# New NYU Stern Research Shows How Platform-Led Earning Floors Benefit Gig Workers, Customers, and Business 1 Research Highlights February 10, 2026 ![Arun Sundararajan and Xiao Liu headshots](/sites/default/files/styles/246w/public/2026-02/sundararajan_liu.png?itok=rxcAvOLX)Based on a field experiment with Lyft, new, independent research from NYU Stern School of Business examines how voluntary earnings guarantees and greater transparency can unlock win-win-win outcomes across platform stakeholders, challenging the effectiveness of federally imposed minimum wage policies > In a new, forthcoming paper entitled, “[Platform Design, Earnings Transparency, and Minimum Wage Policies: Evidence from A Natural Experiment on Lyft](https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/2026-02/ssrn-6205978.pdf),” NYU Stern Professors [Arun Sundararajan](https://www.stern.nyu.edu/faculty/bio/arun-sundararajan) and [Xiao Liu](https://www.stern.nyu.edu/faculty/bio/xiao-liu) and NYU Stern PhD student [Rubing Li](https://rubingli123.github.io) examine how consumers, gig workers, and business could collectively benefit from platforms embracing earnings policies that are a market-driven alternative to government-mandated minimum wages, while balancing societal and regulatory goals with operational realities. In February 2024, Lyft introduced a policy guaranteeing drivers a minimum fraction of rider payments while also increasing per-ride earnings transparency. The rollout of this policy was staggered, first introduced in “major markets” that were more urban, providing a natural experiment to compare “treated” drivers with a natural “control” group and assess how this new model of platform transparency and earnings guarantees affect ridesharing availability, driver engagement, and rider satisfaction. By analyzing trip-level data from over 47 million Lyft rides in a major urban market over six months, the authors find that the earnings transparency policy led to a win-win-win outcome for drivers, riders, and the platform: - **Higher driver earnings driven by multiple factors** - Anticipated increase in driver earnings caused by higher driver engagement that lead to more hours spent on the Lyft platform, longer sessions, and more trips being completed per hour - **Greater engagement rates from drivers:** - Expansion of between 8.6% and 33.3% in the weekly hours that “treated” drivers spent driving for Lyft - Rides per active hour for treated drivers increased between 6.1% and 20.1% - Treated, full-time drivers added 26.4% *more* hours than treated part-time drivers - Drivers that drove for other ride-sharing platforms and drivers whose prior platform activity suggested a lower tolerance for uncertainty responded more favorably to the policy change - **Financial upside for Lyft:** - Increased platform revenue - **Enhanced rider experience:** - Increased rider ratings - Lower rider wait times in high-demand areas “Our results have important policy implications, suggesting that platform-led earning floors may serve as a viable substitute for externally imposed minimum wage policies,” note the authors. “City-mandated regulatory minimums significantly constrain the extent to which the market mechanism shapes pricing and allocation. Our research points to a natural alternative to minimum pay laws—let market forces dictate both consumer pricing and the division of revenues. Rather than relying on complex and often opaque formulas—such as per-minute or per-mile rates that drivers may not fully understand—an earnings guarantee simplifies earning structures while preserving platform flexibility. We hope our results inform future debates on gig worker protections by offering a hybrid solution that balances regulatory objectives with operational practicality.” Click [here](https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/2026-02/ssrn-6205978.pdf) for access to the full paper. ***Note:** This study was conducted as an independent academic research project. No consulting fees, research grants, or other payments were made by Lyft to the authors.* ## NYU Stern Contacts: Professor Arun Sundararajan Carolyn Ritter, Office of Public Affairs 212-998-0624, Jeff Piascik, Office of Public Affairs 212-998-0906, ## Related News - [Green Badges, Big Wins: How Eco-Labels Boost Sales, Prices, and Competition Online](https://www.stern.nyu.edu/index%2ephp/experience-stern/faculty-research/green-badges-big-wins-how-eco-labels-boost-sales-prices-and-competition-online) - [Rethinking Intellectual Property Law in an Era of Generative AI](https://www.stern.nyu.edu/index%2ephp/experience-stern/faculty-research/rethinking-intellectual-property-law-era-generative-ai) - [COVID-19 and Digital Resilience: Evidence from Uber Eats](https://www.stern.nyu.edu/index%2ephp/experience-stern/faculty-research/covid-19-and-digital-resilience-evidence-uber-eats) - [Alexa and Other Voice-Activated Shopping Devices Boost Consumer Spending, According to New Research](https://www.stern.nyu.edu/index%2ephp/experience-stern/faculty-research/alexa-and-other-voice-activated-shopping-devices-boost-consumer-spending-according-new-research) - [New Findings from NYU Stern, NYU Wagner, and Airbnb Researchers Bring an Economic Lens to the Evolution and Profitability of Short-Term Rentals in New York City](https://www.stern.nyu.edu/index%2ephp/experience-stern/faculty-research/research-brings-economic-lens-to-evolution-and-profitability-of-short-term-rentals-in-nyc-highlight)