Duke University, Fuqua School of Business University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of Business

<u>Central Bank Policy Impacts</u> on the Distribution of Future Interest Rates

Douglas T. Breeden* and Robert H. Litzenberger** September 20, 2013

Notes for presentation at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York/ New York University Conference on "Risk Neutral Densities"

*William W. Priest Professor of Finance, Duke University, Fuqua School of Business, and Co-Founder and Senior Consultant, Smith Breeden Associates. Email: <u>doug.breeden@duke.edu</u> and Website: dougbreeden.net.

**Edward Hopkinson Professor of Investment Banking Emeritus, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.

We thank Robert Merton, Robert Litterman, Michael Brennan, Francis Longstaff, David Shimko, Stephen Ross and Stephen Figlewski for helpful comments and discussions. We thank Lina Ren of Smith Breeden Associates, B.J. Whisler of Harrington Bank, Layla Zhu of MIT and Matthew Heitz of Duke for excellent research assistance. Of course, all remaining errors are our own.

I. State Prices and Risk Neutral Densities Implicit in Prices of Interest Rate Caps and Floors

Disadvantages of Many Prior Approaches for Estimating Risk Neutral Densities

• 1. Short-term option prices used.

Most options mature in 3 months to 18 months, as many markets only have active markets for those maturities. Often there are not options actively traded for a large number of standardized strike prices.


• 2. Parametric vs. nonparametric approach.


Applications often parameterize option prices with 3 or 4 parameters (mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis) and estimate implied volatility surfaces and entire risk-neutral densities. It is wellknown among practitioners that these methods can be off significantly in estimating tail risks.


3

State Prices Implicit in Interest Rate Cap and Floor Prices

- Interest rate caps and floors are portfolios of long-term put and call options on 3-month LIBOR. No option on first quarter rate, so 19 quarterly options on 5-yr floor, and 11 quarterly options on 3-year floor. Caps and floors are portfolios of long-term options and are traded in large volumes by many portfolio managers and financial institutions to hedge/manage option risk.
- Difference between 5-yr floor price and 4-year floor price is value of 4 quarterly options on LIBOR in year 5, a "floorlet." Similar for "caplets."
- Approach: Compute butterfly spreads of option prices with various strike rates, per Breeden-Litzenberger 1978, to get prices of (triangles of) state contingent claims, proportional to the "risk neutral density."
- Example: Long 1 floor with strike rate of 2%, short 2 for 3%, long 1 for 4% gives payoff only between 2% and 4%, peaking at 3%.









Butterfly Spread and Tail Spread Costs and Risk Neutral Probabilites


Figure 6F


	Spread Cost	"Kisk-Neutral Probability"
"0%" = Left tail spread: Long 1%, Short 0% floorlet	\$0.290	0.297
1% Butterfly spread (Long 0%, Short 2 1%, Long 2%)	\$0.320	0.328
2% Butterfly spread (Long 1%, Short 2 2%, Long 3%)	\$0.180	0.184
3% Butterfly spread	\$0.080	0.082
4% Butterfly spread	\$0.037	0.038
5% Butterfly spread	\$0.028	0.028
6% Butterfly spread	\$0.014	0.014
7% Butterfly spread	\$0.007	0.007
8% Butterfly spread	\$0.007	0.007
9%+ = Right tail spread: Long 8%, Short 9% caplet	<u>\$0.015</u>	<u>0.015</u>
Totals	\$0.977	1.000

II. Estimates of USA State Prices Implicit in Prices of Interest Rate Caps and Floors, 2003-2012.













III. Risk Neutral Densities for 6-Month Euro LIBOR from Dec 2003 to Dec 2012












IV. Impact of USA Federal Reserve Policy Announcements on State Prices and Risk Neutral Densities for Future Levels of 3-Month LIBOR


Major Federal Reserve Policy Announcements 2008-2013

- <u>December 2008</u>. Cut rates to record lows in financial panic.
- <u>March 2009</u>: Will keep rates close to zero for "extended period." Stock market bottoms March 9th.
- <u>August 2011</u>: Will keep rates extremely low "at least until 2013."
- <u>September 2012</u>: Low "at least until 2015"
- <u>December 2012</u>: Will tie low rates to range in Unemployment (>6.5%) and Inflation (<2%).
- <u>May/June 2013</u>: <u>May 22</u>: Given economic strength, Fed is seriously considering "tapering" asset purchases (QE3). <u>June 19</u>: Housing market is strong and supportive; tapering QE3 likely in 2nd half 2013.











V. Risk Neutral Densities for Euro LIBOR During the Sovereign Debt Crisis 2010-2013


Key Events in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis European Central Bank 2010-2012 Source: BBC, Reuters


- <u>January 2010</u>. Greek deficit revised upward from 3.7% to 12.7%. "Severe irregularities" in accounting.
- <u>April, May 2010</u>, EU agrees to \$30 billion, then \$110 billion bailout of Greece. Ireland bailed out in November 2010.
- July 2011: Talk of Greek exit from Euro. Second bailout agreed.
- <u>August 2011</u>: European Commission President Barroso warns sovereign debt crisis spreading. Spain, Italy yields surge.
- <u>November 1, 2011</u>: Mario Draghi takes over European Central Bank from Jean-Claude Trichet. Draghi cuts rates twice quickly.
- July, 2012: ECB cuts rates again.
- <u>September, 2012</u>: ECB ready to buy "unlimited amounts" of bonds of weaker member countries. Draghi says ECB will do "whatever it takes to preserve the Euro." "...and believe me, it will be enough."
- <u>May/June 2013</u>: U.S.Fed considers "tapering" asset purchases, as economy strengthens. Long term interest rates move up sharply.

DJ Euro Stoxx 600 and DJ Euro Stoxx 50 Stock Indexes Sovereign Debt Crisis: Monthly, Dec 2009 to Feb 2013












Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month Euro LIBOR in 5 Years as of Jun 30, 2012 and Dec 31, 2012. Draghi Says ECB Ready to Buy "Unlimited Amounts" of Bonds of Weaker Members. Will Do "Whatever it takes to preserve the Euro"





VI. May-September 2013 U.S. Federal Reserve Considers "Tapering" Asset Purchases

USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 3 Years 5 Days: May 21, 2013 (1.94% 10 Yr) to May 28, 2013 (2.15%) May 22, 2013: Fed will consider "tapering" asset purchases Rate distribution shifts higher, especially after Memorial Day












<u>USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 3 Years</u> <u>as of May 21, 2013 (1.94%) vs September 16, 2013 (2.9%)</u> *May 22, 2013: Fed will consider "tapering" asset purchases Stronger economy, stock market transform rate distribution*




USA Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 5 Years as of May 21, 2013 (1.94) vs September 16, 2013 (2.9%) May 22, 2013: Fed Says will consider "tapering" asset purchases Stronger economy, stock market transform rate distribution






<u>Euro Risk Neutral Density for 3-Month LIBOR in 5 Years</u> as of May 21, 2013 (2.68% 10 Yr) vs September 16, 2013 (3.10%) May 22 & June 19, 2013, US Fed considers "tapering" purchases Strong economy, stock market shift RND towards higher rates




Postscript: September 15-18, 2013 Events

September 15: Larry Summers withdraws from consideration as new Fed Chair. Janet Yellen presumed frontrunner, believed proponent of easy money longer.

September 18: Fed surprises markets and does not start "taper." Reduces growth forecasts.





VIII. Conclusions

- 1. The approach of Breeden-Litzenberger 1978 is being used to estimate tail risks and risk neutral densities in practice.
- 2. Time spreads of interest rate caps and floors give prices for longterm call and put options (e.g., 4-5 year maturities) on 3-month LIBOR. State prices and risk neutral densities implicit in cap and floor prices are realistic and recently have been highly non-normal (very positively skewed), as near-zero interest rates occurred.

3. This approach is non-parametric, using only cap and floor prices that are generally observable. No parameter estimation needed.

3. Before and after state prices/risk neutral densities implicit in interest rate floors and caps demonstrate the efficacy (and sometimes the lack thereof) of Federal Reserve and European Central Bank policy actions on interest rate probability distributions. Distributions have changed shape quite dramatically in the past 10 years.

<u>Appendix 1</u>

<u>Review of Theory and Recent Uses:</u> <u>Prices of State Contingent Claims</u> <u>Implicit in Option Prices</u>

Stephen Ross (Yale/MIT) (1976, QJE), Douglas Breeden-Robert Litzenberger (Stanford/Chicago, 1978, J Business)

State Prices (Arrow Securities) Implicit in Option Prices Breeden-Litzenberger 1978, Journal of Business, following Ross 1976 QJE.

In general, any derivative asset with payoffs $f(\widetilde{P})$ can be priced by arbitrage from the prices of \$1

"elementary claims" on \widetilde{P} . An elementary claim on \widetilde{P} has a payoff of \$1 contingent upon

 $\widetilde{P} = P_1, \widetilde{P} = P_2, \cdots, \widetilde{P} = P_N$. With these, we can price all payoffs of the form $f(\widetilde{P})$.

				Call Option Portfolios						
	Payoffs or	n Call Optio	ons	<u>Port. A</u>	<u>Port. B</u>	Port.C=A-B				
<u>P</u>	C(X=2)	C(X=3)	C(X=4)	C(2)-C(3)	C(3)-C(4)	C(2)-2C(3)+C(4)				
1	0	0	0	0	0	0				
2	0	0	0	0	0	0				
3	1	0	0	1	0	1				
4	2	1	0	1	1	0				
5	3	2	1	1	1	0				
6	4	3	2	1	1	0				
•		-			-	-				
•	-				-	-				
•		-			-					
N	N-2	N-3	N-4	1	1	0				

The following construction shows that elementary claims can be created from call or put options:

Butterfly Spreads" of Options Give State Prices and Risk Neutral Densities

Generally,
$$e(\tilde{P} = x) = \frac{[c(x - \Delta) - c(x)] - [c(x) - c(x + \Delta)]}{\Delta}$$

 $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{e(\tilde{P} = x)}{\Delta} = c_{xx}(x = \tilde{P}) = 2^{nd} \text{ partial of call price w.r.t. exercise price, evaluated at } x = \tilde{P}.$

45

(Journal of Business, 1978, vol. 51, no. 4) © 1978 by The University of Chicago

Douglas T. Breeden University of Chicago

Robert H. Litzenberger

Stanford University

TABLE 3 Delta-Security Prices*

Prices of State-contingent Claims Implicit in Option Prices*


v	Y_2										
$\frac{I_1}{M_0}$	$\frac{I_2}{M_0}$	3 Mos.	6 Mos.	9 Mos.	1 Yr.	2 Yrs.	3 Yrs.	4 Yrs.	5 Yrs.	10 Yrs.	20 Yrs.
01		fail in an na i b' an dhannac									.2¢
.12									-	.3¢	.9
.23								.1¢	.3¢	1.2	1.6
.34						.1¢	.3¢	.7	1.2	2.5	1.9
.4–.5						.6	1.5	2.4	3.0	3.5	2.0
.56				.2¢	.5¢	2.5	4.0	4.7	4.9	4.0	1.9
.67			.6¢	1.7	3.0	6.1	6.8	6.7	6.4	4.2	1.8
.7–.8		1.2¢	5.0	7.6	9.0	9.9	9.0	8.0	7.1	4.2	1.7
.89		13.1	16.6	16.5	15.7	12.4	10.1	8.5	7.3	4.0	1.6
.9-1.0		34.8	26.4	21.9	18.9	12.9	10.0	8.2	6.9	3.6	1.4
.0-1.1		32.5	24.3	20.0	17.3	11.7	9.1	7.4	6.2	3.3	1.3
.1-1.2		13.5	14.7	13.8	12.8	9.6	7.7	6.4	5.5	3.0	1.2
.2-1.3		2.9	6.5	7.8	8.1	7.3	6.2	5.4	4.7	2.6	1.0
.3-1.4		.4	2.2	3.7	4.6	5.3	4.9	4.4	3.9	2.3	.9
.4-1.5			.6	1.5	2.3	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.2	2.0	.9
.5-1.6					1.1	2.5	2.8	2.8	2.6	1.8	.8
.6-1.7					.5	1.6	2.1	2.2	2.1	1.5	.7
.7-1.8					.2	1.0	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.3	.6
9-2.0						.4	.8	1.0	1.1	1.0	.5
0-2.1 1-2.2						.2 .1	.5	.8 .6	.9 .7	.9	.5 .4
2-2.3 3-2.4						.1	.4 .3 .2		.6	.9 .8 .7	.4
3-2.4						.1	.2	.4 .3 .2 .1	.5	.6	.4
4-2.5							.1	.3	.4	.5 .5 .4	.3 .3 .3
5-2.6 6-2.7 7-2.8 8-2.9							.1 .		.3 .2	.5	
7-2.8							• •	.1	.2	.4	.3
8-2.9								.1	1	.3	.2
9-3.0								.1	-1	.3 .3 .2 .2 .2 .2	.2
0-3.1 1-3.2								.1	.1 .1	.2	.2
2 - 3.3									.1	.2	.2
3-3.4 4-3.5											.2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2
4-3.5										1	
53.6 63.7										.1	.1
7-3.8										.1	.1
7-3.8 8-3.9										.1	.1
9-4.0 0-4.1										.1 .1	.1

* Assumptions for all maturities are: r = .06, $\delta = .04$, $\sigma = .20$.

Selected Academic Articles and Extensions

Articles estimating risk neutral densities and/or applying them to price more complex securities include academic works by Banz and Miller (1978), Shimko (1993), Rubinstein (1994), Longstaff (1995), Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996), Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998), Ait-Sahalia, Wang and Yared (2001),

Longstaff, Santa-Clara and Schwartz (2001), Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003), Carr (1998, 2004, 2012), Bates (2000), Li and Zhao (2006), Figlewski (2008), Zitzewitz (2009), Birru and Figlewski (20010a,b), Kitsul and Wright (2012), Ross (2013), and Martin (2013), to name a few. Freakonomics article: "Quantifying the Nightmare Scenarios" Eric Zitzewitz (Dartmouth) Uses Breeden-Litzenberger 1978 Technique In *Freakonomics* Blog by Justin Wolfers, March 2, 2009



Central Bank Applications

Central banks have also estimated "option implied (riskneutral) probability distributions" using these techniques. Central bank applications are discussed in articles of Bahra (1996, 1997), Clews, Panigirtzoglous and Proudman (2000), and Smith (2012) of the Bank of England,; Malz (1995,1997) of the Federal Reserve Board of New York; and Durham (2007) and Kim (2008) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Washington.

Kocherlakota's (2013) research group at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis use Shimko's (1993) statistical method applying the Breeden-Litzenberger formula to regularly estimate and publish RNDs and tail risks (e.g., risk neutral probabilities of moves of +/- 20% or more) for many assets, such as stocks, crude oil, wheat, real estate, and foreign exchange. ⁴⁹

<u>Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Uses</u> <u>Breeden-Litzenberger Method to Estimate "Tail Risk" Every 2</u> <u>Weeks For Stocks, Commodities, Currencies, Real Estate.</u>

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS

BANKING AND POLICY STUDIES

Methodology for Estimating Risk Neutral Probability Density Functions

We estimate risk neutral probability density functions (RNPDs) for a variety of different asset classes using a variation of the technique developed by Shimko (1993). This procedure involves fitting a curve to the implied volatilities of a series of options and expressing the volatility as a function of the strike price. The implied volatilities are then translated into continuous call option prices, and the risk neutral distribution of the underlying asset is obtained through the Breeden-Litzenberger (1978) method.

References

Breeden, D. T., and Litzenberger, R. H. (1978), "Prices of state-contingent claims implicit in option prices," *Journal of Business* 51 (4), pp. 621-51.

Shimko, D. C. (1993), "Bounds of Probability," Risk, 6 (4), pp. 33-37.

Source: Excerpts from "Methodology" tab of Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis website, February 1, 2013. President: Dr. Narayana Kocherlakota.

50


FRB of Minneapolis


Updated with data through 01/24/2013

RISK NEUTRAL PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTIONS -- S&P 500


Log returns are based on the risk neutral density function of the underlying asset derived from options that expire in approximately 12 months.

Implied Volatilities (lines--left axis) and Volume (bars--right axis)










European Central Bank Article ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 2011 Distributions for Euribor in 3 Months

THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF OPTION PRICES DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

Financial asset prices have experienced significant volatility in reaction to the financial and economic crisis. In the context of such market volatility, investors' expectations and the level of market uncertainty as regards the future course of financial asset prices provide valuable information for analytical purposes. This article presents a technique recently adopted by ECB staff for the purposes of quantifying market participants' expectations regarding future asset prices in the form of probability distributions drawing on option prices. It shows how these techniques can be applied to money and stock markets, and the information content of measures of market expectations is discussed, with a particular focus on the behaviour of such measures during the financial crisis.

These measures of market expectations allow the central bank to better understand market sentiment and behaviour. They also extend the central bank's information set and have shown themselves to be particularly relevant during periods of financial market tension.

European Central Bank Article (cont.) ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 2011 Distributions for Euribor in 3 Months



Sources: NYSE Liffe and ECB calculations

Appendix 2

<u>True Probabilities vs.</u> <u>Risk Neutral Probabilities</u> (Normalized State Prices)

In a general state preference model:

Inserting eq. 6 for the zero coupon bond gives:


$$\frac{\phi_{tr_j}^*}{\pi_{tr_j}} = \frac{E[\widetilde{u}_{ts}|r_j]}{E[\widetilde{u}_t]}$$
(12)

Thus, we see that the risk-neutral probability to true probability ratio at the optimum for r_j is equal to the expected marginal utility of consumption, conditional upon the interest rate being at the specified level, divided by the unconditional expected marginal utility of consumption at time t. So if we are looking at butterfly spreads or digital options centered upon LIBOR = 2%, we need to compute the conditionally expected marginal utility of consumption, given that 2% rate. If assume power utility (CRRA) and lognormally distributed consumption, we get a simple <u>formula for state price to probability ratios:</u>

$$\log\left(\frac{\phi_{ts}^{*}}{\pi_{ts}}\right) = \gamma \left[\mu_{t} - g_{ts} - \frac{1}{2}\gamma\sigma_{c}^{2}\right]t$$
(19)

As expected, higher growth states for consumption have lower $\left(\frac{\phi_{ts}^*}{\pi_{ts}}\right)$ ratios. One could input

different estimates of relative risk aversion and different states' growth rates and consumption volatility into the eq. 19 and compute the estimated log of the risk neutral probability to the true probability.






		Illustration	<u>n of True</u>	Probab	ilities R	elated to	Risk Ne	eutral Pro	obabiliti	<u>es</u>		
True prob	ability = K	*Risk Neutral	mu))	Assumes: CRRA-Lognormal real growth model								
Real Growth on Nominal Rate: 1998 to 2011 Data						Real Growth on Nominal Rate: 1977 to 1997 Data						
Intercept	-3.71	(t=-2.2)				Intercept	4.11	(t= 3.2)				
Slope	1.42	(t= 3.8)				Slope	-0.12	(t=-0.8)				
MuCgrow	3					MuCgrowt	3					
		Relative Risk Aversion (Gamma)						Relative Risk Aversion (Gamma))	
Nominal	Real	2	4	8		Nominal	Real	2	4	8		
<u>Rate</u>	<u>Growth</u>	Ratio of True	<u>Probability</u>	<u>to Risk Ne</u>	<u>eutral*</u>	Rate	<u>Growth</u>	Ratio of Tr	ue Probab	ility to Risk	<u>Neutral*</u>	
1	-2.29	0.90	0.81	0.65		1	3.99	1.02	1.04	1.08		
2	-0.87	0.93	0.86	0.73		2	3.87	1.02	1.04	1.07		
3	0.55	0.95	0.91	0.82		3	3.75	1.02	1.03	1.06		
4	1.97	0.98	0.96	0.92		4	3.63	1.01	1.03	1.05		
5	3.39	1.01	1.02	1.03		5	3.51	1.01	1.02	1.04		
6	4.81	1.04	1.08	1.16		6	3.39	1.01	1.02	1.03		
7	6.23	1.07	1.14	1.29		7	3.27	1.01	1.01	1.02		
8	7.65	1.10	1.20	1.45		8	3.15	1.00	1.01	1.01		
9	9.07	1.13	1.27	1.63		9	3.03	1.00	1.00	1.00		
10	10.49	1.16	1.35	1.82		10	2.91	1.00	1.00	0.99		
						11	2.79	1.00	0.99	0.98		
						12	2.67	0.99	0.99	0.97		
						13	2.55	0.99	0.98	0.96		
						14	2.43	0.99	0.98	0.96		
						15	2.31	0.99	0.97	0.95		
*=Up to a scalar multiple				16	2.19	0.98	0.97	0.94				