# Professor Laura Veldkamp's joint research on information sharing in US Treasury auctions is featured

1 Faculty News August 10, 2016 ![Financial Times logo](/sites/default/files/styles/246w/public/assets/images/uat_025699.jpg?itok=5SpaxEbn)>

Excerpt from the [Financial Times](http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/08/10/2172222/how-much-auction-information-is-too-much/) -- "Using auction data and game theory, the authors came to the conclusion that full pre-auction information sharing between dealers and investors would raise $4.8bn more revenue for the US Treasury each year than a fully closed bidding mechanism where no information is shared. The paper comes from New York Fed economists Nina Boyarchenko and David Lucca, along with NYU professor [Laura Veldkamp](http://www.stern.nyu.edu/faculty/bio/laura-veldkamp)."

[Read more](http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/08/10/2172222/how-much-auction-information-is-too-much/)