The Unholy Trinity: Regulatory Forbearance, Stressed Banks and Zombie Firms

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Abstract

Asset-quality forbearance during the global financial crisis allowed banks to lower capital provisioning requirements for loans under temporary liquidity stress and provides a policy experiment to examine credit allocation efficiency. Stressed banks responded by increasing lending to low-solvency firms alongside low-liquidity firms. Lending was reallocated from creditworthy to zombie firms in industries with high zombie-firm prevalence, a pattern that persists after forbearance is withdrawn. Forbearance provided banks with an incentive to hide true asset quality and a license to engage in regulatory arbitrage indicating that the build-up of stressed assets in India’s banking system is a by-product of accounting subterfuge.

Keywords: Stressed Banks, Non-performing Assets, Regulatory Forbearance, Zombie Lending.

JEL classifications: F3, F4, G15.

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1 Introduction

Incipient stress in loan accounts is a recurrent theme in India’s banking system over the last decade\(^1\). The share of non-performing assets (NPA) and restructured assets (RA) in gross advances (GA) rose significantly between 2008 and 2018 (Figures [1] & [2]). The data also show falling profitability and capital provisioning ratios accompanied by a collapse in credit especially for public sector banks\(^2\).

In this paper, we examine whether regulatory forbearance measures enacted by the Reserve Bank of India during the global financial crisis effectively handed over a license for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage. We investigate whether the measures provided banks with an incentive to hide true asset quality, and therefore whether the build-up of stressed assets in the system is a by-product of accounting subterfuge. Using both bank and firm-level data, our primary goal is to examine the externalities and costs generated by regulatory forbearance.

Prior to 2008, commercial bank loan portfolios under the RBI’s asset classification norms were broadly classified as “standard” (assets in good standing) or non-performing assets (NPAs). Additional sub-classification of NPAs depending on over-due principal and/or interest, further categorized bank assets as sub-standard, doubtful and loss assets. Standard advances restructured for delays or non-payment were immediately re-classified as sub-standard and NPAs re-classified to further lower categories such as from sub-standard to doubtful and so on.

However, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the RBI introduced a series of regulatory forbearance measures\(^3\). The rationale was to provide forbearance for liquidity rather than solvency problems in the form of temporary relief with respect to loan service

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2 A contemporaneous development is the declining credit quality of Indian firms. In a study, Ansari, Khandelwal, and Prabhala (2016) find that over the sample time period, the aggregate interest coverage ratio for the corporate sector as a whole changes from a peak of 6.92 in 2007 to nearly half at 3.38 between 2008 and 2015. The study notes that the coverage ratio declines even whilst leverage is stable. Thus, the debt capacity of the Indian corporate sector declined measurably over the last decade.

3 Forbearance refers to the act of granting a concession to the borrower by the lender bank, in view of some economic or legal reasons related to temporary financial difficulties being faced by the borrower.
payments. In particular, the forbearance measures permitted accounts of borrowers engaged in important business activities to retain their “standard” classification even after restructuring subject to certain conditions\(^4\) In the absence of forbearance, these assets would be classified as NPAs and immediately subject to higher capital provisioning requirements.

With respect to forbearance provision it is important to consider the following trade-off. For viable firms the use of forbearance can allow firms that are solvent but experiencing temporary liquidity problems to continue operations. However, the use of forbearance to avoid the "non-performing" classification or simply keeping zombie firms alive can lead to an inefficient allocation of resources and pose eventual problems for lenders. Therefore, forbearance can create dueling incentives. On the one hand, forbearance may enable borrowers to sustain the capacity to pay their debts during temporary difficulties, and provide a risk management tool for temporarily problematic loans of viable firms. On the other hand, forbearance can also provide a strategy to shield non-performing assets, thus reducing bank incentives to appropriately provision for and manage credit risk in loan portfolios\(^5\).

This leads to a further observation about the emergence of ‘zombie’ firms in the Indian corporate sector. In a study, of a sample of 3,112 non-financial companies from the Capitaline database, one-third had interest payments higher than earnings before interest and taxes in 2017. Acharya et al. (2019) show in the context of Europe that while zombie lending may be initially successful in that it can keep the troubled borrowers alive, in the long-run when forbearance is withdrawn many zombie firms will ultimately fail due to their significantly lower firm quality. There is therefore a fear that the lax regulatory policy of RBI between 2008-2015 may have led to increased lending by distressed banks to zombie firms crowding out more productive lending to healthy firms\(^6\).

We organize the analysis in four steps. First, we examine the relationship between the


\(^5\) [https://www.bis.org/review/r180420e.htm](https://www.bis.org/review/r180420e.htm)

\(^6\) Thus, the system suffers from a twin balance Sheet problem where both the banking sector and the corporate sector are under financial stress. While loan restructuring may be helpful when the underlying objective is ensuring the survival of viable units, it can provide an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage when high default probability loans get classified as good loans. In the case of India, there is a growing sentiment that the forbearance policy has led to the latter result.
timeline of the regulatory forbearance policy of the Reserve Bank of India, and the nexus between bank distress, and the liquidity/solvency status of the borrower firms. We begin by classifying banks into stressed or ‘bad’ banks and ‘good’ banks based on the proportion of non-performing loans in the total gross advances lent out by the bank in 2007, i.e., before the introduction of forbearance policy by RBI. We then examine the relationship between bank level ratios and the proportion of low quality borrowers in the bank’s portfolio, i.e. proportion of firms with low solvency measures and low liquidity measures in a bank’s portfolio. Next, we analyze lending by stressed banks to low solvency and low liquidity firms following the implementation of the forbearance policy and whether the lending pattern changed once the policy was withdrawn.

Third, we examine the direct and spillover effects of regulatory forbearance on stressed bank lending to zombie firms and to healthy (or non-zombie) firms across industries. Finally, we also examine the real effects of the forbearance policy by analyzing the impact of stressed bank lending on the investment and employment outcomes of low-solvency and low-liquidity firms.

We begin by constructing a timeline of the RBI’s forbearance stance by carefully parsing policy statements in a series of official circulars posted on the RBI website. Next, we compile a matched firm-bank dataset with corresponding firm and bank fundamentals using annual data from Prowess CMIE. Prowess captures the financial statements from a wide universe of public and private Indian firms which we use to construct firm-level measures such as liquidity, solvency, firm size and so on. The bank-level measures of distress are constructed from the Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) in India published annually on RBI’s website.

Using a matched dataset of firms and their lead banker, we cover over 8,000 firms over the period 2006-2016 in our analysis to evaluate the allocation of credit from stressed banks to low-quality borrowers.

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7 A firm is classified as a zombie if the firm received subsidized credit, i.e., the firm is able to borrow loans at an average interest rate that is lower than the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) of State Bank of India and has a debt-to-assets ratio greater than 0.15.

8 https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_CircularIndexDisplay.aspx
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find a strong positive correlation between firm- and bank-distress over the period 2006-2016. Simple univariate regressions show a statistically significant correlation between the proportion of low-liquidity and low-solvency firms in bank portfolios and the proportion of distressed assets on individual bank balance sheets, suggesting a strong co-incidence between bank- and firm-distress.

Secondly, we find that lending to low-solvency and low-liquidity borrowers increased following the implementation of forbearance measures. Surprisingly, we do not find that lending to low-solvency and low-liquidity borrowers declines following the withdrawal of forbearance. Using a triple interaction specification in a pooled regression setting, we show that indirect recapitalization schemes like forbearance in the classification of stressed loans may have encouraged banks to channel debt to not only to firms with low-liquidity but also to low-solvency borrowers. Relatedly, we also find evidence for a sticky match between stressed banks and low-solvency and low-liquidity borrowers. The pattern is consistent with the concern that prolonged periods of “asset-quality” forbearance on bank lending may have persistent effects.

Third, McGowan, Andrews, and Millot (2018) suggest that there may be a policy dimension (including bank forbearance policies) to the problem of zombie lending prevalent in many countries. We focus on the match between zombie firms and stressed banks which may adversely affect the ability of healthy firms to borrow from these banks especially if the stressed banks also dominate lending to particular industries. We show that there is a statistically significant increase in zombie lending by stressed banks during the forbearance period. Also, debt levels for zombie firms borrowing from stressed banks doesn’t fall significantly in the post-withdrawal period.

The above findings suggest that the lending norms that were relaxed in the forbearance period promoted loans from stressed banks to their existing low-quality borrowers and these loans likely enabled zombie firms to continue to service on their old loans, i.e., forbearance facilitated the ever-greening of previous loans. That the pattern does not appear to reverse or change once the forbearance withdrawal was announced suggests once again the potentially
persistent effects of policies that relax lending norms.

A consequence of lending to zombie-firms is healthy firms may be crowded out and the spillover effects of zombie lending could reduce healthy firms’ access to bank credit (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008)). To test this hypothesis, we examine the ‘spillovers’ to the leverage ratios of higher quality borrowers in industries that have a high proportion of zombie firms and also on the lending of banks with high proportions of zombie firms in their portfolios. We find that the borrowings of non-zombie firms, in industries with high proportions of zombie firms, decline significantly during the forbearance period and the post-withdrawal phase shows no significant change or visible increase in the borrowings of non-zombies. Similarly, the borrowings of healthy firms decline significantly as the proportion of zombies in the lending portfolios of their bankers increase.

Finally, we examine the real effects of the forbearance policy by looking at real investment and employment. We find that capital expenditures by low-solvency firms borrowing from stressed banks declines significantly during the forbearance phase. Moreover, the wage bill for these firms is positively and statistically significantly correlated with the implementation of forbearance suggesting that, in addition to repaying existing loans, low-quality borrowers may have used the new loans for wage payments.

We are, however, unable to discern any statistically significant patterns in the capital expenditures or wage expenditures for low-liquidity firms in the forbearance or withdrawal periods. The overall pattern of results suggest that forbearance may have had the unintended consequence of propping up low solvency firms rather than firms facing temporary liquidity constraints as originally intended. We also make a novel contribution by showing evidence of a sticky match between stressed banks and low-quality borrowers that strengthened during times of forbearance.

**Related Literature:** Similar to the behavior of weakly-capitalized Japanese banks during the Japan’s banking crisis, Acharya et al. (2019) show that following ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) policy the banks extended new (subsidized) loans at advantageous conditions to provide their existing impaired borrowers with the liquidity necessary
to meet payments on other outstanding loans. Thereby, these banks avoided (or at least
defered) realizing immediate loan losses in the hope that the respective borrowers would
eventually regain solvency. We analyze spillovers in a very similar way. Our paper is also
related to the literature that analyzes the impact of explicit bailouts on bank lending, whose
findings are rather mixed. For example, Cong et al. (2019) show that implicit government
guarantees for state-connected firms become more prominent during recessions while Laeven
and Valencia (2018) provide evidence that banking crises last longer in presence of bank
guarantees. To our knowledge this is the first paper to directly examine the impact of
forbearance on the intensive and extensive margin of the banks. Our nearest neighbor is
Acharya et al. (2019) paper, which looks at the impact of unconventional monetary policy
in Europe on these margins.

The paper is also related to the literature on marginal banks, namely, banks close to
their minimum capital requirement may be reluctant to recognize bad loans either due to
sunk costs or due to soft budget constraints. Peek and Rosengren (2005) examine the
misallocation of credit in Japan due to the perverse incentives faced by marginal banks to
provide additional credit to severely impaired borrowers so as to avoid recognizing losses on
their balance sheets. Marginal banks can continue to evergreen loans (also known as "extend
and pretend" loans), in the hope that firms recover in the future. These banks are essentially
gambling for resurrection, but such zombie-lending can distort competition by subsidizing
credit to inefficient firms. Blattner, Farinha, and Rebelo (2019) confirm similar patterns
and show how a weak banking sector contributed to low productivity growth following the
European sovereign debt crisis. Storz et al. (2017) show that zombie firms connected to weak
banks in the periphery countries of the Euro area become further indebted. Sustainable
economic recovery therefore requires the deleveraging of both banks and firms.

In terms of negative spillovers of zombie firms on rest of the economy, Caballero, Hoshi,
and Kashyap (2008) look at Japan and show that healthy firms in zombie-dominated indus-

\footnote{For example, with sunk costs and ex-ante asymmetric information, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)
theoretically motivate how banks may continue lending to inefficient borrowers even after the borrower type
is revealed. Such inefficient lending may also arise due to soft budget constraints as in Peek and Rosengren
(2005).}
tries exhibit depressed investment and employment. Further, zombie dominated industries also have lower productivity growth. Giannetti and Saidi (2018) explore whether the extent to which lenders internalize the negative spillovers of industry downturns affects their decisions to provide liquidity in periods of distress. Andrews and Petroulakis (2019) explore the connection between ‘zombie’ firms and bank health. McGowan, Andrews, and Millot (2018) argue that it has become easier for weak firms to remain in the market, while more productive firms are less likely to expand. Banerjee and Hofmann (2018) find that zombies are a drag on economic performance because they are less productive so that their presence lowers investment and employment in more productive firms. In addition, there is a growing concern that zombie firms may be holding back potential growth in a number of countries, including Japan (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008)), and the Europe (Acharya et al. (2019), (Gopinath et al. (2017)).

We also contribute to the novel literature on tackling zombie firms in the economy. Papers in this emerging literature show the prevalence of zombie lending in advanced economies and argue that more intrusive bank supervision can mitigate zombie lending (Bonfim et al. (2020)). Andrews and Petroulakis (2019) suggest that insolvency regimes that encourage corporate restructuring will enhance measures to strengthen bank balance sheets.

In a similar vein to Acharya et al. (2019), Gropp et al. (2020) analyze the impact of the recapitalization of distressed banks through TARP in the US during the global financial crisis, and show that regions with higher regulatory forbearance had lower productivity growth. In line with these results, we find that regulatory forbearance results in depressed wage growth and capital expenditures for healthy firms. In addition, we show that the effects of forbearance are persistent and do not revert once forbearance measures are retracted. This

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10Indirect means of forbearance include beneficial restructuring, maturity extension or conversion of the payment structure (from regular installments to a lump-sum payment at maturity) and may be more prevalent in developing countries like India.

11Further, the study emphasizes that there may be a policy dimension to this problem including structural policy weaknesses (e.g., inadequate insolvency regimes), bank forbearance, loose monetary policy and impaired banking systems, and the persistence of crisis-induced support to small and medium enterprises.

12Consistent with the cleansing recessions hypothesis, Gropp et al. (2020) show that regions with higher regulatory forbearance during the crisis experienced slower productivity growth with depressed job creation, employment and wage growth.
is consistent with models where frictions to creative destruction processes also predict weak recovery (Caballero (2007) and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008)). We also hypothesize that forbearance measures may permanently change industry structure by altering the composition of credit to zombie versus healthy firms.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background details of the RBI’s forbearance policy in the aftermath of the global financial policy. Section 3 describes our data sources and presents summary statistics. Section 4 presents our findings on (i) the lending patterns to low-solvency and low-liquidity borrowers following the implementation and withdrawal of forbearance; (ii) lending to zombie firms; (iii) the spillovers to healthy firms, and (iv) the real effects of forbearance. Section 5 concludes.

2 Regulatory Forbearance and The GFC

This section describes the asset quality forbearance policy implemented by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). We begin by describing the evolution of the legal framework that banks can access to resolve non-performing or stressed loans. Next, we describe the forbearance policies that were put in place in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis. Broadly, we divide the forbearance policies into two sub-periods: a period of increasing forbearance between August 2008 and May 2013 and a period with declining forbearance between May 2013 and February 2018 when forbearance measures introduced in the previous years were significantly withdrawn.

2.1 Loan Recovery Processes Prior to the GFC

India did not implement an effective and comprehensive bankruptcy framework until 2016[13]. Prior to this, and in the absence of the requisite legal apparatus for resolving stressed assets, the central bank resorted to makeshift arrangements with out-of-court resolutions that mimicked formal bankruptcy laws. Not surprisingly, India has consistently ranked very low in

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global rankings of loan recovery prospects and the time taken for the resolution of stressed-assets.

Debt Recovery Tribunals\textsuperscript{14} were established to help banks and financial institutions recover their dues speedily without being subject to the lengthy procedures of the civil courts\textsuperscript{15}. Subsequently, the SARFAESI Act of 2002 allowed banks and other financial institutions to auction off the residential or commercial properties of defaulters to recover loans. In addition, the RBI introduced the Corporate Debt Restructuring mechanism in 2001 to allow syndicates or consortium of lenders to restructure the debt of corporate firms\textsuperscript{16}.

Criticism arose that the provisions of SARFAESI Act were not being used properly by banks and recovery rates were a mere 13% of the original amounts at stake in 2013-14. Influential promoters could still play off one bank against another by choosing to repay some loans while strategically defaulting on others\textsuperscript{17}. Overall, banks were not backed by the regulators in their efforts to recover outstanding loans, particularly those given to politically-connected promoters.

2.2 The GFC, Regulatory Forbearance and Regulatory Arbitrage

Before 2008, loans in good standing were classified as standard assets and subject to a capital requirement of 0.25%-1% (Table\textsuperscript{1})\textsuperscript{18}. Loans that missed principal and/or interest payments were immediately classified as a sub-standard asset and subjected to a higher

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14}The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act of 1993
  \item \textsuperscript{15}https://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/directory/r/raghuram-g-rajan
  \item \textsuperscript{16}The policy specifically targeted multiple banking accounts along with syndication/consortium accounts of corporate borrowers with outstanding exposures to banks and other financial institutions exceeding Rs.10 crores (roughly US$1.35 million). Recognizing the difficulties in reaching an agreement among different lending institutions, the policy specifically targeted exposures involving more than one lender under a consortium or multiple banking arrangements. The rationale for the restructuring mechanism was to allow loans to otherwise viable firms to be restructured through an orderly and coordinated program to help minimize losses to the both borrowers and creditors.
  \item \textsuperscript{17}Many listed firms in India are backed by promoters who are a set of persons and/or families that effectively control the firm. The term 'promoter' is defined under Section 2(69) of the Companies Act, 2013 and Regulation 2(1)(za) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009 to broadly mean persons having 'control' over a company. https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2016/12/promoter-exits-india-real-leash-reined-market-watchdog
  \item \textsuperscript{18}The provisioning requirements for standard assets depends on the industry sector of the loan and hence there is a range of provisioning rates across industries.
\end{itemize}
capital provisioning rate of 10% up to a one year period. If an asset continued in the sub-standard category beyond one year, it was downgraded further into the doubtful and then loss categories with progressive increases in provisioning rates to account for the steady deterioration in asset quality. Table 1 shows the different provisioning rates based on the alternative categories of loans in 2008.\footnote{These provisioning rates have been gradually increased since 2008. The most recent rates (as of July 1st, 2015) are 15% for sub-standard category, 25% for doubtful assets up to one year) & 40% for assets in doubtful category from one to three years. The latest circular pertaining to provisioning norms can be found here: \url{https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/101MC16B68A0EDCA9434CBC239741F5267329.PDF}]

Table 1: Provisioning Requirements by Loan Category in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset Category</th>
<th>NPA Duration</th>
<th>Provisioning Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.25%-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Standard</td>
<td>&lt;12 months</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>12 to 24 months</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 to 48 months</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 48 months</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Provisioning requirements by loan categories as defined by the Reserve Bank of India.

With the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC), the Reserve Bank of India announced a ‘Special Regulatory Treatment’ for the restructuring of debt in 2008. Asset quality forbearance was designed to provide temporary liquidity relief to otherwise solvent due to GFC-related adverse shocks to the cash flows of firms. Under the terms of this new regulation, lending institutions were no longer required to automatically downgrade the asset quality of a loan to the sub-standard category due to missed payments of principal or interest or both. If banks could claim that a firm had missed payments because it was facing temporary liquidity difficulties during the crisis, they could classify the loan assets into the new ‘restructured’ category that was not subject to the higher provisioning rates. Under normal circumstances, the loan would be downgraded to the sub-standard category and capital
provisioning requirements would increase proportionately.

Not surprisingly, banks took full advantage of the ‘restructured’ classification to avoid the higher provisioning requirements. Forbearance steadily provided banks with a route to postpone or all together avoid the recognition of troubled assets. The restructured classification was used to engage in regulatory arbitrage, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as ‘extend and pretend’, deviating sharply from the original intent of the forbearance policy, namely, to provide temporary relief for otherwise viable firms who were encountering liquidity issues during a crisis.

By 2013 restructured assets constituted nearly 70% (50%) of stressed assets for public (private) commercial banks, respectively (Figure 2(a)). The non-performing to gross asset ratio in Figure 2(b) mirrors the pattern in Panel (a). As restructured or hidden assets rose with the announcement of forbearance, the non-performing asset ratio declines. Similarly, the ratio of distressed assets was relatively flat during the forbearance period and increases sharply after the withdrawal is announced– distressed assets had, however, started increasing for public banks by 2011(Figure 2).

Taken together the patterns in in the three panels of Figure 2 suggest that the evolution of the hidden asset ratio masked the true extent of deterioration of bank loan portfolios. We see that once the withdrawal of forbearance was announced in 2013, the restructured to distressed assets ratio begins to decline while the ratio of non-performing and distressed assets increases sharply. We discuss the construction of these measures in greater detail in Section 3.1.2.

A Financial Stability Report from the RBI notes that while regulatory forbearance may be justified during major crisis periods, forbearance for extended periods of time potentially lead to moral hazard problems. It also noted that as India moved towards implementing Basel II norms, accounting discretion such as restructuring would subsequently have no impact on capital requirements. In May 2013, the RBI announced that forbearance on asset classification would be withdrawn effective April 1, 2015.

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20 See [https://www.bis.org/review/r180420e.htm](https://www.bis.org/review/r180420e.htm)

21 Distressed assets are the sum of non-performing and restructured assets.

22 See [https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/FSR29122014_FL.PDF](https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/FSR29122014_FL.PDF)
2.3 Regulatory Forbearance: The Withdrawal Phase

Between 2013 and 2017, the RBI together with the government began tightening the prudential norms for asset classification and income recognition. However, some windows of restructuring remained open. Raghuram Rajan, then governor initiated an ‘Asset Quality Review’ (AQR) that led banks to the recognize the non-performing nature of several loans previously considered as restructured assets under the forbearance regime. During this time we see a significant increase in the proportion of non-performing assets in the gross loans of banks. Noticeably, its only after 2015 (the AQR implementation year) that the proportion of restructured assets in gross loans finally starts declining. The figure provides clear evidence of the use of forbearance regulations to hide the stressed loans under the guise of ‘restructured’ assets.

The mechanism for Sustainable Structuring of Stressed Assets (S4A) was designed to determine sustainable debt levels for stressed borrowers, and bifurcate outstanding debt amounts into sustainable debt and equity/quasi-equity instruments that were anticipated to provide upside gains to the lenders if a borrower emerged from stressed status. The policy provided an incentive to capable, but over-leveraged promoters to perform and banks to continue to lend as the project is not deemed an NPA, if provided for adequately. The Strategic Debt Restructuring (SDR) scheme allowed for the conversion of debt into equity. Many of these restructuring policies, however, failed to produce noticeable results primarily because banks misused them to restructure bad loans and not to revive viable projects as was the policy intention. On 12th February, 2018 all forbearance and restructuring schemes were fully withdrawn.

Forbearance measures can therefore be broadly classified into two phases, a phase starting August 2008 and ending May 2013 where forbearance increased and a second phase.

\footnote{Other measures implemented include the creation of a data warehouse of large loans called as Central Repository of Information on Large Credits (CRILC) that covers all loans in India over Rs. 5 crore (approximately US$ 0.7 million). The database is accessible to all the banks and provides a transparent way for banks gain information about whether a borrower has defaulted with another bank. Certain additional measures to facilitate the restructuring process were announced. For example, the 5/25 policy was designed to allow borrowers to more suitably align their repayment schedules to their cash flows and service the debt for long term projects.}
beginning May 2013 and ending February 2018 when forbearance was completely removed. Table 2 summarizes the major policy events and the direction of increases and decreases in forbearance over our sample period. Although the individual forbearance measures incrementally increased and decreased forbearance, we classify years into a phase I of increasing forbearance and a phase II of declining forbearance to reflect the broad levels of forbearance between 2008-2016.

3 Data

We use bank- and firm-level data from the Prowess database. Prowess covers both publicly listed and unlisted firms from a wide cross-section of manufacturing, services, utilities, and financial industries from 1989-2019. About one-third of the firms in Prowess are publicly listed firms. The companies covered account for more than 70% of industrial output, 75% of corporate taxes, and more than 95% of excise taxes collected by the Government of India (CMIE). The database also provides information about public, private and foreign banks.

The advantage of detailed balance sheet and ownership data at the firm level is the information it provides on a number of variables, such as sales, profitability, and assets for an average of almost 49,384 firms as of 2019. Prowess also provides bank-level data built from the standalone annual financial statements of individual banks. The data are particularly well suited for understanding how banks and firms adjust over time and how their responses may be related to policy changes such as the forbearance policy.

For our analysis we use a sample period from 2006-2016. We end the sample in March 2016 to avoid the confounding the results with the demonetization policy announced in November, 2016. Throughout the sample we distinguish between the phase after introduction of forbearance in 2008 and the phase after withdrawal was announced in 2013.

Prowess covers firms in the organized sector, which refers to registered companies that submit financial statements. According to the government, “the organized sector comprises enterprises for which the statistics are available from the budget documents or reports, etc.
On the other hand the unorganized sector refers to those enterprises whose activities or collection of data is not regulated under any legal provision or do not maintain any regular accounts” (“Informal Sector in India: Approaches for Social Security,” Government of India, 2000, p. 2). The 1956 Companies Act requires Indian firms to disclose information on capacities, production, and sales in their annual reports. All listed companies are included in the database regardless of whether financials are available.

The Indian NIC system (2008) system classifies firms in the Prowess dataset by industry. The data include firms from a wide range of industries, including mining, basic manufacturing, financial and real estate services, and energy distribution.

Another advantage of the bank- and firm-level data is that detailed balance sheet information allows us to analyze how the forbearance policy affects banks according to their loan portfolios of firms distinguished by solvency and liquidity status. The data allow us to compile a sample of non-financial Indian firms matched with their bankers so that the nature of matching can be explored using the borrower and bank level characteristics. Prowess also provides data on stock market returns and financial performance variables like current assets, current liabilities, debt, cash flows, interest expenses, and so on. We use the financial variables to construct firm-level measures of quality i.e. liquidity and solvency. We also use information on real variables like the change in gross fixed assets and the wage bill of a firm to examine the real effects of the forbearance policy changes.

The firm-level data is matched with the bank-level information obtained from annual Bank Statistical Returns (BRS) available from the Reserve Bank of India’s website. The publicly available version has bank-level balance sheet data and common variables such as industry classification, credit, deposits, NPAs, restructured advances, etc.

In 2016, there were 27 public sector banks, 21 private sector banks and 49 foreign banks in the Indian banking system. In terms of market share, public sector banks account for almost 70%, private sector banks account for almost 23% and the remaining 7% is held by

\[24\]http://mospi.nic.in/classification/national-industrial-classification

\[25\]In addition there were 56 regional rural banks, 1,562 urban cooperative banks and 94,384 rural cooperative banks, and cooperative credit institutions—these banks are excluded from our analysis as they do not lend to the firms in our sample.
foreign banks. Figure 2 shows that asset quality has declined significantly post-2013 and more so for public sector banks. With this motivation, we restrict our sample of lenders to public and private sector banks. We construct bank-level measures of performance using this dataset.

The fiscal year for a vast majority of Indian firms ends in March. However for some firms the data are released on a quarterly basis as well. The bank-level data is, however, released at the end of March every year. To ensure that we use the latest available information about each firm we use the latest date in a financial year for firms’ financial variables. We also drop observations with missing values for the variable total assets which is a central variable required for the computation of many variables used in our main analysis. In our final, cleaned dataset, we have a total of 39,227 observations of firm-bank pairs over the years 2006-2016 with a set of 8,609 unique firms covered in the sample. All the regression estimations are run over this sample.

To identify zombie firms, we require a minimum benchmark lending rate for prime borrowers. We use the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) charged by State Bank of India as the benchmark minimum interest rate. The prime lending rate is the rate at which banks are willing to lend to highly-rated borrowers. We use the minimum prime lending rate as a conservative estimate of the interest rates at which even the most creditworthy borrowers can borrow.

3.1 Constructing Borrower and Bank-Level Measures

In the formal analysis, we examine both bank and borrower-level responses to the forbearance policy to examine whether bank lending to low-quality firms changed and whether banks used the asset classification benefits to their advantage. In other words, did the forbearance provide an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage? Consistent lending increases to low-solvency and zombie firms following the announcement of forbearance could indicate that the firms were distressed were due to fundamental economic problems and not due to temporary liquidity constraints. Next, we describe the construction of our borrower-level measures
from the firm-level data and the bank-level measures.

### 3.1.1 Borrower-Level Measures

We begin with measures of borrower-level liquidity and solvency indicators. Liquidity ratios are based on the portions of the company’s current assets and current liabilities taken from firm balance sheet and indicate the ability to repay short term obligations. We consider the Quick Ratio (Current Assets-Inventory/Current Liabilities) and the Cash Ratio (Cash to Current Liabilities) as measures of liquidity. The higher the value of these ratios, the more comfortable the firm is with respect to short term survival and cash availability.

The solvency measures indicate the long term survival potential firms. To measure solvency, we use Debt-to-Equity\(^{26}\) Ratio, Debt to Assets ratio and Altman Scores using Emerging Market weights Following Alfaro et al. (2017), lower Altman Z-scores are associated with greater vulnerability and likelihood of bankruptcy. Companies with EM Z-scores greater than 6.25 are considered to be in the ‘safe zone’, scores between 5.85 and 3.75 indicate vulnerability, and scores below 3.75 indicate that the firm is in a state of distress. Similarly, the Debt to Equity ratio signals the extent of leverage and measures the ability to repay long term obligations. The lower the ratio, the more comfortable is the leverage position of the firm. The measures are winsorized at 95% level for every year to avoid major outliers from biasing the averages.

Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the selected firm level ratios used in our analysis. We present the statistics for high and low quality borrowers by: solvency, liquidity and zombie status. We also test for the significance of the difference in means between the high and low quality groups. Panel A shows the summary statistics by solvency and liquidity status. We observe that firms classified as low-solvency have significantly lower liquidity measures and significantly higher total debt compared to solvent firms. Similarly, low-liquidity firms also have significantly lower-solvency measures and lower aggregate debt levels compared to the liquid firms. Looking at the panel B which splits the sample via zombie status

\(^{26}\)Assets = Liabilities + Shareholder Equity
we see significantly higher aggregate debt, significantly lower interest coverage ratio, significantly higher leverage ratios and lower liquidity ratios for zombie firms compared to the non-zombies in the sample. For the empirical specifications, we use the above median cut-off of debt to equity ratio for indicating low-solvency firm and below median cut-off of cash ratio for indicating low-liquidity. We defer the detailed definitions to the next section.

### 3.1.2 Bank-Level Measures

At the bank level, we require a measure that can capture the effect of regulatory forbearance on the bank’s portfolio of assets. We begin by constructing bank-level portfolios by first collapsing the matched bank-firm dataset at the bank level to compute the total number of borrowers attached to each bank. Next, we map the bank-level information from the RBI, namely, Gross Advances (GA), Restructured Advances (RA) and Non-Performing Advances (NPA) to our collapsed dataset by bank and year to compute the measures as follows.

We construct the ‘Hidden Assets Ratio’, or the proportion of restructured assets in the total pool of distressed assets of a bank. It is computed as the restructured assets as a proportion of restructured and non-performing assets on a bank’s balance sheet ($\frac{RA}{DA}$). Given that more granular level data is not available for tracking the overtime evolution of loans across the different loan classification categories like standard and non-standard, we use this measure with the caveat that this is an overestimate of the potential hiding of bad loans by banks in India. For the purpose of our analysis, we define Distressed Assets as the sum total of non-performing loans (NPAs) and restructured loans (RA) in any given year. This is the proportion of potentially bad loans hidden as RAs and declared bad loans as NPAs by banks. We compute the measure as the fraction of restructured assets and non-performing assets ad a proportion of gross advances by bank ($\frac{DA}{GA}$). Similarly, we compute the NPA ratio as the ratio of non-performing assets to gross advances ($\frac{NPA}{GA}$).

Figure 2 plots the evolution of these measures between 2006-2016, further split by own-
ership, into public and private banks. Panel A depicts $\frac{RA}{DA}$ steeply rising post 2008 until 2013 indicating that banks used the forbearance policy heavily, reflected in the rising levels of restructured loans. Panel B depicts $\frac{DA}{GA}$, increasing significantly post-2008 and continuing to do so in the post-2013 period indicating the rapidly rising levels of distressed loans. Panel C depicts $\frac{NPA}{DA}$. We can interpret this ratio as the proportion of loans correctly recognized as bad loans. The ratio hovered at relatively low levels till 2013 following which it spikes up pretty quickly indicating a transfer restructured assets to the non-performing category (i.e., from Panel A to Panel C). By 2016, NPAs were almost 10% of total loans in the Indian banking sector—significantly higher than other emerging markets. Also note that the non-performing loans are significantly higher for public sector banks compared to private sector banks.

Table 4 displays the correlation between the proportion of firms in a bank’s portfolio with low-liquidity and low-solvency and the proportion of distressed assets of the bank using simple uni-variate regressions in the panel data ranging from 2006-2016. Panel A (Panel B) shows the coefficients from regression of $\frac{DA}{GA}$, $\frac{RA}{DA}$ and $\frac{NPA}{GA}$ for different measures of low-solvency (low-liquidity). For example, HighDE2 measures the proportion of firms in a bank’s portfolio with leverage ratio above two, an accepted definition of ‘too high’ for leverage. LowCash1 measures the proportion of firms in a bank’s portfolio with cash ratio below one as a measure of liquidity constraints. $Q_1$ refers to the proportion of low-solvency (or low-liquidity) firms in the bottom 25% and $Q_2$ refers to the proportion of low-solvency (or low-liquidity) firms in the bottom 50% of the distribution of relevant firm-level measure in a year. We see significant positive correlation coefficient across all measures of solvency and liquidity suggesting a strong co-incidence of bank- and firm distress. We see these statistically significant and positive correlation coefficients as preliminary evidence for our hypothesis that there may be a time-invariant sticky match between stressed banks and low-quality borrowers.

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29We use Debt to Equity Ratio (HighDEQ4, (HighDEQ2, (HighDE2) for indicating low solvency; We use Cash ratio (LowCashQ1, LowCashQ2, LowCash1) to indicate low-liquidity.
4 Methodology and Results

Given the likely overlap in the set of low-liquidity firms, low-solvency and zombie credit firms suggests that the forbearance policies may have been an indirect subsidy for low solvency firms who may have not been viable without forbearance. In Table 5, we display the overlaps between the three measures. The confusion matrices dissect the patterns in lending of stressed banks. They lend more to low-solvency, low-liquidity and zombie credit firms compared to good banks. The set of high solvency but low-liquidity firms and low-solvency but low-liquidity firms is non-trivial. This is important because former constitute the ‘intended’ beneficiaries of the policy whereas the latter constitute the ‘unintended’ beneficiaries. A larger share of low-quality firms fall in the portfolio of stressed banks which signals the misallocation of credit by the stressed banks. In our empirical strategy discussed in this section, we test the statistical validity of these patterns. We begin with a pictorial description of our results in Figure 3.

4.1 Firm-level Borrowing

In Figure 3, we observe some striking patterns. In Panel(a), we see a steep expansion in the aggregate credit extended by banks classified as ‘stressed’ compared to ‘good’ banks. Though it could also be due to the fact that the stressed banks also are the dominant or systemically important institutions, hence, we need a deeper understanding of credit allocation in the financial sector. If the lending was extended to good quality borrowers then the expansion in credit may not necessarily be problematic. To address this concern, we do a visual inspection of how the aggregate credit is split between good and low quality borrowers where we use different criteria for low-quality of borrower firms: Zombie status (Panel b), Solvency (Panel c) and Liquidity (Panel d). Detailed definitions follow, but on first inspection we see that the credit extended to zombie firms show a steep sustained increase post 2008 whereas the healthy or good firms witness a sharp drop post withdrawal announcement of forbearance by RBI. There is no reversal in the trends for zombie firms after the retraction of forbearance.
For the low-solvency firms there is a consistent increasing trend in credit borrowing relative to 2008 and simultaneously a very apparent decline in credit extended to solvent firms post 2008. We do see a flattening of increase in credit around announcement of withdrawal for low-solvency firms and improvement in credit allocation for solvent firms. Finally, with regard to liquidity, we fail to observe a striking difference between the credit allocated to liquid and low-liquidity firms although we do see a bit of decline in credit extended to liquid firms post withdrawal of forbearance. This is puzzling since the intended beneficiaries of the original forbearance policy allowances were targeted specifically to address firms with temporary liquidity issues.

Next we move from visual inspection to examine the firm-level dynamics in detail to formally test for the statistical significance of the patterns observed in Figure 3 above. Following Acharya et al. (2019) we use triple-interaction specifications for our variables of interest. First, we test whether lending to low-solvency borrowers increased following the implementation of forbearance measures. Specifically, we explore whether there is any evidence for a sticky match between stressed banks and low solvency borrowers. We estimate the following pooled specification:

\[
\log(\text{Debt}_{j,t+1}) = \alpha_t + \gamma_j + \beta_1 \times \text{Stressed Bank}_b \times \text{Low Solvency}_{j,t} \\
+ \delta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Stressed Bank}_b \times \text{Forbearance}_t^{k} + \eta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Low Solvency}_{j,t} \times \text{Forbearance}_t^{k} \\
+ \zeta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Stressed Bank}_b \times \text{Low Solvency}_{j,t} \times \text{Forbearance}_t^{k} + \epsilon_{j,t+1} \tag{1}
\]

where a bank is classified as \text{Stressed Bank}_b if the proportion of non-performing loans in the total gross advances lent out by the bank is in top two terciles in the year 2007, i.e., before the introduction of forbearance policy by RBI. It is noteworthy that there is substantial overlap between the subset of banks we classify as stressed based on 2007 NPA ratio and the set of banks placed under the Prompt Corrective Action framework of RBI between February
2014 and January 2018. The Reserve Bank specified certain regulatory trigger points based on the capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR), the net non-performing assets (NPA) and Return on Assets (RoA), to initiate certain structured and discretionary actions with respect of banks hitting crossing these thresholds.

A firm is classified as $\text{Low Solvency}_{j,t}$ in the year $t$ if the debt-to-equity measure of the firm in time period $t$ is above median. A firm is classified as $\text{Low Liquidity}_{j,t}$ in the year $t$ if the cash ratio measure of the firm in time period $t$ is below median. The indicator variable $\text{Forbearance}^k = 1$ takes a value of 1 in the years following 2008 i.e. after the introduction of forbearance and $\text{Forbearance}^k = 2$ takes a value of 1 post 2013, i.e., after the announcement of withdrawal of forbearance by RBI. All specifications control for time-invariant borrower characteristics and time-varying firm size using log Sales.

The pooled estimation allows us to test the effects of the introduction and withdrawal of forbearance in the same regression specification. Our primary interest lies in the interaction coefficients, $\zeta_1$ and $\zeta_2$. The triple interaction coefficient $\zeta_1$ measures the marginal change on a low solvency firm $j$’s borrowing from a stressed bank $b$ in the post-introduction phase (2009-2016) of our sample.

Note that in all the regression specifications, we also control for the main and pairwise and interaction terms if they are not absorbed by the fixed effects. For brevity we omit these interaction terms from the Tables display.

Table 6 summarizes the results. On average, we observe a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 0.384 in the log of borrowings of low-solvency firms from stressed banks in the increasing forbearance phase. To get a more granular understanding of marginal impacts of lending to low-solvency firms vs good quality firms, we estimated the margin effects for the above regressions. We compare the difference in margins for low solvency variable when it changes from 0 to 1 at (Stressed bank=1, Post Forbearance=1) and at (Stressed bank=0, Post Forbearance=1). The difference in margins is 7% higher lending to low-solvency firms. The triple interaction coefficient $\zeta_2$ measures the marginal change.

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30(https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/PCAFR060514_4.pdf)
on a low-solvency firm \( j \)’s borrowing from a stressed bank \( b \) in the withdrawal (2014-2016) phase of our sample. The coefficient \( \zeta_2 \) is insignificant. If the withdrawal of forbearance would curb lending to low-solvency firms, we would expect the borrowings of these firms to go down once the policy was retracted. The results signals a sticky match between bank lending and borrowing by low-quality borrowers even following the withdrawal of forbearance indicating perhaps the potentially persistent effects of having provided forbearance in the first place.

Next we look at the liquidity-constrained firms. We estimate the following pooled specification:

\[
\text{Log}(\text{Debt}_{j,t+1}) = \alpha_t + \gamma_j + \beta_1 \times \text{Stressed Bank}_b \times \text{Low Liquidity}_{j,t} \\
+ \delta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Stressed Bank}_b \times \text{Forbearance}_t^k + \eta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Low Liquidity}_{j,t} \times \text{Forbearance}_t^k \\
+ \zeta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Stressed Bank}_b \times \text{Low Liquidity}_{j,t} \times \text{Forbearance}_t^k + \epsilon_{j,t+1} \tag{2}
\]

Our interest is once again in the triple interaction coefficients \( \zeta_1 \) and \( \zeta_2 \). The triple interaction coefficient \( \zeta_1 \) measures the marginal change on an average liquidity-constrained firm \( j \)’s borrowing from a stressed bank \( b \) in the forbearance phase (2009-2016) of our sample. Table 6 summarises the results. We observe a positive and significant coefficient of 0.306 on the borrowings of an average low-liquidity firm from a stressed bank after introduction of forbearance. This result is robust after controlling for time-invariant bank and borrower characteristics as well as year effects. Again, difference in lending to liquid and low-liquidity firms from stressed banks based on the margins computation comes out to be a differential margin of about 4% higher loans to low-liquidity firms. The triple interaction coefficient \( \zeta_2 \) measures the marginal change on a liquidity-constrained firm \( j \)’s borrowing from a stressed bank \( b \) in the withdrawal (2014-2016) phase of our sample. Again, similar to solvency result, the coefficient \( \zeta_2 \) is statistically insignificant whereas we might expect it to be negative once forbearance was withdrawn. The coefficient is consistent with the notion of persistence in
the lending to low-quality borrowers not decreasing following the retraction of forbearance.

As a robustness exercise, we further partition the firms into four bins based on their liquidity and solvency status. The rationale for the forbearance policy was to help high solvency and low liquidity borrowers. In contrast, we find instead that there is no significant change in loans to this set of firms in the forbearance period. On the contrary, we find that the borrowers in the low-solvency and high-liquidity bin see a growth in leverage of about 25% in the most stringent specification. This finding provides initial evidence of credit misallocation by stressed banks.

4.2 Zombie Lending

Identification of zombies: Andrews and Petroulakis (2019) explore the connection between ‘zombie’ firms (firms that would typically exit in a competitive market) and bank health. Indirect means of forbearance include beneficial restructuring, maturity extension or conversion of the payment structure (from regular installments to a lump-sum payment at maturity) and may be more prevalent in developing countries like India. McGowan, Andrews, and Millot (2018) argue that it has become easier for weak firms that do not adopt the latest technologies to remain in the market, while more productive firms are less likely to expand. Further, the study emphasizes that there may be a policy dimension to this problem including structural policy weaknesses (e.g., inadequate insolvency regimes), bank forbearance, loose monetary policy and impaired banking systems, and the persistence of crisis-induced support to small and medium enterprises. In addition, there is a growing concern that zombie firms may be holding back potential growth in a number of countries, including Japan (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008)), the United Kingdom (Acharya et al. (2019)), and Southern Europe (Gopinath et al. (2017)).

Much of the literature like Acharya et al. (2019) attributes the rise of zombie credit to weakening capital ratios of banks. A popular measure of bank capital is the Tier-I Capital to the Risk Weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR-T1). CRAR-T1 consists of the first line of defense for a bank in wake of any losses. We plot the proportion of zombie borrowers
against the Tier 1 capital ratio of an average bank in our sample. We observe a negative relationship between bank capital adequacy and the proportion of zombie borrowers. One interpretation of this finding is that if banks' balance sheets were under stress in the midst and aftermath of the great financial crisis, they may have faced a perverse incentive to lend to zombie borrowers. In case of India, the regulator enabled such lending by allowing regulatory forbearance. This happened against a backdrop of increasing capital requirements. Looking at the worsening interest coverage ratio of low quality borrowers in our sample which is coincident with worsening bank health and forbearance provision, we hypothesize that zombie lending may be prevalent in India. Again, we focus on whether there exists a match between zombie firms and stressed banks which adversely affects the ability of healthy firms to borrow from these banks especially if the stressed banks also dominate lending to particular industries. If true, healthy firms may be crowded out and the spillover effects of zombie lending could reduce healthy firm access to bank credit.

Before we test our hypothesis of a matching between zombie firms and stressed banks, we briefly discuss alternative methods to identify zombie firms from the literature. The seminal approach in Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) defines zombie firms as those potentially receiving subsidized bank credit. More specifically, actual observed interest payments made by the firm are compared with an estimated benchmark interest rate based on the firm's debt structure and market interest rates.

McGowan, Andrews, and Millot (2018) base their zombie classification on the interest coverage ratio—the choice is based on the fact that interest coverage ratios encompass channels other than subsidized credit through which zombie firms may be kept alive e.g., non-performing loans (NPLs), government guarantees to SMEs, weak insolvency regimes. Acharya et al. (2019) classify a firm as zombie if it meets the following criteria: (i) subsidized credit access in year $t$; (ii) it's credit rating (derived from three year median is BB or lower), and (iii) the syndicate composition has either remained constant, or banks that left the syndicate were not replaced by new participants, i.e., the same syndicate has already provided a loan to the firm.
In the baseline specification, we define zombies firms similar to Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008). Specifically, we classify a firm as a Zombie if the firm received subsidized credit in time period $T$ i.e. the firm is able to borrow loans at an average interest rate that is lower than the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) of State Bank of India and has a debt-to-assets ratio $> 0.15$.

As a robustness exercise, we use a set of alternative measures and additional conditions for classifying a borrower as a recipient of ‘zombie credit’. These include, (i) in addition to subsidised credit the borrower has an interest coverage ratio below one, (ii) accounting for persistent low debt servicing ability the borrower has a below one interest coverage ratio for at least two consecutive years, and finally, (iii) following Banerjee and Hofmann (2018) the borrower has a below median Tobin’s q in any given year in the industry to which it belongs. Please note that the Tobin’s q condition can be imposed only on the set of listed borrowers.

**Impact of forbearance on Zombie Lending and Spillovers:** Keeping in line with the triple-interaction pooled regressions, we estimate the following specification to analyze the borrowings of zombie firms in our sample.

$$
\log(\text{Debt}_{j,t+1}) = \alpha_t + \gamma_j + \beta_1 \ast \text{Stressed Bank}_b \ast \text{Zombie}_{j,t} \\
+ \delta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Stressed Bank}_b \ast \text{Forbearance}_k^t + \eta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Zombie}_{j,t} \ast \text{Forbearance}_k^t \\
+ \zeta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Stressed Bank}_b \ast \text{Zombie}_{j,t} \ast \text{Forbearance}_k^t + \epsilon_{j,t+1} (3)
$$

where $k = 1$ for introduction of forbearance and $k = 2$ for withdrawal of forbearance.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table summarize the results. We see a positive and significant coefficient (0.313) on the triple interaction term of zombie lending by stressed banks in the forbearance period on the debt ratios for these firms (Column 1). The positive and significant coefficient rises slightly to 0.324 in the more robust specification with bank and year fixed effects. In terms of the margins calculation, the lending is higher to zombie firms by stressed banks by 2% when compared to lending by good banks. Interestingly
debt levels for zombie firms borrowing from stressed banks does not fall significantly in
the post-withdrawal period—the coefficient on the triple interaction term is not statistically
significant. The findings suggest that the lending norms that were relaxed in the forbearance
period promoted loans from stressed banks to their existing low quality borrowers and these
loans likely enabled zombie firms to continue servicing their old loans, i.e., forbearance
facilitated the ever-greening of previous loans. Interestingly, the pattern does not appear to
reverse or change once the withdrawal of forbearance was announced suggesting once again
the potentially persistent effects of policies that relax lending norms.

**Spillovers:** These findings raise an important question—does zombie-lending crowd out
the credit access of healthy firms? To investigate this question, we examine the ‘spillovers’
to the leverage ratios of higher quality borrowers in industries that have a higher proportion
of zombie firms. To identify the granular industry classification, first, we make use of the
two-digit NIC codes available from the Prowess data. We calculate the proportion of zombies
in every industry \( h \) each year \( t \) and classify the other firms, not classified as zombie, healthy
\( j \). With this classification, we estimate the following baseline specification:

\[
\log(Debt_{j,t+1}) = \alpha_t + \gamma_j + \beta_1 \times \text{Industry Frac Zombie}_{h,t} \times \text{Healthy}_{j,t}
\]
\[
+ \delta_k \sum_{k=1}^2 \text{Industry Frac Zombie}_{h,t} \times \text{Forbearance}_t^k + \eta_k \sum_{k=1}^2 \text{Healthy}_{j,t} \times \text{Forbearance}_t^k
\]
\[
+ \zeta_k \sum_{k=1}^2 \text{Industry Frac Zombie}_{h,t} \times \text{Healthy}_{j,t} \times \text{Forbearance}_t^k + \epsilon_{j,t+1} \quad (4)
\]

where \( k = 1 \) for introduction of forbearance and \( k = 2 \) for withdrawal of forbearance.

Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 present the results. The coefficient on the triple interaction
term, which measures the borrowings of healthy firms as proportions of zombie firms changes
during the forbearance period, is negative and statistically significant \((-0.695)\) in the baseline
specification without bank-fixed effects and also in the more robust specification with bank
and industry*year fixed effects \((-0.880)\). This result suggests that as the proportion of
zombie firms in an industry goes up by 0.1 points the borrowings of healthy firms, in those industries is lower on an average by a statistically significant 8.80% relative to the reference group of zombie firms during the forbearance period in the most robust specification. Again, the post withdrawal phase shows no significant change or visible increase in the borrowings of healthy firms. This is of particular concern as one would expect healthy firms to regain access to credit once forbearance is withdrawn. To summarize, we do not observe any significant reversals in the patterns of borrowings of low-quality and high-quality borrowers once forbearance withdrawal is announced.

Next, we test the hypotheses related to zombie and healthy firm borrowings but from the perspective of banks i.e., what happens to the borrowings of healthy firms that borrow from stressed banks that have a high proportion of zombies in their portfolios? We transpose the data at the bank level and calculate the proportion of zombies in a bank’s portfolio in a year. We map this proportion back to the firm level dataset and estimate the following baseline specification:

$$\log(\text{Debt}_{j,t+1}) = \alpha_t + \gamma_j + \beta_1 \times \text{Bank Frac Zombie}_{b,t} \times \text{Healthy}_{j,t} + \delta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Bank Frac Zombie}_{b,t} \times \text{Forbearance}^k_t + \eta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Healthy}_{j,t} \times \text{Forbearance}^k_t$$

$$+ \zeta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} \text{Bank Frac Zombie}_{b,t} \times \text{Healthy}_{j,t} \times \text{Forbearance}^k_t + \epsilon_{j,t+1} \quad (5)$$

where $k = 1$ for Introduction of forbearance and $k = 2$ for withdrawal of forbearance.

Columns (5) and (6) of Table 7 summarize the results from the estimation. The coefficient on the triple interaction term is negative and significant ($-1.090$ and $-1.071$) in the baseline specification with and without bank-fixed effects. The results suggest that the borrowings of healthy firms who borrow from stressed banks is significantly lower by about 10.7% compared to the zombie firms as the proportion of zombies in the lending portfolios of these bankers increases by 0.1 points in the most robust specification.

The pattern of results from the zombie-lending and spillovers estimations highlight the
crowding-out effects of the artificially bolstered survival of low quality borrowers on the healthy firms. If creative destruction were allowed to operate, inefficient and loss making firms would exit allowing the fittest to survive. A perverse pattern appears to prevail instead—the ever-greening of loans to low quality borrowers by stressed banks and reduced access to bank credit for healthy firms.

4.3 Robustness tests

As a robustness exercise, we replace the time-invariant stressed bank dummy with a continuous time-varying measure of bank health captured by the CRAR ratio. Note that higher levels of CRAR indicate stronger bank health and vice-versa. Thus, if banks with lower levels of CRAR engage in zombie lending we would expect to see a negative coefficient. We find that for a 1% lower CRAR an average bank lends about 7% higher to a zombie borrower.

In a separate exercise, we substitute the forbearance and withdrawal phase binary dummies with a continuous measure of the provisioning rate. As discussed earlier, the provisioning rate directly captures the regulatory arbitrage incentives. Specifically, we use the provisioning rate on restructured loans. With respect to substandard loans, if a bank is able to classify a potentially non-performing loan as a restructured loan (and restructured standard loans carry lower provisioning compared to a non-performing loan) then banks are able to free-up capital to increase lending. Thus the low provisioning rate on restructured loans makes zombie lending attractive whereas the higher the provisioning rate, the smaller is the gain from being able to restructure a bad loan. Thus, we expect a negative sign on the provisioning rate coefficient in presence of zombie lending. We find that for a stressed bank-zombie borrower pair, there is indeed a negative relationship between the provisioning rate and growth rate of credit. Thus, a 1% lower provisioning rate on restructured loans corresponds to an increase in zombie credit of about 3%. On the spillovers side, we find that a 1% lower provisioning rate on restructured loans corresponds to a decrease in credit to healthy firms of about 10% via the industry congestion channel and 9% via the bank congestion channel.
We also conduct placebo tests on foreign banks operating in India. So far, we excluded foreign banks from our analysis as their ownership structure is different and ex ante we do expect them to be affected by local forbearance measures. In addition, the market share of foreign banks in the banking sector is only about 6%. We do, however, find evidence of zombie lending even by foreign banks.

We also replace the stressed-bank dummy with an indicator for the ownership of the bank. A public bank is a bank with a majority stake of the government of India. Public sector banks are infamous for their higher levels of non-performing loans. Thus, we use the dummy as an indicator of stressed banks and we find largely similar result of zombie lending and spillovers.

Finally, a concern is that the the matching between stressed banks and low-quality borrowers could be a result of the size matching of large banks lending to large sized borrowers. To address the concern, we divide the firms and banks into four bins based on the assets size of banks and firms: big bank, small bank, big firm & small firm. We re-estimate our specifications for these four sub-samples based on size. However we do not find a statistically significant relationship on matching taking place based on firm or bank size.

4.4 The Real Effects of Forbearance

We hypothesize that policies like forbearance that relax lending norms if continued over a long enough period of time can alter industry structure in industries where stressed banks get permanently matched to low-quality firms. Healthy firms in turn may have to find other lenders to gain credit access giving rise to new bank-firm relationships. We turn next to uncover some evidence about the real effects of the forbearance policy. As a first pass, we look at the association with firm investment and employment patterns. We compute real investment as the $capex_{ratio} = \frac{capex_{j,t+1} - capex_{j,t}}{Total\ Assets_{j,t+1}}$ where $capex_{j,t+1}$ is the change in gross fixed assets between year $t$ and $t + 1$. For employment, we utilize the proportion of wages in total expenses of firm i.e. $\frac{wages_{j,t+1}}{Total\ Expenses_{j,t+1}}$. We estimate the following specification for
low-solvency borrowers:

\[ y_{j,t+1} = \alpha_t + \gamma_j + \beta_1 \cdot Stressed \ Bank_b \cdot X_{j,t} \]

\[ + \delta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} Stressed \ Bank_b \cdot Forbearance^k_t + \eta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} X_{j,t} \cdot Forbearance^k_t \]

\[ + \zeta_k \sum_{k=1}^{2} Stressed \ Bank_b \cdot X_{j,t} \cdot Forbearance^k_t + \epsilon_{j,t+1} \] (6)

where \( y \in (\text{Capex Ratio, Wage ratio}) \) and \( X \in (\text{Low Solvency, Low Liquidity}) \); \( k = 1 \) for introduction of forbearance and \( k = 2 \) for withdrawal of forbearance.

Panel A of Table 8 summarizes the results for low-solvency borrowers. Columns (1) and (2) signal that following the introduction of forbearance, low-quality borrowers do not appear to have an increase in capital expenditures. In fact, capital expenditures by low-solvency firms borrowing from stressed banks declines significantly during the forbearance phase. Columns (3) and (4) show that these low-quality borrowers, in addition to repaying existing loans, may have used the new loans for wage payments. An interesting observation is that once forbearance is withdrawn, wage expenditures decline. Panel B of Table 8 summarizes the results for low-liquidity borrowers. We are unable to discern any statistically significant patterns in the capital expenditures or wage expenditures for low-liquidity firms in the forbearance or withdrawal periods. The overall pattern of results suggest that forbearance may have had the unintended consequence of propping up low solvency firms rather than firms facing temporary liquidity constraints as originally intended.

To verify the performance of zombie and healthy companies to examine whether they genuinely perform better or worse during the forbearance period, we replace the dependent variable with productivity of firms in our benchmark specification. We use the Olley-Pakes method to estimate firm-level productivity using balance sheet variables. We find that the productivity of zombie borrowers is, on average, 8% lower than healthy borrowers. This difference of 8% in productivity represents 10% of the mean productivity in the sample. Turning to the spillover channel, in industries with an average fraction of zombie borrowers,
the average productivity of a healthy borrowers is about 40% higher relative to the zombie borrowers. We do not find significant differences in productivity of zombies versus healthy borrowers by the bank congestion channel.

5 Conclusion

This paper provides evidence that the regulatory forbearance measures enacted by the Reserve Bank of India during the global financial crisis effectively handed over a license for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage. We find that the forbearance measures provided banks with an incentive to hide true asset quality, and therefore the build-up of stressed assets in the system is a by-product of accounting subterfuge. Using both bank and firm-level data, we examine the externalities and costs generated by regulatory forbearance.

We document a series of findings. We find a strong positive correlation between firm- and bank-distress measures over the period 2006-2016. Next, we show that indirect recapitalization schemes like forbearance in classification of stressed loans may have encouraged banks to channel debt to not only to firms with low-liquidity but also to low-solvency borrowers.

We also show that there is a significant increase in the borrowings of zombie firms during our sample period. The flow of credit to low-quality borrowers has led to a significant misallocation of credit, especially, in industries that have a higher proportion of zombies and also through banks that have higher proportion of zombie-borrowers in their portfolio.

We find evidence of the spillovers to the non-zombies in industries that have a higher proportion of zombie firms. Lending to healthy firms falls significantly in industries with a higher proportion of zombies and also by banks that have higher proportions of zombie-borrowers. We also investigate whether there is any evidence of a reversal in these crowding out or spillover effects following the withdrawal of the policy in 2013, but fail to do so. Finally, we find evidence of a significant decline in the capital expenditures and a significant increase in the proportion of labor costs in the total expenses for low-quality firms.

Overall, the results emphasize the possibly irreversible negative effects of prolonged
phases of forbearance. It appears that the process of creative destruction is hindered as low-quality firms on life support of new credit continue to survive at the expense of healthy firms.
References


Figure 1: Recent Banking Trends in India

Notes: Panel (a) shows the aggregate growth trends of the banks in India in last five years. We observe a slowdown in the growth of assets and a collapse in the growth rate of credit. Deposits also decline till 2016, and then rise following demonetization. There is a steep rise in the share of gross non-performing loans as a fraction of the total bank loans. Panel (b) shows the growth in advances by bank-type. We observe a secular decline in growth of advances across all bank types: public, private, foreign and all banks.
Figure 2: A Time Series Evolution of Troubled Asset Ratios

Notes: The ‘Hidden Assets Ratio’ is computed as the restructured assets as a proportion of restructured and non-performing assets on a bank’s balance sheet ($\frac{RA}{DA}$). Distressed Assets are defined as the sum of non-performing loans (NPAs) and restructured loans (RA) in any given year. The NPA ratio as the ratio of non-performing assets to gross advances ($\frac{NPA}{GA}$). The distressed assets ratio is the fraction of restructured assets and non-performing assets as a proportion of gross advances by bank ($\frac{DA}{GA}$). Panel A of the figure plots the evolution of average bank level proportion of restructured loans in the total distressed loans during the sample period 2006-2016. Panel B of the figure shows the evolution of average bank level proportion of non-performing loans in the total loans during the sample period 2006-2016. Panel C of the figure shows the evolution of average bank level proportion of distressed loans in the total loans given out by a bank during the sample period 2006-2016.
Figure 3: Borrowings of Firms Based on Solvency, Liquidity and Zombie Status

Notes: Panel A of the figure shows the evolution of sum of loans issued by stressed banks and good banks during the sample period 2006-2016. A bank is tagged as Stressed Bank if the proportion of non-performing loans in the total gross advances lent out by the bank is in top two terciles in the year 2007 i.e. before the introduction of forbearance policy by RBI. The remaining one-third of the banks are tagged as good banks. Panel B of the figure shows the log-ratio of total debt borrowed by zombie and no-zombie firms in a given year relative to the year of the forbearance announcement, i.e., the y-axis is normalized to 0 at the year of the announcement in 2008. A firm is tagged as Zombie if the firm received subsidized credit in time period T i.e. the firm is able to borrow loans at an average interest rate that is lower than the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) of State Bank of India and has Debt to Assets ratio > .15. Remaining firms are tagged as non-zombies. Panel C of the figure shows the log-ratio of total debt borrowed by the low-solvency and solvent firms in a given year relative to the year of the forbearance announcement, i.e., the y-axis is normalized to 0 at the year of the announcement in 2008. A firm is tagged as Low Solvency if the Debt to equity measure of the firm in time period T is above median. Remaining firms are tagged as solvent. Panel D of the figure shows the log-ratio of total debt borrowed by the low-liquidity and liquid firms in a given year relative to the year of the forbearance announcement, i.e., the y-axis is normalized to 0 at the year of the announcement in 2008. A firm is tagged as Low Liquidity if the cash ratio measure of the firm in time period T is below median. Remaining firms are tagged as liquid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Content of Announcement</th>
<th>Direction of RF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27-Aug-08</td>
<td>Special Regulatory Treatment Announced allowing forbearance</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-May-13</td>
<td>Announcement of withdrawal of Forbearance beginning April 1, 2015</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Feb-14</td>
<td>Framework for Revitalising Distressed Assets in the Economy-Guidelines on Joint Lenders Forum (JLF) and Corrective Action Plan (CAP)</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Jul-14</td>
<td>Flexible Structuring of Long Term Project Loans to Infrastructure and Core Industries</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Apr-15</td>
<td>Asset Quality Review Started</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Jun-15</td>
<td>Strategic Debt Restructuring Scheme for conversion of debt to equity</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Jun-16</td>
<td>Scheme for Sustainable Structuring of Stressed Assets</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Feb-18</td>
<td>Resolution of stressed assets: Revised Framework</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Major Regulatory Announcements since 2008

This table lists in a chronological order the major policy announcements by RBI pertaining to the increase or decrease in Regulatory Forbearance (RF) allowed on classification norms of stressed assets held by banks. The dates were collected by a detailed survey of all master RBI circulars released between August 27, 2008 and February 12, 2018.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Solvency Status</th>
<th>Liquidity Status</th>
<th>Firm Health Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low-Solvency</td>
<td>Solvent</td>
<td>Diff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Ratio</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>3.46 (***)</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Ratio</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.61 (***)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altman Score</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>7.30 (***)</td>
<td>7.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Cov Ratio</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>50.66 (***)</td>
<td>18.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Asset Ratio</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.12 (***)</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Equity Ratio</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>0.15 (***)</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Debt</td>
<td>5858</td>
<td>1461 (***)</td>
<td>3698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Sales)</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>5.71 (***)</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>17976</td>
<td>16720</td>
<td>20073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the selected firm level ratios used in our analysis. We present the statistics for high and low quality borrowers by: Solvency, Liquidity and Zombie status. We also test for the significance of difference in means between the high and low quality groups.
Table 4: The Relationship Between Bank and Firm Distress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>RA</th>
<th>RA</th>
<th>GA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Borrowers (Debt-Equity Ratio &gt; Q4)</td>
<td>0.722***</td>
<td>0.0362***</td>
<td>0.144***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Borrowers (Debt-Equity Ratio &gt; Q2)</td>
<td>0.695***</td>
<td>-0.00164</td>
<td>0.0769***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Borrowers (Debt-Equity Ratio &gt; 2)</td>
<td>1.303***</td>
<td>0.0408***</td>
<td>0.212***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Borrowers (Cash Ratio &lt; Q1)</td>
<td>0.384**</td>
<td>0.0310*</td>
<td>0.0946***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Borrowers (Cash Ratio &lt; Q2)</td>
<td>0.387***</td>
<td>0.00935</td>
<td>0.0407*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Borrowers (Cash Ratio &lt; 1)</td>
<td>0.973***</td>
<td>0.0776***</td>
<td>0.219***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table 4 summarizes the correlation between bank level ratios and the proportion of low quality borrowers in the bank’s portfolio i.e. proportion of firms with low solvency measures and low liquidity measures in a bank’s portfolio. LowCashQ1 refers to the proportion of borrowers with a cash ratio measure in the lowest quartile Q1. LowCashQ2 refers to the proportion of borrowers with a cash ratio measure below the median Q2. LowCash1 refers to the proportion of borrowers with a cash ratio measure < 1 which is the industry accepted signal of declining liquidity. HighDEQ4 refers to the proportion of borrowers with a debt to equity measure in the top quartile Q4. HighDEQ2 refers to the proportion of borrowers with a debt to equity measure above the median Q2. HighDEQ4 refers to the proportion of borrowers with a debt to equity measure > 2 which is the industry accepted signal of insolvency.
Table 5: Confusion Matrices for the Panel of Firm-Year-Bank Observations in the Sample (#39,227)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Healthy Banks</th>
<th>Stressed Banks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liquidity_j,t</strong></td>
<td><strong>Liquidity_j,t</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Solvency_j,t</strong></th>
<th><strong>Zombie_j,t</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Zombie_j,t</strong></th>
<th><strong>Zombie_j,t</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table 5 shows the distribution of sample across the measures of firm quality and bank quality. A bank is tagged as Stressed Bank if the proportion of non-performing loans in the total gross advances lent out by the bank is in top two terciles in the year 2007 i.e. before the introduction of forbearance policy by RBI. A firm is tagged as Low Solvency if the Debt to equity measure of the firm in time period T is above median. A firm is tagged as Low Liquidity if the cash ratio measure of the firm in time period T is below median. A firm is tagged as Zombie if the firm received subsidized credit in time period T i.e. the firm is able to borrow loans at an average interest rate that is lower than the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) of State Bank of India and has Debt to Assets ratio > .15.
Table 6: The Impact on the Borrowings of Low-Solvency & Low-Liquidity Firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Log Debt_{j,t+1}</th>
<th>Solvency</th>
<th>Liquidity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stressed Bank_{b} * Low Solvency_{j,t} * Forbearance_{t} Post 2008</td>
<td>0.359***</td>
<td>0.384***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stressed Bank_{b} * Low Solvency_{j,t} * Forbearance_{t} Post 2013</td>
<td>0.0661</td>
<td>0.0603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0899)</td>
<td>(0.0893)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stressed Bank_{b} * Low Liquidity_{j,t} * Forbearance_{t} Post 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stressed Bank_{b} * Low Liquidity_{j,t} * Forbearance_{t} Post 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>21827</td>
<td>21827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>0.933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrower FE</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank FE</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table 6 summarises the results of the regression where the dependent variable is Log of Debt of a firm in period \( T + 1 \) and the explanatory variables are triple interaction dummies indicating the Low-Solvent firms borrowing from stressed banks in the post introduction of forbearance period. A bank is tagged as  \textit{Stressed Bank} if the proportion of non-performing loans in the total gross advances lent out by the bank is in top two terciles in the year 2007 i.e. before the introduction of forbearance policy by RBI. A firm is tagged as  \textit{Low Solvency} if the Debt to equity measure of the firm in time period \( T \) is above median. A firm is tagged as  \textit{Low Liquidity} if the cash ratio measure of the firm in time period \( T \) is below median. The indicator variable \textit{Forbearance}_{t} Post 2008 takes a value 1 in the years post 2008 i.e. after the introduction of forbearance. The indicator variable \textit{Forbearance}_{t} Post 2013 takes a value 1 in the years post 2013 i.e. after the announcement of withdrawal of forbearance by RBI. All specifications control for time invariant borrower characteristics and time varying firm size via Log of Sales.
Table 7: The Impact on Borrowings of Zombie and Non-Zombie Firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Log Debt_{j,t+1}</th>
<th>Direct Effects</th>
<th>Spillover Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zombie Firms</td>
<td>Non-Zombie Firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2)</td>
<td>(3) (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Industry_i</td>
<td>(5) (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stressed Bank_b * Zombie_{j,t} * Forbearance_t^{Post 2008}</td>
<td>0.313***</td>
<td>0.324***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stressed Bank_b * Zombie_{j,t} * Forbearance_t^{Post 2013}</td>
<td>0.0167</td>
<td>0.0205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0908)</td>
<td>(0.0907)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy_{j,t} * Industry Frac Zombie_{h,t} * Forbearance_t^{Post 2008}</td>
<td>-0.695**</td>
<td>-0.880***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.279)</td>
<td>(0.309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy_{j,t} * Industry Frac Zombie_{h,t} * Forbearance_t^{Post 2013}</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.0202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy_{j,t} * Bank Frac Zombie_{b,t} * Forbearance_t^{Post 2008}</td>
<td>-1.090**</td>
<td>-1.071**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.438)</td>
<td>(0.428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy_{j,t} * Bank Frac Zombie_{b,t} * Forbearance_t^{Post 2013}</td>
<td>-0.347</td>
<td>-0.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.441)</td>
<td>(0.457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>24126</td>
<td>24126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.930</td>
<td>0.931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrower FE</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndustryXYear FE</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank FE</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table 7 summarizes the direct and spillover effects of regulatory Forbearance where the dependent variable is Log of Debt of a firm in period \( T + 1 \) and the explanatory variables are triple interaction terms as discussed following. (1) and (2) look at the Zombie firms borrowing from stressed banks in the Post introduction of Forbearance period. A firm is tagged as Zombie if the firm received subsidized credit in time period \( T \) i.e. the firm is able to borrow loans at an average interest rate that is lower than the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) of State Bank of India and has Debt to Assets ratio \( > 0.15 \). A bank is tagged as Stressed Bank if the proportion of non-performing loans in the total gross advances lent out by the bank is in top two terciles in the year 2007 i.e. before the introduction of Forbearance policy by RBI. The indicator variable Forbearance\textsuperscript{Post 2008} takes a value 1 in the years Post 2008 i.e. after the introduction of Forbearance. The indicator variable Forbearance\textsuperscript{Post 2013} takes a value 1 in the years Post 2013 i.e. after the announcement of withdrawal of Forbearance by RBI. (3) and (4) show the spillovers on the Log of borrowings of non-zombie firms as the proportion of zombies in a specific industry goes up. (5) and (6) show the spillovers on the borrowings of non-zombie firms as the proportion of zombies attached to their lead lending bank goes up. All specifications control for time invariant borrower characteristics and time varying firm size via Log of Sales.
Table 8: The Real Effects of Forbearance on Labor and Capital

Panel A: Low-Solvency Firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Capex_{j,t+1} = \Delta \text{GFA}<em>{j,t+1} / \text{Total Assets}</em>{j,t+1}</th>
<th>\text{Emp}<em>{j,t+1} = \text{Wages}</em>{j,t+1} / \text{Total Expenses}_{j,t+1}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Stressed Bank_{b} \times \text{Low Solvency}_{j,t} \times \text{RF}_{Post 2008} | \begin{align*}
-0.0171^* \\
(0.00932)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
-0.0173^* \\
(0.00931)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
0.0163^{**} \\
(0.00705)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
0.0162^{**} \\
(0.00704)
\end{align*} |
| Stressed Bank_{b} \times \text{Low Solvency}_{j,t} \times \text{RF}_{Post 2013} | \begin{align*}
0.00820 \\
(0.00619)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
0.00790 \\
(0.00620)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
-0.0116^* \\
(0.00666)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
-0.0111^* \\
(0.00667)
\end{align*} |
| No. of Observations | 22144 | 22144 | 24678 | 24678 |
| R^2 | 0.453 | 0.456 | 0.862 | 0.863 |

Panel B: Low-Liquidity Firms

| Stressed Bank_{b} \times \text{Low Liquidity}_{j,t} \times \text{RF}_{Post 2008} | \begin{align*}
-0.0105 \\
(0.00804)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
-0.00973 \\
(0.00803)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
0.00302 \\
(0.00605)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
0.00279 \\
(0.00604)
\end{align*} |
| Stressed Bank_{b} \times \text{Low Liquidity}_{j,t} \times \text{RF}_{Post 2013} | \begin{align*}
-0.00489 \\
(0.00625)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
-0.00458 \\
(0.00620)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
0.00323 \\
(0.00598)
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
0.00361 \\
(0.00598)
\end{align*} |
| No. of Observations | 24136 | 24136 | 27002 | 27002 |
| R^2 | 0.436 | 0.439 | 0.850 | 0.851 |

| Borrower FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year FE | N | Y | N | Y |
| Bank FE | N | Y | N | Y |
Notes: Table 8 summarizes the real effects of regulatory forbearance on capital & employment. Panel A depict results for Low solvency firms and Panel B depict results for Low liquidity firms. In specifications (1) & (2) the dependent variable is the capex ratio defined as the proportion of change in gross fixed assets out of total assets of a firm in period $T + 1$. (3) & (4) show results for expenditure on employment proxied via the proportion of wages in the total expenses of a firm in period $T + 1$. A bank is tagged as Stressed Bank if the proportion of non-performing loans in the total gross advances lent out by the bank is in top two terciles in the year 2007 i.e. before the introduction of forbearance policy by RBI. A firm is tagged as Low Solvency if the Debt to equity measure of the firm in time period $T$ is above median. A firm is tagged as Low Liquidity if the cash ratio measure of the firm in time period $T$ is below median. The indicator variable $Forbearance_{Post 2008}$ takes a value 1 in the years Post 2008 i.e. after the introduction of forbearance. The indicator variable $Forbearance_{Post 2013}$ takes a value 1 in the years Post 2013 i.e. after the announcement of withdrawal of forbearance by RBI. All specifications control for time invariant borrower characteristics and time varying firm size via Log of Sales.