$  is the one key moment

# Price Aggregation

FOCs and consumption share rules imply that

$$P_t(z^t) = \beta^t C(z^t)^{-\alpha} h_t(z^t)^{+\alpha}.$$

Perturbed version of Breeden-Lucas stochastic discount factor

$$m_{t+1} \equiv \frac{P_{t+1}(z^{t+1})}{P_t(z^t)} = \beta \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^{-\alpha} \left(\frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t}\right)^{+\alpha}$$

- standard part from a representative CRRA agent
- this is the new part
- Depends on common homogeneous preferences

## Computation

Stochastic discount factor

$$m_{t+1} \equiv \beta \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^{-\alpha} \left(\frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t}\right)^{+\alpha}$$

#### How to compute?

- Conjecture on state contingent prices, h<sub>t+1</sub>/h<sub>t</sub>
- Use individual multiplier  $\zeta^i$  as state variable
- Compute the law of motion on ζ<sup>i</sup> for each individual
- Update  $h_{t+1}/h_t$ : moments of multiplier distribution
- Equilibrium is fixed point  $F[h_{t+1}/h_t] = [h_{t+1}/h_t]$ .

## Heterogeneity in Preferences and Beliefs

Previously, all households had same CRRA preferences, discount rates and beliefs. Now agent of type i has preferences

$$\sum_{\geq 1,(z^t,\eta^t)}^{\infty} (\beta_i)^t u^i (c_t^i(z^t,\eta^t)) \tilde{\pi}^i(z^t,\eta^t),$$

- $u^i(c_t^i(z^t, \eta^t))$  is strictly concave
- own discount rate  $\beta_i$

t

•  $\tilde{\pi}^i(z^t, \eta^t)$  subjective probability of agent *i* on event  $(z^t, \eta^t)$ .

## New Trick to Get Aggregation

How can we apply the price aggregation result without common homogeneous preferences?

Answer: Create reference economy

#### Reference economy has

- fraternal twin for each trader with nice preferences+beliefs
- has given (same) state prices
- uses social planning weights to allocate consumptions
- choose weights so consumptions are the same between twins.

$$\sum_{i} \left\{ \beta^{t} \sum_{(z^{t},\eta^{t})} \frac{1}{\bar{\zeta}^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t})} \bar{u}(\bar{c}(z^{t},\eta^{t})) - P(z^{t})\bar{c}(z^{t},\eta^{t}) \right\} \mu_{i}.$$

## Mapping to Reference Trader

The FOC for a type i household

 $\beta_i^t u'(c_t(z^t,\eta^t))\tilde{\pi}^i(z^t,\eta^t) = \zeta^i(z^t,\eta^t) P_t(z^t)\pi(z^t,\eta^t)$ 

 Consider a reference trader, who has standard CRRA preference and correct belief.

$$\beta^t \bar{c}^i(z^t, \eta^t)^{-\bar{\alpha}} = \bar{\zeta}^i(z^t, \eta^t) P_t(z^t),$$

• Define an **adjusted multiplier**,  $\bar{\zeta}^i(z^t, \eta^t)$  such that  $c^i = \bar{c}^i$ 

$$\left(\frac{\bar{\zeta}^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t})P_{t}(z^{t})}{\beta^{t}}\right)^{-1/\bar{\alpha}} \equiv u'^{-1}\left(\frac{\zeta^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t})\pi(z^{t},\eta^{t})P_{t}(z^{t})}{\beta^{t}_{i}\tilde{\pi}^{i}(z^{t},\eta^{t})}\right)$$

## Mapping to Reference Trader

- With these **adjusted multiplier** for the reference traders:
  - If markets clear in the economy with reference traders, they do in the original one too.
  - The same price aggregation applies in reference economy
  - Need law of motion for individual multipliers from original economy
  - Need (change of variable) reference trader multipliers to compute new h
- Also works on recursive utility or robust utility
- Simple mapping trick with a wide range of applications

## Computation

Stochastic discount factor

$$m_{t+1} \equiv \beta \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^{-\alpha} \left(\frac{\bar{h}_{t+1}}{\bar{h}_t}\right)^{+\alpha}.$$

- How to compute?
  - Conjecture on state contingent prices,  $\bar{h}_{t+1}/\bar{h}_t$
  - Use ζ<sup>i</sup> as state variable
  - Compute the law of motion on ζ<sup>i</sup> for each individual
  - Map ζ<sup>i</sup> into ζ̄<sup>i</sup>
  - Update  $\bar{h}_{t+1}/\bar{h}_t$ : moments of adjusted multiplier distribution
  - Equilibrium is fixed point  $F[\bar{h}_{t+1}/\bar{h}_t] = [\bar{h}_{t+1}/\bar{h}_t]$ .

## Some Remarks

- Key to our methodology: price aggregation
- Compute via simple iterative method
- No need to find prices to each market
- Allow rich asset markets
- Price aggregation applies to finite agent case

## Quantitative Exercise: Heterogeneity in Beliefs

#### Why beliefs?

- Counter-cyclical market price of risk
- Survey evidence: Greenwood and Shleifer (2012)
  - expectations of returns are
  - positively correlated with past stock market returns and
  - negatively correlated with future returns
- Adjust portfolio based on past returns (miss market timing)

## Quantitative Exercise: Heterogeneity in Beliefs

Evidence on missed market timing: US equity mutual funds



## Volatile beliefs

- ▶ Volatile beliefs: traders form their belief  $\tilde{\pi}(z^t, \eta^t)$ 
  - with probability  $\kappa$  on the ergodic transition  $\pi(z_{t+1}|z_t)$  and
  - with probability  $1 \kappa$  by the observed transition frequencies during the past 4 periods.
- Consistent with forecasting in a non-stationary world
  - Agent who thinks that the transition matrix might have changed a fixed number of periods ago.
  - Similar strategies are followed by many forecasting models which truncate the data or overweight recent observations.
- (Standard trader has  $\kappa = 1$ ).

# Bayesian Regime Switching

Bayesian regime-switching belief traders believe that

- There is high and a low regime
- In high regime more likely to get high growth rate.
- Regime switching governed by Markov transition matrix
- Regime cannot be observed so infer from past history
- Recursive relationship for probability of high regime.
  - $\blacktriangleright$  Use past history to update beliefs that regime is high,  $\omega$
  - High growth rates raise this probability.
- (Standard trader has  $\pi^h = 1$ ,  $\pi^l = 0$ , and no persistence).

## Calibration

- Preferences: CRRA with  $\alpha = 5$  and  $\beta = .95$
- Endowments:
  - Aggregate shock
    - iid version of Merha-Prescott
    - Two state Markov process
  - Idiosyncratic risk calibrated to Storeslatten et al (no CCV)
    - Two state Markov process
- Assets: equity, bond and aggregate-state contingent claim
- Non-negative net saving constraints for all agents

## Calibration

- Fraction of traders
  - ▶ 50% does not participate equity market. (bond only)
  - 40% holds the market
  - 10% aggregate-complete (Z-com traders)
- Among the 10% of Z-com traders
  - Case 1: all of them have correct belief,  $\kappa = 1$
  - Case 2: 1/2 have **volatile beliefs** with  $\kappa = 0.75$
  - ► Case 3: 1/2 have Bayesian regime-switching beliefs.

## Variation in Beliefs Results

	Baseline	Volatile	R-S
$\frac{\sigma(m)}{E(m)}$	0.41	0.41	0.42
Std $\left\{ \frac{\sigma(m)}{E(m)} \right\}$	2.78	8.07	9.28
$E(R_f)$	1.93	2.04	2.04
$E(\omega_z)$	0.79	0.89	0.88
$E\left(\omega_{\tilde{z}} ight)$	-	0.69	0.70
$Corr(\omega_z, SR)$	0.93	0.98	0.98
Corr $(\omega_{\tilde{z}}, SR)$	-	-0.93	-0.87
$E(W_z/W)$	2.15	2.33	2.36
$E(W_{\tilde{z}}/W)$	-	1.91	1.86

 $\omega$ : equity share of portfolio, W: value of wealth

## Variation in Beliefs Results

	Baseline	Volatile	R-S
$\frac{\sigma(\triangle \log(c_z))}{\sigma(\triangle \log(C))}$	2.99	2.92	2.92
$\frac{\sigma(\triangle \log(c_{\tilde{z}}))}{\sigma(\triangle \log(C))}$	-	3.07	3.12
$\frac{\sigma(\triangle \log(c_{cap}))}{\sigma(\triangle \log(C))}$	3.38	3.37	3.37
$\frac{\sigma(\triangle \log(c_{bond}))}{\sigma(\triangle \log(C))}$	3.59	3.57	3.57
$\frac{\sigma(\triangle \log(C_z))}{\sigma(\triangle \log(C))}$	6.98	7.08	7.12
$\frac{\sigma(\triangle \log(C_{\tilde{z}}))}{\sigma(\triangle \log(C))}$	-	7.02	7.00
$\frac{\sigma(\triangle \log(c_{cap}))}{\sigma(\triangle \log(C))}$	1.00	1.00	1.00
$\frac{\sigma(\triangle \log(c_{bond}))}{\sigma(\triangle \log(C))}$	0.91	0.92	0.92

 $c_i$  is individual consumption and  $C_i$  is group average

## Volatile Beliefs



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## Regime-Switching Beliefs



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## **Tentative Conclusion**

- New methodology
  - Compute a G.E. model with a rich degree of heterogeneity
  - Heterogeneity in trading technologies, preferences and beliefs
- Volatile and R-S belief active traders
  - Volatility of market price of risk up a lot
  - Missed market timing
- Disciplined by trading behavior + belief survey data.

Can also report on risk aversion and discount differences.