Experience Stern | Faculty & Research

Structural remedies in antitrust cases are often considered the “gold standard” of successful prosecutions of monopolization and proposed-merger cases: The plaintiff has convinced a court of an antitrust violation. The violation can be “actual” in monopolization cases or “potential” in cases that involve proposed mergers. And a successful structural remedy will reduce the likelihood of future antitrust violations. Further, once the structural remedy is put in place, the changed structure of the relevant market should not require ongoing monitoring by the plaintiff (especially government prosecutors) and the court (unlike a behavioral remedy).

In principle, this sounds straightforward. In practice, things are more complicated. The remainder of this essay will expand on these ideas.

A structural remedy for an antitrust case involves a change in the structure of a market. Typically, this would involve a divestiture of the assets of the defendant company in a way that would make the market more competitive going forward; alternatively, the defendant could be broken-up into two or more stand-alone entities that would enhance competition. The divested assets could include a physical plant, a brand name, a patent, and/or anything else that – in the hands of the acquirer, or as a free-standing entity – would create the conditions for more vigorous competition.

Read the full Competition Policy International article.
___
Lawrence White is Robert Kavesh Professor of Economics at New York University Stern School of Business.